concurring specially, in which RAPER, Justice, joins.
I concur in the result, believing, however, that the holding that § 1-7.7, W.S.1957, 1976 IntSupp., cannot be applied retrospectively makes a complete and proper basis for the disposal thereof, and do not join in the discussion of the applicability of § 1-7.7 to this set of facts.
RAPER, Justice,specially concurring.
I would only add to the remarks of the Chief Justice, cases that clearly support his position, holding that questions of academic interest and potentially determinative when not requisite to an adjudication will not be discussed. Wallace v. Casper Adjustment Service, Wyo., 1972, 500 P.2d 72; Druley v. Houdesheldt, 1956, 75 Wyo. 155, 294 P.2d 351, reh. den. 296 P.2d 251. There is no need to anticipate the application of the statute and, in doing so, the majority is rendering an advisory opinion. Retrospec-tivity was the only question and that is well disposed of by that part of the opinion, entitled, “RETROSPECTIVE APPLICATION OF SECTION 1-7.7.” It will be soon enough to consider the effect of the amendment and its application in a real case arising when § 1-7.7 is in force and effect. Until we see it in operation, we should not precast its future. The majority’s utterances beyond retrospectivity are no more than obiter dicta.