DISSENTING OPINION OF
MIZUHA, J.The right of members of the press to remain silent as to confidential sources of neAVs and to be free from compulsory testimony divulging such sources Avas not recognized under the English common law. However, James Madison, the proponent in the First Congress of the First Amendment, wrote that “the state of the press under the common laiv, cannot * * * be the standard of its freedom in the United States.” (VI Writings of James Madison 1790-1802, 387),
The Supreme Court of the United States in the case of Bridges v. California, 314 U.S. 252, 256, 86 L.Ed. 192, 204, confirmed Madison’s opinion and held that:
“No purpose in ratifying the Bill of Rights was clearer than that of securing for the people of the United States much greater freedom of religion, expression, assembly, and petition than the people of Great Britain had ever enjoyed. * * * And since the same unequivocal language is used with respect to freedom of the press, it signifies a similar enlargement of that concept as wdl. * * * [T]he only conclusion supported by history is that the unqualified prohibitions laid down by the framers Avere intended to give to liberty of the press, as to the other liberties, the broadest scope that could be countenanced in an orderly society.”
*353Bestraints against the freedom of press clause, applied at the stage of news dissemination, have been invalidated. Near v. Minnesota, 283 U.S. 697, 716, 75 L.Ed. 1357. Judicial protection of the press has prevented forced disclosure of the identity of those who distributed or sponsored handbills and booklets, Talley v. California, 362 U.S. 60, 64, 4 L.Ed.2d 559, and forced disclosure of identity at the last step of the news dissemination process — the purchaser of the books. Rumely v. United States, 197 F.2d 166, 174 (D.C. Cir. 1952), aff’d on other grounds, 345 U.S. 41.
Forced disclosure of certain relationships may interfere as effectively with the exercise of the First Amendment liberties as direct governmental restraints against such exercise. Shelton v. Tucker, 364 U.S. 479, 5 L.Ed.2d 231. The protection granted to the freedom of the press cannot be limited to any particular way of abridging it. Near v. Minnesota, supra; Grosjean v. American Press Co., 297 U.S. 233, 249, 80 L.Ed. 660.
“* * * [T]he fact that no direct restraint or punishment is imposed upon speech or assembly does not determine the free speech question. Under some circumstances, indirect ‘discouragements’ undoubtedly have the same coercive effect upon the exercise of First Amendment rights as imprisonment, fines, injunctions or taxes.” American Communications Assn., CIO v. Douds, 339 U.S. 382, 402, 94 L.Ed. 925.
“* * * [Abridgement of such rights [of free speech, press and association], even though unintended, may inevitably follow from varied forms of governmental action.” N.A.A.C.P. v. Alabama, 357 U.S. 449, 461. See also Bates v. City of Little Rock, 361 U.S. 516, 522-23 and Watkins v. United States, 354 U.S. 178, 197-99.
Beeognizing the principle that the First Amendment *354includes in its sweep the gathering of news, the Supreme Court of the United States in Associated Press v. United States, 326 U.S. 1, 89 L.Ed. 2013, stated:
“That [the First] Amendment rests on the assumption that the widest possible dissemination of information from diverse and antagonistic sources is essential to the welfare of the public, that a free press is a condition of a free society.” Associated Press v. United States, supra at 20.
Not only does the Amendment constitute a “command that the government itself shall not impede the free flow of ideas” but also “affords not the slightest support for the contention that a combination to restrain trade in news and views has any constitutional immunity.” Id. at 20.
Mr. Justice Murphy in his dissent, stated:
“Nor can we escape the fact that governmental action directly aimed at the methods or conditions of such collection or distribution is an interference with the press, however differing in degree it may be from governmental restraints on written or spoken utterances themselves.” Id. at 51. See also Associated Press v. KVOS, 80 F.2d 575, rav’d on jurisdictional grounds, 299 U.S. 269.
News gathering and news dissemination are inseparable aspects of a single publishing process and should not be separable in law, if we are to give to liberty of the press “the broadest scope that could be countenanced in an orderly society.” Bridges v. California, supra at 265. Writers of note have urged the protection and maintenance of the broad scope of the freedom of the press. The noted American author and reporter, Dorothy Thompson, has stated:
“The suggestion that freedom of reporting can exclude access to facts is extremely dangerous doc*355trine. The gleaning of facts is essential to knowledge, without which the right to publish is empty — and its exercise irresponsible.” Dorothy Thompson quoted by William O. Douglas in “The Right of the People” 81 (1958).
