specially concurring.
While I concur with the majority opinion, I am concerned that it does not sufficiently harmonize State v. Hobson, 99 Idaho 200, 579 P.2d 697 (1978) and State v. Russell, *189108 Idaho 58, 696 P.2d 909 (1985). The decision of District Judge Alan M. Schwartzman, the trial judge in this case, presents a succinct reconciliation of these two cases that is satisfying to me. Judge Schwartzman said:
Idaho Code section 19-3501(3) (Supp. 1986) prescribes a six-month period in which a criminal defendant must be brought to trial following a plea of not guilty to a misdemeanor offense. If his trial is not held within that time frame and the delay is not due to the defendant’s application, the prosecution or indictment must be dismissed. Sindak entered a not guilty plea on October 1, 1985, and his trial was finally held, following two postponements, on April 24, 1986. Neither of the postponements were due to Sindak’s application. Since the delay between the entry of the not guilty plea and the trial was six months and 24 days, Sindak has established a prima facie case under section 19-3501(3).
When a criminal defendant has established a prima facie case under section 19-3501, the burden shifts to the state to show that “good cause” existed for the delay. State v. Hobson, 99 Idaho 200, 202, 579 P.2d 697 (1978). In order to determine whether good cause has been shown, the factors set out by the United States Supreme Court in Barker v. Wingo, 407 U.S. 514 [92 S.Ct. 2182, 33 L.Ed.2d 101] (1972), are to be weighed by the court. State v. Russell, 108 Idaho 58, 62, 696 P.2d 909, 913 (1985). These factors are: Length of delay, the reason for the delay, the defendant’s assertion of his right, and prejudice to the defendant. Barker, 407 U.S. at 530 [92 S.Ct. at 2192],
Perhaps this formulation will be helpful to others, as it has been to me, in harmonizing Hobson and Russell.