Randolph v. New Mexico Employment Security Department

STOWERS, Justice,

dissenting.

I respectfully dissent from the majority opinion that Patricia D. Randolph (Randolph), petitioner-appellant, voluntarily quit her work for good cause; receipt of late paychecks. I would affirm the trial court’s denial of Randolph’s claim for unemployment compensation benefits.

In my view, the New Mexico Employment Security Department (NMESD) correctly found that Randolph quit work to accept another job with a former employer. The record indicates that Randolph was dissatisfied with her job and her employer. Randolph told her employer and co-workers she quit work to accept a job with a former employer. On the day Randolph quit, she told her employer she was meeting a former employer to display her portfolio. Randolph’s claim that she quit due to late paychecks and religious harassment, arose only when she filed an unemployment benefits claim.

On review, we determine whether the trial court correctly found that the whole record contains substantial evidence to support the agency’s decision. Duke City Lumber Co. v. New Mexico Envtl. Improvement Bd., 101 N.M. 291, 294, 681 P.2d 717, 720 (1984). The trial court must adopt administrative findings supported by substantial evidence. New Mexico Human Services Dep’t v. Garcia, 94 N.M. 175, 177, 608 P.2d 151, 153 (1980) (citation omitted). Substantial evidence is relevant evidence which a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion. Register v. Roberson Constr. Co., Inc., 106 N.M. 243, 245, 741 P.2d 1364, 1366 (1987). Although trial court evidentiary review favors the agency, unfavorable evidence may not be completely ignored. Garcia, 94 N.M. at 177, 608 P.2d at 153.

The trial court concluded that Randolph voluntarily quit work without good cause in connection with her work and denied her benefits claim pursuant to NMSA 1978, Section 51-1-7(A) (Repl.Pamp.1987). Good cause is established when vast compelling and necessitous circumstances exist such that there is no alternative to leaving gainful employment. Ribera v. Employment Sec. Comm’n, 92 N.M. 694, 695, 594 P.2d 742, 743 (1979). See also 81 C.J.S. Social Security § 226(a) (1977). Good cause is an objective measure of real, substantial and reasonable circumstances which would cause the average able and qualified worker to quit gainful employment. Kistler v. Commw. Unemployment Compensation Bd., 52 Pa.Commw. 465, 467, 416 A.2d 594, 596 (1980). See also Annotation, Unemployment Compensation: Harassment or Other Mistreatment by Employer or Supervisor as “Good Cause” Justifying Abandonment of Employment, 76 A.L.R. 3d 1089, 1092-93 (1977); 76 Am.Jur.2d Unemployment Compensation § 59 (1975). Good cause also includes good faith; the desire to work and be self-supporting. Annotation, 76 A.L.R.3d at 1093; 76 Am.Jur. 2d Unemployment Compensation § 59 (1975).

The record indicates Randolph quit work to accept another job. This was not a compelling or necessitous cause which left Randolph no alternative to quitting her job. Thus, substantial evidence supports the trial court’s finding that Randolph voluntarily quit her employment without good cause and its judgment should be affirmed.