specially concurring.
Once again, I agree with the majority, but I am compelled to write separately because I believe that the constitutional analysis established in Barker v. Wingo, 407 U.S. 514, 92 S.Ct. 2182, 38 L.Ed.2d 101 (1972), which we adopted in Cosco v. State, 503 P.2d 1403, 1405 (Wyo.1972), cert. denied, 411 U.S. 971, 93 S.Ct. 2164, 36 L.Ed.2d 693 (1973), should no longer be utilized by this Court in deciding speedy trial issues. It is my opinion that W.R.C.P. 48 dispositively addresses the circumstances which are present in this case and that the majority should have limited its discussion accordingly.
I have thoroughly explained my position in Hall v. State, 911 P.2d 1364 (Wyo.1996) (Macy, J., specially concurring), and Yung v. State, 906 P.2d 1028, 1038 (Wyo.1995) (Macy, J., specially concurring). I find that the sentiments in those specially concurring opinions are appropriate to this case and adopt them herein.