dissenting.
I respectfully conclude that the totality of the following circumstances call for a reversal and remand for new trial:
1. When the court heard from the bailiff that the jury was at an impasse, it told the jury to put its message in writing but it failed to tell the jurors not to announce how they were split. This failure led to the court learning that the jurors had voted 7-1 for guilty. After that, everyone knew the sole reason for the impasse: one juror believed that defendant was not guilty.
2. The jury advised that it had voted 7-1 for guilty and that one juror “believes that Mr. Sabala is not guilty.” The court then advised the jury to continue its deliberations, it gave some additional suggestions, and it *422explained that, “We are merely trying to be responsive to your apparent need for help.” Considering the context, it was apparent to all jurors that the only one in need of the court’s “help” was the one who voted “not guilty.”
3. The court should have advised the jurors not to surrender their honest convictions, but it failed to do so. “[Wjhenever further deliberations are ordered, it would be sound practice to remind jurors that they are not to surrender their honest convictions for the purpose of reaching a verdict, for ‘under our system the judge is not allowed to help persuade a juror to surrender his conviction and conform.’ ” State v. McCutcheon, 162 Ariz. 54, 60, 781 P.2d 31, 37 (1989) (quoting State v. Roberts, 131 Ariz. 513, 517-18, 642 P.2d 858, 862-63 (1982) (Feldman, J., dissenting)).
4. This was a one-day trial that went into two days. When a trial is as simple and short as this one — and when the court knows the split — the court’s “help” is a more-obvious suggestion that the minority juror join the majority than it would be in a complicated trial, or when the court does not know the split.
5. I agree with the majority that “pressure always exists to some degree whenever jurors adopt majority and minority positions.” Maj. op. at 419, 943 P.2d at 779. That pressure is greatly increased when the court helps a jury towards unanimity in circumstances such as exist in this case, where it was clear to everyone that the jury could go home as soon as the minority juror joined the majority.
In my opinion, this jury reached unanimity because of judicial help which appeared to put unacceptable pressure on the minority juror. The cost of retrying this case is less than the cost of affirming this sort of “help” when the court knows that the only “problem” is one juror’s belief that defendant is not guilty. Juror unanimity is desirable, yes, but not at the apparent expense of juror independence. The trial court was a well-intentioned pioneer on the Rule 22.4 frontier here; but on the facts presented, the trial court’s effort to “help” the jury reach unanimity was too clear a message that the minority juror should join the majority.