I dissent.
R.C.M.1947, § 92-838, provides that “Whenever this act or any part or section thereof is interpreted by a court, it shall be liberally construed by such court.”
This court has consistently held that it means “liberally construed” in favor of the claimant. See McCoy v. Mike Horse Mining & Milling Co., 126 Mont. 435, 440, 252 P.2d 1036; Tabor v. Industrial Acc. Fund, 126 Mont. 240, 242, 247 P.2d 472; Gaffney v. Ind. Acc. Bd., 129 Mont. 394, 400, 287 P.2d 256; Grief v. Ind. Acc. Fund, 108. Mont. 519, 93 P.2d 961.
There was testimony to indicate the appellant was hired to do any work that was required for the partnership, and that the partnership work had priority over work on the residence. The various jobs done by the appellant, including work being performed at the time of the appellant’s injury, were consistent with this understanding.
There are a number of factors which support a finding that the employer-employee relationship existed between the partnership and the appellant, and which show that the partners looked upon the construction of Dan Zeiler’s house as being closely related to the partnership business and to the advantage and benefit of the partnership. These factors are as follows: In addition to the appellant, other persons were employed by the partnership and worked on the construction of the house. The *57testimony shows that tools and equipment of the partnership were used in building the house. There was evidence that Joe Zeiler, the other partner, approved and ratified these other employees working on the residence, at least he did not at the time of the industrial accident herein nor the time of the trial appear to contest this statement of his brother. These employees were paid out of partnership funds for their work. Other indications that this work was not considered by the partners as entirely foreign to the partnership activities was evidence that the partnership employees had been used at a prior time on the construction of the home of Joe Zeiler, the other brother.
There was also testimony to the effect that the financing of Dan Zeiler’s house was through the partnership; that the partners looked upon the payment out of partnership funds of the cost of construction as a form of reimbursement to the partner. Dan Zeiler testified that the plans for his residence included office space to be used in the furtherance of the partnership business. There was also testimony indicating that the partners considered that it was in the interest of the partnership to furnish regular employment to the appellant in order to have him available for the later construction of the slaughter house and the feed lot.
There was testimony to show the partnership employees worked on the houses of Dan Zeiler and Joe Zeiler when there was no regular work to be done at the meat market. The testimony indicated that the partners considered it to be of a benefit to the partnership to maintain a regular working force by utilizing their employees fully, doing any work that was available and not having to lay any of them off during the slow periods.
Another factor indicating employer-employee relationship was the employer’s first report of injury which was submitted to the Industrial Accident Board by Dan Zeiler and Joe Zeiler, doing business as the Hardin Meat Market.
In considering the acts of the alleged partner as indicating the relationship of an employer-employee relationship, see 99 *58C.J.S. "Workmen’s Compensation § 64, p. 278, wherein it is said: “* * * the fact that he reports an injury to the insurance company tends to indicate that he considered such relationship to exist between himself and the injured person.” Ryder v. Johnson, 313 Mich. 702, 22 N.W.2d 43.
It is my opinion that the understanding of the party at the time of the appellant’s employment, the subsequent actions of the parties, the integral relationship between the partnership activities and the work on Dan Zeiler’s house support a finding that the relationship of employer and employee existed between the partnership and the appellant at the time of the appellant’s injury, and that therefore the findings of the Industrial Accident Board and the district court were contrary to a preponderance of the evidence. The judgment should therefore have been reversed and the cause remanded to the district court with instructions to remand proceedings to the Industrial Accident Board for the allowance of compensation to the appellant, Edmund Marker.