Dr. Wallace Parks in The George Washington Law Review:
“ ‘* * * It is certainly reasonable to conclude that freedom of the press and speech under contemporary conditions includes the right to gather information from government agencies and stands as a constitutional prohibition against all forms of withholding information beyond that reasonably required for the exercise of delegated powers or the protection of other rights. In view of the fact that the general availability of government information is essential to the exercise of the role entrusted by the Constitution to voters, to ‘free publics’, and the Congress, it would appear that information can be withheld constitutionally only in particular situations when it is decided by competent authority not only that its release would affect adversely other rights or would interfere with the exercise of granted powers but also that'on balance the over-all public interest requires withholding. * * *.’ ” Dr. Wallace Parks, 26 The George Washington Law Review 1, 12 (1957).
Siebert and Rvniker in the “Editor and Publisher”:
“ ‘News channels which prove valuable in unearthing such examples of public scandals remain so only as long as the source remains secret. Honest officials, and occasionally dishonest persons, Avho can furnish necessary information, cannot afford to jeopardize their freedom or their jobs by permitting their names to be used.
“ ‘No community can afford to shut off these chan*356neis of information, and no honest newspaper can afford to keep its reporters in hourly fear of contempt charges. * * *.
“ ‘No information would be given if the informant did not have faith in the integrity of the reporter in the matter of withholding his name. The newspaper man would find his channels of news closed.’ ” Siebert and Ryniker, Editor and Publisher, September 1,1934, pp. 36-37.
See also United Nations Economic & Social Council, Document E/2893 p. 25 (1955), Zechariah Chafee, Government and Mass Communications 497 (1947), 1949 Report of the Law Revision Commission, New York 26.
Whenever the Supreme Court of the United States has been called upon in the past to weigh First Amendment rights on the scales against other compelling rights, it has been fully cognizant of “the preferred place given in our scheme to the great, the indispensable democratic freedoms secured by the First Amendment.” Thomas v. Collins, 323 U.S. 516, 530.
“ ‘* * * [W]e remain mindful of the fact that the latter [freedom of press and religion] occupy a preferred position.’ ” Marsh v. Alabama, 326 U.S. 501, 509, 90 L.Ed. 265, 270. But freedom of the press and other First Amendment rights, occupying this preferred position is not an absolute. Konigsberg v. State Bar of California, 366 U.S. 36, 6 L.Ed.2d 105, 117; American Communications Assn., CIO v. Douds, supra at 399.
The test as to when First Amendment freedoms can be rigidly circumscribed was laid down in the Schenck case where the Supreme Court of the United States said:
“The question in every case is whether the words used are used in such circumstances and are of such a nature as to create a clear and present danger that they Avill bring about the substantive evils that Con*357gress has a right to prevent.” Schenck v. United States, 249 U.S. 47, 52, 63 L.Ed. 470.
However great the likelihood that a substantive evil will result, restriction on fundamental rights cannot be sustained unless the evil itself is “relatively serious,” Whitney v. California, 274 U.S. 357, 379, 71 L.Ed. 1095, (Brandeis, J., concurring), or “extremely serious and the degree of imminence extremely high,” Bridges v. California, supra at 263, or “an imminent, * * * threat to the administration of justice.” Craig v. Harney, 331 U.S. 367, 376.
“Those cases [clear and present danger] do not purport to mark the furthermost constitutional boundaries of protected expression, nor do we here. They do no more than recognize a minimum compulsion of the Bill of Bights. For the First Amendment does not speak equivocally. It prohibits any law ‘abridging the freedom of speech, or of the press.’ ” Bridges v. California, supra at 263.
