Kimberly Kay Coss was arrested for possession of a controlled substance after a vehicle in which she was a passenger was impounded and searched. Ms. Coss moved to suppress drugs and drug paraphernalia found under the passenger seat. The trial court, without determining whether Ms. Coss had standing, found that the impoundment was proper and denied her motion to suppress. Ms. Coss was convicted of one count of possession of a controlled substance pursuant to RCW 69.50-.401(d). She appeals.
On March 3, 1995, at approximately 1:30 a.m., Police Officer John W. Griffen stopped a vehicle driven by Mary Laposa because it had a cracked taillight. Two other individuals, including Ms. Coss, were passengers in Ms. Laposa’s vehicle. Officer Griffen checked Ms. Laposa’s driver’s license and discovered that it was suspended. At that point, Officer Griffen decided to impound the vehicle rather than take the driver into custody. Officer Griffen testified that due to the crowded nature of the jail, the general policy of the Spokane Police Department was not to book individuals on misdemeanor offenses unless it involved driving under the influence. Therefore, in order for Officer Griffen to arrest Ms. Laposa based on her suspended license, he would have had to obtain an exception to the Spokane Police Department policy from a sergeant. Officer Griffen also testified that he did not believe he had a reasonable alternative to impoundment because the traffic stop occurred around 1:30 a.m.
After Officer Griffen impounded the vehicle, he conducted an inventory search. Officer Griffen found a black leather case under the front passenger’s seat. He opened it and found a syringe, drug paraphernalia, and plastic baggies of a white powdered substance which field tested positive for methamphetamine. Since Ms. Coss was the occupant in the front passenger seat, Officer Griffen arrested *895her. He advised her of her Miranda1 rights. Ms. Coss then admitted that the drugs belonged to her.
Ms. Coss moved to suppress the evidence obtained during Officer Griffen’s inventory search. The trial court found that the impoundment was proper and denied Ms. Coss’s motion. Ms. Coss stipulated to the facts and submitted the case to the trial court on the record. The trial court found Ms. Coss guilty of one count of possession of a controlled substance.
On appeal, the State contends Ms. Coss does not have standing to challenge the impoundment and subsequent inventory search of Ms. Laposa’s vehicle. As respondent, the State may raise the issue of Ms. Coss’s standing for the first time on appeal.2 State v. Grundy, 25 Wn. App. 411, 415-16, 607 P.2d 1235 (1980), review denied, 95 Wn.2d 1008 (1981). The State has asked us to reconsider State v. Gonzalez, 77 Wn. App. 479, 891 P.2d 743 (1995), review denied, 128 Wn.2d 1008 (1996), in which we held that automatic standing is still viable in this division. The State urges this court to follow Division One and Division Two and hold that automatic standing no longer exists in Washington. State v. Carter, 74 Wn. App. 320, 329, 875 P.2d 1 (1994), aff’d, 127 Wn.2d 836, 904 P.2d 290 (1995); State v. Zakel, 61 Wn. App. 805, 812 P.2d 512 (1991), aff’d, 119 Wn.2d 563, 834 P.2d 1046 (1992).
The automatic standing doctrine confers standing on anyone charged with a possessory crime, eliminating the requirement of showing a legitimate expectation of privacy before the defendant can challenge a search or seizure. Carter, 127 Wn.2d at 850. The doctrine was originally adopted to guard against the risk of self-incrimination by a defendant who would have to admit possession of seized evidence at a suppression hearing to *896establish standing, then face use of the admission as proof of guilt at trial. Id. at 850. The United States Supreme Court abandoned the automatic standing doctrine as a matter of federal constitutional law in United States v. Salvucci, 448 U.S. 83, 92-93, 100 S. Ct. 2547, 65 L. Ed. 2d 619 (1980), based on an earlier ruling that a defendant’s pretrial testimony cannot be used as substantive evidence at trial. Salvucci declined to decide whether the defendant’s suppression hearing testimony could later be used for impeachment purposes, however, and the Washington Supreme Court has not followed Salvucci.
