(concurring) :
I concur with the main opinion, but add certain comments to emphasize what I think is the proper application of the language of the statute, Sec. 77-65-l(a), U. C.A.1953. Its purpose is to prevent keeping criminal charges “hanging over the head” of one who is in prison. It affords him a means of having such charges disposed of and is in accord with the constitutional guarantee of a speedy trial: The' purpose is a salutary one which should be carried out. But it should be done in accordance with the express terms of the statute.
The fact should not be ignored that the procedure authorized by the statute is not prescribed in general terms as it could have been if it had been intended to be applied as the defendant contends. But it expressly specifies three different situations ; and they are stated in the disjunctive. It provides that where an “indictment, information or complaint is pending . . . ” the prisoner may file with the county attorney and with “the appropriate court” the notice requiring disposition of the charge. The appropriate court surely must mean the court which is required to act upon the notice.
If the pending charge is for a misdemeanor, it is on a complaint. In such instance the city or justice’s court is the only court in which there could be “pending . any untried . . . complaint against the prisoner” upon which there could be a final disposition of the “complaint”; and the city or justice’s court is “the appropriate court” to which the demand should be made.
But if the charge is for felony, then the district court is the only court in which there could be “pending . . . any untried indictment, [or] information against the prisoner”; and it is the only *276court which could make any “final disposition” of such an indictment or information. It therefore appears to be both logical and in precise conformity with the language of the statute that in the procedure on a felony the “appropriate court” to be given notice is the district court, which is the court obliged to comply therewith. It also seems obvious that a demand could properly be filed with the district court only after it had acquired jurisdiction by the filing of the indictment or information.
It should be pointed out further that if the defendant’s contention were correct, there could well be exigent circumstances in which nearly all of the ninety day period (or even beyond it) may have elapsed before the defendant is bound over to the district court, and before the information is filed therein. In such a situation, because of delays which may have occurred for any cause whatsoever, the district court would have very little time to act. In fact the entire 90 days could have elapsed, so that defendant’s interpretation would require the district court to act before it ever acquired a jurisdiction. This could create a situation much more difficult for the prosecution to cope with in felony than in misdemeanor cases.
It is therefore submitted that the application of the statute contended for by the defendant is not in accord with its language, and that it leaves open the possibility of unintended difficulties. Whereas, on the contrary, the application of the statute as stated in the main opinion, is in harmony with its literal terms, and provides adequate protection for the prisoner in conformity with the purpose of the statute. (Emphasis mine)