From the “clear and present danger” test on First Amendment freedoms, there has now evolved a “balancing” test. When particular conduct is regulated in the interest of public order and the regulation results in an indirect, conditional, partial abridgement of speech, the duty of the courts is to determine which of the two conflicting interests demands the greater protection under the particular circumstances presented. American Communications Assn., CIO v. Douds, supra at 382. “Where First Amendment rights are asserted to bar governmental interrogation resolution of the issue always involves a balancing by the courts of the competing private and public interests at stake in the particular circumstances shown.” Barenblatt v. United States, 360 U.S. 109, 126, 3 L.Ed. 2d 1115. “Whenever, * * * these constitutional protections [freedom of speech and association] are asserted *358against the exercise of valid governmental powers a reconciliation must be effected and that perforce requires an appropriate weighing of the respective interests involved.” Konigsberg v. State Bar of California, supra at 51.
The Supreme Court of the United States has frequently and consistently upheld the right of the public to be protected from evils of conduct, even though First Amendment rights of persons or groups are in some manner restricted and infringed. See Kovacs v. Cooper, 336 U.S. 77; Cox v. New Hampshire, 312 U.S. 569; Prince v. Massachusetts, 321 U.S. 158; In re Summers, 325 U.S. 561; United Public Workers of America, CIO v. Mitchell, 330 U.S. 75; Giboney v. Empire Storage & Ice Co., 336 U.S. 490. As Mr. Chief Justice Hughes put it, “Civil liberties as guaranteed by the Constitution, imply the existence of an organized society maintaining public order without which liberty itself would be lost in the excesses of unrestrained abuses.” Cox v. New Hampshire, supra at 574.
The recent case of Garland v. Torre, 259 F.2d 545, cert. denied, 358 U.S. 910, 3 L.Ed.2d 231, illustrates the application of the “balancing” test, i.e., the freedom of press guaranty against the infringement of that freedom by the forced disclosure of the reporter’s confidential source of information. The United States Second Circuit Court of Appeals held that the compelled disclosure under the particular combination of facts was not such an infringement of the press freedom. However, the court accepted “the hypothesis that compulsory disclosure of a journalist’s confidential sources of information may entail an abridgement of press freedom by imposing some limitation upon the availability of news.” Id. at 548.
By Act of 5 Eliz., c. 9, § 12 (1562), provision was made for the service of process out of any English court *359of record requiring the person served to testify or depose concerning any cause or matter pending in the court, and by the early Eighteenth Century it had become a “maxim that the public has a right to every man’s evidence.” 8 Wigmore, Evidence, §§ 2190-92, at 64 (3d ed. 1940). We have long recognized the obligation of a witness to testify. Bennett v. Walker, 23 Ill. 97, 101; Dixon v. People of the State of Illinois, 168 Ill. 179; West v. State, 1 Wis. 209, 253; Blair v. United States, 250 U.S. 273, 279-81, 63 L.Ed. 979. “* * * [0]ne of the duties which the citizen owes to his government is to support the administration of justice by attending its courts and giving his testimony whenever he is properly summoned.” Blackmer v. United States, 284 U.S. 421, 438, 76 L.Ed. 757.
This duty of the witness to testify in a court of law involves material sacrifice, and nearly always, invasion of personal privacy. The freedom to choose whether to speak or be silent disappears in a courtroom, and becomes a delicate task, especially when this right is based upon First Amendment freedoms of the witness. When personal sacrifice is involved it “is a part of the necessary contribution of the individual to the welfare of the public.” Blair v. United States, supra at 281. The duty to testify would be meaningless unless there is power to compel testimony. Judicial compulsion of testimony with the power to fine or imprison for disobedience, has been accepted as part of the basic concept of the judicial power in the United States. People ex rel. Phelps v. Fancher, 2 Hun. 226, (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1874); Blair v. United States, supra at 279-81; Blackmer v. United States, supra at 438; Wilson v. United States, 221 U.S. 361, 372-73, 55 L.Ed. 771. The right of a litigant to secure judicial compulsion of testimony in civil suits under a procedural rule as 26(b), H.R.C.P. is standard procedure in the federal courts. General Motors Corp. v. California Research Corp., *3609 F.R.D. 568; E. I. Du Pont De Nemours & Co. v. Phillips Petroleum Co., 24 F.R.D. 416; Grogan v. Pennsylvania R.R., 11 F.R.D. 186; Hornung v. Eastern Auto. Forwarding Co., 11 F.R.D. 300.
In the instant case, what must be determined is whether the interest to be served by compelling the testimony of newspaper reporter Ooodfader justifies an impairment of this First Amendment freedom of the press.
