dissenting.
I respectfully dissent. I do not agree with the majority that the insurance policy issued in 1972 covering Mr. Hicks’ 1969 Ford, was a “renewal” of the 1968 policy covering his 1965 Ford. In my opinion the 1972 policy was a new and distinct insurance policy which was unaffected by Mr. Hicks’ rejection of uninsured motorist coverage in the 1968 policy.
Our uninsured motorist statute, 36 O.S. 3636(A) provides that no liability policy shall be issued without uninsured motorist coverage, except that 3636(F) gives the named insured the right to reject such coverage in writing. § 3636(F) provides:
“The named insured shall have the right to reject such uninsured motorist coverage in writing, and except that unless the named insured requests such coverage in writing, such coverage need not be provided in or supplemental to a renewal policy where the named insured had rejected the coverage in connection with a policy previously issued to him by the same insurer.” (emphasis added)
The exception is clearly limited to an actual renewal of the original insurance policy.
This was a new contract. It involved a different subject matter, the types of coverage were different and the premiums were for a different amount.
I am persuaded by the reasoning of Russell v. State Farm Mutual Automobile Ins. Co., 47 Mich.App. 677, 209 N.W.2d 815 (1973) upon which appellants rely. In Russell, supra, the insured claimed a third policy issued to him by State Farm was a renewal of the first policy issued to him which did not have a subrogation clause on medical coverage. The third policy did contain a subrogation clause. The Michigan court noted that aside from a lapse of coverage, the subject matter of the two policies was entirely different. The first policy insured a 1964 car and the third, a 1968 vehicle.
The court stated:
“A renewal implies a fixed contract and the expiration of the original coverage. Attorney General, ex rel. Comm. of Ins. v. Lapeer Farmers Mutual Fire Ins. Assn., 297 Mich. 174, 297 N.W. 232 (1941). In the case at bar, there was not a fixed contract with respect to the first and third policies of insurance. With respect to these policies, the coverage, the premiums and the subject matter were different. Thus, there certainly was not a fixed contract in this case.”
Contracts of insurance are controlled by the same principles of law that are applicable to any other contract. I am not aware of any authority in the law of contracts which supports the notion that once parties have entered into a contract regarding subject matter “X”, a subsequent and separate *635contract between them regarding subject matter “Y” is a renewal of the first contract.
Our mandatory uninsured motorist statute is remedial in nature. Its purpose is to provide protection against injuries suffered by reason of uninsured and financially irresponsible motorists, and it must be liberally construed to effect its intended purpose. See, e. g., Van Hoozer v. Farmer’s Ins. Exchange, 219 Kan. 595, 549 P.2d 1354 (1976); Chavez v. State Farm Mutual Ins. Co., 87 N.M. 327, 533 P.2d 100 (1975). See, also, Annot. Uninsured Motorist Coverage Waiver, 55 A.L.R.3d 216.
Under the majority decision, once an insured rejects uninsured motorist coverage, ANY subsequent policy issued by the insurer need not comply with the mandatory requirements of 36 O.S.1971, § 3636, for it will merely be a renewal of the original policy. This will be so in spite of the fact that it is a new and distinct policy which insures an entirely different subject matter. I believe this result is against the clear public policy of the State of Oklahoma and is also contrary to basic rules of contract law.
I would reverse the judgment of the trial court.
I am authorized to state that Chief Justice HODGES joins me in this Dissent.
DOOLIN, Justice,dissenting:
I not only agree with the opinions and statements made by Justice Simms in his dissent but would dissent also on the grounds that the appellants by their pleadings have raised a question of fact, as to whether or not deceased, knowingly and voluntarily rejected coverage on the “subsequent” policy. To decide this question by summary judgment is to require the opponent of the motion to carry the burden of proof.