In State v. Michaels, 60 Wn.2d 638, 644-47, 374 P.2d 989 (1962), the Washington Supreme Court held the state constitution confers automatic standing on defendants charged with an offense that has possession as an essential element, as long as the person is in possession at the time of the contested search or seizure. In State v. Simpson, 95 Wn.2d 170, 174-81, 622 P.2d 1199 (1980), the plurality thoroughly analyzed Salvucci, then declined to abandon the automatic standing rule in this state. The plurality discerned both a continuing policy basis and firm state constitutional grounds for adherence to the automatic standing rule, which it noted was already established under our state constitution and had served our state well for 17 years. Simpson, 95 Wn.2d at 181. In Gonzalez, 77 Wn. App. 479, we continued to adhere to the automatic standing rule in deference to Simpson and our own earlier decision in State v. Belieu, 50 Wn. App. 834, 838, 751 P.2d 321 (1988), rev’d on other grounds, 112 Wn.2d 587, 773 P.2d 46 (1989). We firmly believe automatic standing is still the law in the State of Washington. Michaels has not been overruled and the plurality opinion in Simpson has received the endorsement of the entire Washington Supreme Court.
In Carter, 74 Wn. App. at 328-29, Division One agreed with the analysis in Salvucci and decided the automatic standing doctrine is no longer necessary to protect a defendant’s Fifth Amendment right against self-*897incrimination. The court also decided that our state constitution provides no more protection in this area than the federal constitution. Carter, 74 Wn. App. at 329. Thus, concluding the doctrine is no longer viable as a matter of state law, the court held the defendant did not have automatic standing to challenge the warrantless, forcible entry into the motel room where she had allegedly sold cocaine. Carter, 74 Wn. App. at 328-29.
The Washington Supreme Court affirmed Carter, but in the process, it took issue with Division One’s abandonment of the doctrine of automatic standing. The majority noted:
Petitioner Carter’s contention that she has automatic standing to challenge the warrantless entry into the motel room was rejected by the Court of Appeals, which chose not to follow this court’s plurality decision in Simpson. We do not agree with the Court of Appeals entirely, but affirm its decision nevertheless.
Carter, 127 Wn.2d at 850. And,
Petitioner Carter did have [automatic] standing to move for suppression of the evidence [because she was present in the room]. This is contrary to the conclusion reached by the Court of Appeals. However, we agree with the trial court that there were exigent circumstances justifying entry of the motel room by Seattle police officers without a warrant. Petitioner does not challenge this finding by the trial court, but relies instead upon the "automatic standing” issue. We disagree with the conclusion of the Court of Appeals on that issue, but, at the same time, affirm its decision for another reason.
Carter, 127 Wn.2d at 850-51 (emphasis added).
The minority recognized that the majority was affirming the automatic standing rule under the state constitution, and agreed that it should do so, stating:
The bulk of the [majority] opinion is devoted to an analysis of an issue that the trial court did not confront, but which was pivotal to the Court of Appeals decision — whether Carter had standing to challenge the warrantless search. The major*898ity, noting our decision in State v. Simpson, 95 Wn.2d 170, 622 P.2d 1199 (1980), eventually concludes, albeit somewhat grudgingly, that under our state’s constitution, article I, section 7, Carter had automatic standing to challenge the search and seizure, and that the Court of Appeals erred in upholding the trial court’s denial of the suppression motion on the basis that she was without standing. That conclusion, with which I agree, is then followed by ... .
Carter, 127 Wn.2d at 851-52 (Alexander, J., dissenting) (emphasis added).
Thus, because she was charged with a possessory offense and was in possession of the contraband under her seat when the police impounded the automobile in which she was riding, Ms. Coss has automatic standing to challenge the seizure and search of Ms. Laposa’s vehicle under Michaels and Simpson.
Under the Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution and article I, section 7 of the Washington State Constitution, all seizures must be reasonable. State v. White, 97 Wn.2d 92, 109-10, 640 P.2d 1061 (1982). Impoundment is a seizure because it involves the governmental taking of a vehicle into its exclusive custody. State v. Reynoso, 41 Wn. App. 113, 116, 702 P.2d 1222 (1985). The reasonableness of a particular impoundment must be determined from the facts of each case. State v. Greenway, 15 Wn. App. 216, 219, 547 P.2d 1231, review denied, 87 Wn.2d 1009 (1976). Three circumstances justify impounding a vehicle: (1) as evidence of a crime; (2) as part of the police "community caretaking function,” if removal of the vehicle is necessary; and (3) as part of the police function of enforcing traffic regulations, if the driver has committed a traffic offense for which the Legislature has authorized impoundment. Simpson, 95 Wn.2d at 189.