The problem is one of balancing and weighing the probable effects of the order of the lower court upon this First Amendment freedom against a procedural rule in discovery examination. A great part' of the news, particularly political news of wide public concern is, for perfectly proper reasons, communicated to reporters on condition that the source not be disclosed. The instant case is of such public concern as it deals with the future status of the director of the Civil Service Commission. Refusal of the condition means refusal of the information. To the extent that judicial compulsion under a procedural rule1 which sanctions a “fishing expedition” renders such assurance to informants unavailable or precarious, the flow of news to the public is pinched off at its' source and, pro tanto the public’s right to know is diminished.
“* * * [Tjhe delicate and difficult task falls upon the courts to weigh the circumstances and to appraise the substantiality of the reasons advanced in support of the regulation of the free enjoyment of the rights.” *361Schneider v. State, 308 U.S. 147, 161, 84 L.Ed. 155; American Communications Assn., CIO v. Douds, supra at 400.
In Garland v. Torre, supra, appellants contended that in a discovery proceeding an order to compel the newspaper reporter to disclose a confidential source of news did encroach upon the freedom of the press guaranteed by the First Amendment because “ fit would impose an important practical restraint on the flow of news from neAvs sources to neAvs media and AArould thus diminish pro tanto the flow of news to the public.’ ” Garland v. Torre, supra at 547.
The Second Circuit Court of Appeals recognized in Garland v. Torre, supra, that the freedom of the press as raised in the case “must give place under the Constitution to a paramount public interest in the fair administration of- justice” and that it Avas not dealing “with a case Avhere the identity of the news source is of doubtful rélevance or materiality. * * * The question asked of the appellant Avent to the heart of the plaintiff’s claim. We hold that the Constitution conferred no right to refuse an answer.” Id. at 549. For relevancy of questions asked on qualification of bar applicant, see Konigsberg v. State Bar of California, supra; for non-relevancy of membership lists requested on whether foreign corporation is engaged in intrastate business, see N.A.A.C.P. v. Alabama, supra at 464. For pertinency of questions asked in aid of the legislative process, see Barenblatt v. United States, supra at 127; for nonpertinency of questions asked in aid of legislative process, see Watkins v. United States, supra at 215.
The Garland case arose from a suit by Judy Garland against Columbia Broadcasting System, Inc. in Avhich she alleged that the defendant had made “false and defamatory” statements about her and had “authorized, request*362ed and induced” the publication in newspapers and elsewhere. As an alleged example of such a publication, Miss Garland annexed as an exhibit to her complaint a few paragraphs of a column entitled “TV-Radio Today” written by Marie Torre and published in the New York Herald Tribune on January 10, 1957. In her deposition Miss Torre testified that the statements appearing in the column were in “exact words” statements which had been made to her over the telephone by a CBS informant. The information sought from Miss Torre was the name of this CBS informant and was vital to the successful prosecution of her complaint.
That portion of the testimony of the appellant which formed the basis of the lower court’s order appears in the margin below.2
The name of the informant who stated to the appellant “that there might be an attempt to fire Mrs. Gallas” is not only irrelevant and immaterial but also is inadmissible hearsay and relates to the speculation of an un*363disclosed third party as to what might happen to Mrs. Gallas, the plaintiff. Furthermore, appellant, upon checking that information, found nothing to substantiate this information but became convinced by circumstantial evidence that there was some truth to it.
We are involved here with the determination as to whether the demands of press freedom are considerably more substantial than in the Garland case in order to outweigh the right of a litigant to judicial compulsion of testimony.
First, the information sought in the Garland case related to the affairs of private parties, an action against Columbia Broadcasting System, Inc. (CBS) by Judy Garland “for allegedly false and defamatory statements allegedly made concerning her by a ‘network executive’ of the broadcasting system * * Garland v. Torre, supra at 545. Here, the desired information concerns the administration of the Civil Service Commission of the City and County of Honolulu. News about the affairs of private parties may not be sufficiently important to outweigh the compelling interest of a litigant to enlist judicial compulsion of testimony. However, the gathering of news relating to the administration of government is sufficiently important to require judicial protection in order to preserve the right of the people to full information regarding the acts or omissions of public servants in order to guard against maladministration or oppression of the government.
