concurring in results:
Initially, I want to compliment Appellant’s attorney on appeal, Barry L. Derry-berry, Assistant Public Defender, Tulsa County. His reasoned argument compelled further research by this judge which resulted in a withdrawal of my original vote and the further analysis contained in this *922separate opinion. Effective appellate advocacy is not only appreciated, but required if the Court is to be provided the insight needed to address issues of this type.
The Court in this case fails to recognize the issue raised is answered by the provisions of the Oklahoma Evidence Code, not our prior caselaw. The admission of prior inconsistent statements for impeachment purposes is governed by 12 O.S.1991, § 2613. This statute provides:
A. In examining a witness concerning a prior statement made by him whether written or not, the statement need not be shown nor its contents disclosed to him at that time but on request the same shall be shown or disclosed to opposing counsel, just prior to the cross-examination of the witness.
B. Extrinsic evidence of a prior inconsistent statement by a witness is not admissible unless the witness is afforded an opportunity to explain or deny the same and the opposite party is afforded an opportunity to interrogate him thereon. This provision does not apply to admissions of a party opponent as defined in subparagraph B of paragraph 4 of Section 801 of this Code. Id.
This enactment changed existing law: no longer must counsel show the witness a copy of the prior statement before questioning the witness upon the statement. See Evidence Subcommittee’s Note following 12 O.S.1991, § 2613. While Section 2613 abandoned the requirement to show the witness a copy of the prior statement, it retained a requirement to show or disclose the contents of the prior statement to opposing counsel upon request. In addition, a party is now allowed to impeach the credibility of any witness, including a witness called by that party. 12 O.S.1991, § 2607. However, as with all evidence, impeachment evidence is subject to the balancing test of 12 O.S.1991, § 2403 (trial judge must weigh probative value against prejudicial value). Smith v. State, 766 P.2d 1007, 1008-09 (Okl.Cr.1988). The trial judge’s ruling admitting, or denying the admission of, impeachment evidence will be reviewed upon an abuse of discretion basis. Reeves v. State, 818 P.2d 495, 501 (Okl.Cr.1991).
The closest statement toward mandating a “proper” method for impeaching witnesses is found in Rogers v. State, 721 P.2d 805 (Okl.Cr.1986). This Court, in addressing the use of extrinsic evidence to impeach a prior inconsistent statement, stated:
This rule requires counsel, normally the cross-examiner, to first ask the witness about the prior inconsistency, and then [give] the witness the opportunity to deny, affirm, or explain the earlier statement. Also imposed upon counsel is the duty of identifying the subject matter of the statement, the time and place of its utterance, and the person to whom it was made.
Id. at 808.
The “rules”, prior to passage of The Evidence Code, regarding the introduction of extrinsic evidence are different depending on whether the matter sought to be impeached is collateral (immaterial) or noncol-lateral (material). If the matter which is subject to impeachment was collateral (immaterial or irrelevant) and the witness denies making the statement, the questioner must take the answer the witness gives. Montgomery v. State, 425 P.2d 470, 472 (Okla.1967). See also, Kelsey v. State, 569 P.2d 1028, 1031 (Okl.Cr.1977) (if when asked about the prior inconsistent statement the witness admits making the statement, the substance of the prior statement cannot be introduced into evidence). The examiner may not “resort to the testimony of other witnesses to prove, or disprove, the collateral matters.” Montgomery, 425 P.2d at 472. However, if the matter is non-collateral, extrinsic evidence could be introduced to prove the prior statement if the witness denied making the earlier statement. (If the witness admits making the prior inconsistent statement, extrinsic evidence of the prior statement should not be admitted into evidence as the admission by the witness has served the purpose of impeachment. Kelsey, 569 P.2d at 1031.) At this juncture, the impact of Section 2613 on this line of cases has not been determined.
*923If a case proceeds to the stage allowing extrinsic evidence, the form of evidence can vary: victim’s statement in police reports (Hawkins v. State, 782 P.2d 139, 142 (Okl.Cr.1989); oral, unsworn statements (United States v. Sisto, 534 F.2d 616, 622 (5th Cir.1976); tape recordings (United States v. Jones, 578 F.2d 1332, 1335 (10th Cir.1978); videotapes (United States v. Stahl, 616 F.2d 30 (2nd Cir.1980); transcript of court reporter; or oral report of observer of prior testimony (United States v. Hibler, 463 F.2d 455, 461 (9th Cir.1972) (citations omitted).
In this case trial counsel was having some difficulty formulating questions for the witness and objections were sustained as to the form of the question. Upon review it is apparent the trial judge had forgotten the impact of Section 2613 and the Evidence Subcommittee Notes to it. However, trial counsel entered into the following question and answer sequence with the witness:
Q. (By Mr. Clark) Officer [Downing], you testified about these matters earlier; correct?
Q. Are your answers today any differently (sic) than they were when you previously testified?
A. Not as best I can recollect, sir. (Tr. 49-50)
At this juncture the witness should have been given the “opportunity to explain or deny” the prior statement. The attorney for the State merely objected and did not “request the [prior statement] be shown or disclosed” prior to the cross-examination. Such a request in this case would have curtailed the ability of defense counsel to comply with Section 2613 because he had not secured even a partial transcript of the prior testimony. Even during the course of trial an innovative trial attorney can secure the requisite documentation needed to comply with the statutory requirements. The record in this case reveals the trial attorney did nothing to obtain the needed transcript. This important fact is not addressed by the Court in its decision. While the Court generically brushes aside the need to show diligence in obtaining a transcript of the prior testimony, at the same time it clouds the issue of scope of cross-examination versus the use of extrinsic evidence to prove the prior statement. The practical difficulty of allowing trial counsel to proceed with questions without a copy of the prior statement concerns the ability of the trial judge to properly rule on objections. What standard will the trial judge be able to utilize to determine if the question is proper and if objections to the question should be sustained or overruled? In this case trial counsel was relying on memory without the ability to meet the proof required for introducing extrinsic evidence. This Court should formulate rules which encourages trial counsel to be prepared for trial. This decision does not require or encourage professional trial preparation.