(concurring in part and dissenting in part) — I concur with the majority to the extent it reverses the dismissal of Phillips’ negligence claim against Lozier and affirms dismissal of most other claims against Lozier and the County. I respectfully dissent from the conclusion that we should reverse the dismissal of the inverse condemnation and trespass claims against the County.
The majority sees a conflict between Wilber10 and Pepper11 and concludes that the former case requires that we reinstate the inverse condemnation claim against the County. I believe it is unnecessary to reach the question of whether there is a conflict between the two cases. Because there is no genuine issue of material fact demonstrated on the record before us, and Wilber supports summary dismissal of the inverse condemnation claim, we should affirm.
In Wilber, the city and county sought summary dismissal of the inverse condemnation action brought by the landowner whose property was located near a platted subdivision.12 Surface water from the subdivision drained naturally into a swamp on the landowner’s property. A natural watercourse, which was controlled by the city, flowed out of the swamp to Puget Sound. The city maintained the level of the swamp as it was prior to the platting and construction of the subdivision by controlling the *494flow through the watercouse. The landowner’s theory of the case was that the approvals by the city and county of the plat of the subdivision caused the construction that increased the amount and manner of flow of water reaching the property.
The Court noted that "the mere fact that the amount of water reaching [the owner’s] land, by reason of the development of the platted lands, might be greater than it formerly was, would not entitle it to compensation for any resulting damage.”13 However, the Court went on to hold that if the water "is collected and deposited upon the land in a different manner,” damages would be recoverable.14 The Court concluded that there was a genuine issue of material fact whether the manner of flow of water had changed, noting that would be difficult to prove. On the basis of the existence of that factual dispute, the Court reversed the trial court’s summary dismissal of the claim.
Here, the factual question is whether the manner of flow of water to Phillips’ property has changed as a result of the actions of the County. Notwithstanding Phillips’ assertion to the contrary, it is clear from Wilber that any increase in the amount of water flowing from the platted area to Phillips’ property is not actionable.15
As I understand Phillips’ argument, it focuses on the spreaders installed in the County right of way as the source of the problem concerning the manner of flow to the property. To the extent that is the point, it is misplaced. In discussing the modeling he did to provide a basis for his opinion, Mr. Keith Leytham, the expert for Phillips, clearly stated that the spreaders do nothing with respect to the flow of water to Phillips’ property.16 Thus, there is no genuine issue of material fact that the manner *495of the flow of water to Phillips’ property has not been affected by the spreaders installed in the County right of way. Moreover, on the basis of Wilber, absent any change in the manner of the flow, the County is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Summary judgment on the inverse condemnation claim is proper.
The majority also reverses the dismissal of the trespass claim. I differ with that conclusion on two bases.
First, Phillips’ opening brief does not appear to address a trespass claim at all. The reply brief asserts the issue was raised in the opening brief.
We do not generally address issues that are first raised in reply briefs.17 It does not appear to me that the opening brief truly addresses trespass. Second, even if the opening brief does address the issue, it addresses it in the context of inverse condemnation. I do not believe there is any merit in the inverse condemnation claim. The trespass claim does not appear to be any more valid. I would therefore affirm the trial court’s dismissal of that claim as well.
Review granted at 134 Wn.2d 1019 (1998).
Wilber Dev. Corp. v. Les Rowland Constr., Inc., 83 Wn.2d 871, 523 P.2d 186 (1974).
Pepper v. J.J. Welcome Constr. Co., 73 Wn. App. 523, 871 P.2d 601, review denied, 124 Wn.2d 1029 (1994).
83 Wn.2d at 872.
Wilber, 83 Wn.2d at 876 (emphasis added).
(Emphasis added).
Id. Phillips’ statement in the reply brief is inconsistent to the extent that it equates the manner of flow of water with the amount of flow of water. Appellants’ Reply Br. at 3.
The County’s counsel examined the expert at deposition as follows:
*495"Q. So is it fair to say, then, that the opinion that you gave and the result that you reached with the modeling would have been the same if the spreaders had not been there?
"A. Yes.”
See Cowiche Canyon Conservancy v. Bosley, 118 Wn.2d 801, 819, 828 P.2d 549 (1992).