This interest of the public in being kept fully informed on day-to-day governmental affairs completely overshadows in importance the interest of private parties who desire to enlist judicial compulsion of testimony for private litigation.
Second, the information sought in the Garland case “went to the heart of the plaintiff’s claim.” Here, the *364order which compelled disclosure of the confidential news source was of doubtful relevance or materiality. See Garland v. Torre, supra at 545; Rosenberg v. Carroll, 99 F. Supp. 629. The remote interest of the plaintiff in a private suit under a procedural rule which states “that it is not ground for objection that the testimony will be inadmissible at the trial if the testimony sought appear reasonably calculated to lead to the discovery of admissible evidence” does not justify an infringement upon so basic a constitutional guaranty as the freedom of the press. The right of a litigant in private suits to secure compulsion of testimony as an incident of the judicial power of the United States does not justify an impairment of this First Amendment freedom on the grounds that it is legitimate “fishing expedition” under Rule 26(b), H.R.C.P.
Clearly, the answer sought by the plaintiff below was relevant to its inquiry only if it were one of the defendants who had supplied the information. In the Garland case, supra, the newspaper article attributed to a CBS “network executive” the several statements which the complaint alleged were false, defamatory and highly damaging to the plaintiff’s professional reputation. In deposition taken by plaintiff’s counsel of executives of CBS, each denied making the statements in question. Here, defendants Moniz and Watanabe affirmatively allege in their amended answer that they had no prior knowledge of the move to discharge plaintiff. Defendant Pedro Sanchez, Chairman of the Civil Service Commission in his deposition states that the persons with whom he discussed or those who were aware of his statement of dismissal which he began preparing on December 10, 1957, were his Avife and Mayor Blaisdell. Earlier in his deposition, appellant had stated: “I questioned three Commissioners at the Wednesday meeting preceding the one at *365which Mrs. Gallas was fired. All of them denied knowledge of any such attempt. However, it seemed to me there must be something in it from the replies I got. That was the impression I got at the time.” It is apparent that the confidential information sought by the plaintiff did not originate from the three defendants. The lower court in its order to compel disclosure stated: “In plaintiff’s case under all circumstances, it would appear that it is very likely to lead to something of extreme value to their case and that is one of the basic functions of discovery, to seek leads. For that reason, this outweighs the other consideration.” The lower court, considered this problem on the ground that the sole question before the court was whether or not the deponent was protected by an evidentiary privilege and finding none, that Eule 26(b), H.E.C.P. applied.
In failing to consider the constitutional problem — the fundamental right of freedom of the press — the lower court, before making its order, was unable to exercise its discretion, and invoke Eule 30(d), H.E.C.P.3 which appears in the margin below.
The problematical interest of the plaintiff in this case does not outweigh the vitally important constitutional *366and public policy consideration involved in the preservation of news gathering sources of our newspapers.
In all these cases where the courts have ordered the disclosure of confidential news sources, there was a much stronger public interest in both the subject matter of the litigation (libel and criminal libel) and disclosure of the information (grand jury, court and disbarment proceedings) sought, than the public interest in protecting confidential news sources. See Clein v. State, 52 So. 2d 117 (Fla. 1951); Plunkett v. Hamilton, 136 Ga. 72, 70 S.E. 781; Matter of Wayne, 4 U.S.D.C. Hawaii 475; Brewster v. Boston Herald-Traveler Corp., 20 F.R.D. 416 (D. Mass. 1957); Pledger v. State, 77 Ga. 242, 3 S.E. 320; Ex Parte Holliway, 272 Mo. 108, 199 S.W. 412; People ex rel. Phelps v. Fancher, 2 Hun. 226 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1874); People ex rel. Mooney v. Sheriff of New York County, 269 N.Y. 291, 199 N.E. 415; Vi Murphy v. Colorado, cert. denied, 365 U.S. 8434.