At issue in this case is whether the impoundment of Ms. Laposa’s vehicle, which was authorized by statute, was reasonable. State v. Hill, 68 Wn. App. 300, 305, 842 P.2d 996, review denied, 121 Wn.2d 1020 (1993); Reynoso, 41 Wn. App. at 119. The State contends that since Ms. La*899posa was operating the vehicle while her license was suspended, the police officer was justified in impounding the car pursuant to former RCW 46.20.435(1). That statute provided: "Upon determining that a person is operating a motor vehicle . . . with a suspended or revoked license in violation of RCW 46.20.342 or 46.20.420, a law enforcement officer may immediately impound the vehicle that the person is operating.”3
In Reynoso, 41 Wn. App. at 119, this court found that the use of the word "may” in former RCW 46.20.435(1) suggests that police officers are to exercise discretion when deciding to impound a vehicle. "Discretion necessarily involves sound judgment based upon the particular facts and circumstances confronting the officer.” Id. Further, it is clear that former RCW 46.20.435 was meant to prevent a continuing violation of RCW 46.20.021. Id. Accordingly, "[i]f a validly licensed driver is available to remove the vehicle, a reason to impound must be shown.” Id. Officer Griffen never inquired whether one of Ms. Laposa’s passengers had a valid driver’s license and would be willing to remove the vehicle. Since the statute at issue was meant to prevent the continuing violation of driving with a suspended license, allowing one of Ms. Laposa’s passengers to drive the vehicle would have accomplished that goal.
The trial court concluded that this alternative would have been equivalent to allowing Ms. Laposa to drive the vehicle once Officer Griffen was no longer present. There is no support for this allegation. Further, the record does not show that Officer Griffen even considered this alternative. Although an officer is not required to exhaust all possibilities, the officer must at least consider alternatives; attempt, if feasible, to obtain a name from the driver of someone in the vicinity who could move the vehicle; and *900then reasonably conclude from this deliberation that impoundment is proper. State v. Hardman, 17 Wn. App. 910, 914, 567 P.2d 238 (1977), review denied, 89 Wn.2d 1020 (1978). Officer Griffen’s testimony at the suppression hearing reveals that he only considered arresting Ms. Laposa or impounding the vehicle. There is no evidence that Officer Griffen considered any other alternatives.
It is clear from the record that a reasonable alternative to impoundment existed. A validly licensed passenger in Ms. Laposa’s vehicle could have driven the vehicle from the traffic stop, thereby preventing a continued violation of RCW 46.20.021. This course of action would not be the equivalent of allowing Ms. Laposa to drive the vehicle. Accordingly, the impoundment was unreasonable and thus unlawful. There was no justification for the inventory search and the evidence should have been suppressed. Reynoso, 41 Wn. App. at 120 (citing State v. Williams, 102 Wn.2d 733, 742-43, 689 P.2d 1065 (1984); Simpson, 95 Wn.2d at 189-91; State v. Houser, 95 Wn.2d 143, 147-48, 622 P.2d 1218 (1980); State v. Bales, 15 Wn. App. 834, 836-37, 552 P.2d 688 (1976), review denied, 89 Wn.2d 1003 (1977)).
Reversed.
Kurtz, J., concurs.
Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 86 S. Ct. 1602, 16 L. Ed. 2d 694, 10 A.L.R.3d 974 (1966).
At the suppression hearing, the trial court did not determine whether Ms. Coss had standing because the issue was inadequately briefed. The trial court also noted that the standing issue was not pivotal to its decision.
This statute is now codified at RCW 46.55.113 and provides:
"[A] police officer may take custody of a vehicle and provide for its prompt removal to a place of safety under any of the following circumstances:
"(7) Upon determining that a person is operating a motor vehicle . . . with a suspended or revoked license in violation of RCW 46.20.342 or 46.20.420.”