dissenting.
I do not believe that attorney’s fees should have been awarded against the City in this matter. When a city or administrative body actively participates in an appeal from its decision, it should be regarded as a party for the purpose of awarding fees. Where, however, it is a mere nominal participant, attorney’s fees should not be awarded either for or against it.1
At the outset, the City of Anchorage heard the appeal from the Planning and Zoning Commission in a quasi-judicial capacity: On the subsequent appeal to the superior court, it was properly named as a party. If it had deemed that the public interest required it to advocate a particular position, the City could have actively participated in the appeal.2 Here, however, the City apparently decided that there were no significant municipal interests justifying opposition to the appeal. The only party who actively disputed the contentions raised by the McCabes was Mr. Carlstrom, who was primarily interested in the construction of the planned unit development. Under these circumstances, he was the one who lost on the appeal; and, in my opinion, the costs and attorney’s fees should have accordingly been awarded against him rather than the City.
I also differ from the majority in regard to the court’s role in public interest litigation. The opinion seems to take the position that such litigation should be actively encouraged. In my view, our function is not to encourage litigation of any sort. On the other hand, I believe that we should strive to prevent our courts from becoming inaccessible, as a practical matter, to those who seek to vindicate rights shared by the public. This concern is similar to that evinced by the Supreme Court in Newman v. Piggie Park Enterprises, Inc., 390 U.S. 400, 81 S.Ct. 964, 19 L.Ed.2d 1263 (1968). The Court noted that few parties would be in a position to advance the public interest if successful plaintiffs were routinely forced to bear their own attorney’s fees. For similar reasons, I agree that in appropriate cases, it is proper to deny an award of fees against an unsuccessful plaintiff.3 Moreover, where a sufficient public interest is involved/it may be appropriate to award full attorney’s fees to a successful plaintiff to the extent that they are reasonable.
In any “public interest” litigation, the plaintiff must also have some direct and immediate interest.4 Moreover, in most litigation, a party can usually contend that his position represents some public interest. For example, a plaintiff in an automobile collision case can say that he is promoting the public interest in preventing negligent driving. Although specific standards for *996determining whether the requisite public interest exists have not been articulated, a few general principles do emerge from those cases where the issue has been raised.
Where the sums at stake in the controversy are sufficiently large to prompt suit regardless of the public interest, an award of attorney’s fees against the losing party has been found reasonable. In such cases, the concern that fear of expenses will significantly deter citizens from litigating questions of general interest to the community is inapplicable. Mobil Oil Corp. v. Local Boundary Comm., 518 P.2d 92, 109 (Alaska 1974). Similarly, questions which primarily affect the rights of the parties before the court lack the requisite public character to prohibit an award, even if some public or constitutional issues are involved. Munroe v. City Council for the City of Anchorage, supra (challenge to denial of application for special exception to applicable zoning ordinances); Kelly Supply Co., Inc. v. City of Anchorage, 516 P.2d 1206, 1211 (Alaska 1973) (challenge to refusal to permit nonconforming use).
In each case, the court must weigh the private motivation for the lawsuit against the extent of the public interest involved. Here, as owners of property adjoining the proposed development, the McCabes had a significant personal interest. While their interest was doubtlessly shared by others in the neighborhood, and to some extent generally by others in Anchorage, it hardly manifests the same degree of public importance as the residency requirement for candidates for political office,5 prohibiting racial discrimination in restaurants6 or enforcing compliance with federal statutes in construction of highways.7 As in Munroe v. City Council for the City of Anchorage, the private property interests of the McCabes appear the paramount motivation for the lawsuit, while the public interest seems of somewhat marginal significance. Accordingly, I would remand for a redetermination of reasonable attorney’s fees sufficient to partially compensate plaintiff.8
. For example, it is customary not to assess fees against the Alaska Workmen’s Compensation Board when it does not actively participate in appeals from its awards although it is named as a party. See, e. g., Alaska Workmen's Compensation Board v. Marsh, 550 P.2d 805 (Alaska 1976); Vetter v. Alaska Workmen’s Compensation Board, 524 P.2d 264 (Alaska 1974).
. Cf. Munroe v. City Council for the City of Anchorage, 545 P.2d 165, opn. on rehearing, 547 P.2d 839 (Alaska 1976).
. See Gilbert v. State, 526 P.2d 1131 (Alaska 1974).
. Sierra Club v. Morton, 405 U.S. 727, 732-36, 92 S.Ct. 1361, 31 L.Ed.2d 636, 641-42 (1972).
. Gilbert, supra.
. Newman v. Piggie Park Enterprises, Inc., supra.
. La Raya Unida v. Volpe, 57 F.R.D. 94 (N.D.Cal.1972).
. Malvo v. J. C. Penney Co., Inc., 512 P.2d 575 (Alaska 1973).