In Vi Murphy v. Colorado, supra, a disbarment proceeding against attorney John H. Gately, the State was attempting to prove that Gately’s actions in filing a petition in the Colorado Supreme Court containing highly defamatory accusations against a former chief justice of the court, and in causing the contents to be published, were malicious and for the purpose of obtaining publicity for himself. The newspaper reporter, Mrs. Yi Murphy, who had Avritten the news article, refused to answer the supreme court’s questions as to whether she had received from Gately a copy of the petition before it was filed. The information Avas essential to establishing Gately’s motives in filing the petition. The information sought was relevant and material, and essential to the State’s case against Gately. Compelling the witness to ansAver the *367questions under these circumstances justified some infringement upon the freedom of the press.
With the exception of Vi Murphy v. Colorado, supra, no state court has ever before ordered forced disclosure of news sources after weighing the claim that the guaranty of the First Amendment freedom of the press forbids such disclosure. In none of the state cases has the judicial power of the court been used to force disclosure of a news source in a discovery proceeding to support a “fishing expedition” that appeared to the trial court “very likely to lead to something of extreme value to their case,” where the news had to do with the executive administration of government, and where the information sought was irrelevant and immaterial and inadmissible as hearsay.
There is no case in the federal court, with the exception of Garland v. Torre, supra, which compelled disclosure on the basis that the identity of the news source was relevant and material, and that the question asked “went to the heart of the plaintiff’s claim.” But the Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit recognized that the type of disclosure sought may infringe on the freedom of the press. Here, compulsion of disclosure results in an indirect censorship on the confidential news sources of newspaper reporters, and does result in an abridgement of press freedom by imposing a definite limitation upon the availability of news. The right of the plaintiff to judicial compulsion of testimony on so meager an interest as may be argumentatively found in the remote possibility that the disclosure of the news source may lead to admissible evidence, must give place under the Constitution in the public interest to a free press which “stands as one of the great interpreters between the government and the people. To allow it to be fettered is to fetter ourselves.” Grosjean v. American Press Co., supra at 250.
H.R.C.P., Rule 26(b). Scope of Examination. Unless otherwise ordered by the court as provided by Rule 30(b) or (d), the deponent may be examined regarding any matter, not privileged, which is relevant to the subject matter involved in the pending action, whether it relates to the claim or defense of the examining party or to the claim or defense of any other party, including the existence, description, nature, custody, condition and location of any books, documents, or other tangible things and the identity and location of persons having knowledge of relevant facts. It is not ground for objection that the testimony will be inadmissible at the trial if the testimony sought appears reasonably calculated to lead to the discovery of admissible evidence.
“Q — You stated that about a week and a half before the December 16th meeting that there might be an attempt to. fire Mrs. Gallas. Is that correct?
A — That’s right.
Q — Where did you hear that?
A — I’m not at liberty to divulge my source of information.
Q — Did someone tell you about it?
A — It would be a very grievous breach of my professional ethics for me to say anything which might lead back to my source.
Q — In other words, you refuse to state who told you about it?
A — (Witness nodded head in affirmative motion.) I refuse to say how I got the information.
Q — And you refuse to state where that information was given to you?
A — (Witness nodded head in affirmative motion.)
Q — Do you also refuse to say who gave this information to you?
A— (Witness nodded head in affirmative motion.)
Q — After you got that information, you did some checking on that information. Is that correct?
A — I did, yes.
Q — In your checking, did you discover any leads to substantiate that ?
A — Nothing definite. I became convinced circumstantial — which was merely circumstantial evidence, that there was some truth to it. I also became convinced that Mrs. Gallas knew nothing of it. . . .” (R. Vol. 1, pp. 569-570.)
H.R.CR, Rule 30(d). Motion To Terminate Or Limit Examination. At any time during the taking of the deposition, on motion of any party or of the deponent and upon a showing that the examination is being conducted in bad faith or in such manner as unreasonably to annoy, embarrass, or oppress the deponent or party, the court in which the action is pending or the court in the circuit where the deposition is being taken may order the officer conducting the examination to cease forthwith from taking the deposition, or may limit the scope and manner of the taking of the deposition as provided in subdivision (b). If the order made terminates the examination, it shall be resumed thereafter only upon the order of the court in which the action is pending. Upon demand of the objecting party or deponent, the taking of the deposition shall be suspended for the time necessary to make a motion for an order. In granting or refusing such order the court may impose upon either party or upon the witness the requirement to pay such costs or expenses as the court may deem reasonable.
Unreported Colorado case mentioned in the opinion of the court.