(dissenting).
It is my conclusion that the majority opinion erred in concluding I.C. § 56-209b requires medical assistance (Medicaid) to be furnished to not only the “categorically needy” but to all who are “medically needy.” As I read the statute, medical assistance must be furnished only to those who are considered- as “categorically needy” leaving the other category optional.
This Court on several occasions has considered the administrative interpretation given statutes as a guideline in arriving at what the legislature intended in enacting a particular statute. In Application of Idaho Hospital Ass’n, 73 Idaho 320, 251 P.2d 538 (1952), this Court stated:
“Administrative interpretation over a period of years has, and is entitled to, great weight, United Pacific Ins. Co. v. Bakes, 57 Idaho 537, at page 545, 67 P. 2d 1024, and will be followed unless there are urgent or cogent reasons to the contrary. McCall v. Potlatch Forests, Inc., 69 Idaho 410, at page 413, 208 P.2d 799.” 73 Idaho at 324, 251 P.2d at 540.
More recently this Court stated in Messenger v. Burns, 86 Idaho 26, 382 P.2d 913 (1963):
“In construing a statute, it is the duty of this court to ascertain the legislative intent, and give effect thereto. In ascertaining this intent, not only must the literal wording of the statute be examined, but also account must be taken of other matters, ‘such as the context, the object in view, the evils to be remedied, the history of the times and of the legislation upon the same subject, public policy, contemporaneous construction, and the like,’ In re Gem State Academy Bakery, 70 Idaho 531, 541, 224 P.2d 529, 535.” 86 Idaho at 29-30, 382 P.2d at 915.
In Idaho Public Utilities Commission v. V-1 Oil Company, 90 Idaho 415, 412 P.2d 581 (1966), it is stated:
“A construction given a statute by executive or administrative officers of the state is entitled to great weight and will be followed by the court unless there are cogent reasons for holding otherwise. (Citing cases.)” 90 Idaho at 420, 412 P.2d at 583.
In this instance the Department of Public Assistance (now Department of Social and Rehabilitation Services, S.L.1972, Ch. 196, p. 483) has clearly demonstrated that since the 1966 amendment of I.C. § 56-209b, at the second extraordinary session of the thirty-eighth session of the legislature, it has consistently determined that medical assistance shall be furnished only to those who are considered as “categorically needy.”
After enactment at the special legislative session the Department of Public Assistance adopted numerous rules and operating policies and procedures, including Section 3161, Manual of Operating Policies and Procedures. This particular section pertains to the matter of eligibility for medical assistance and limits the eligibility to
“(1) Recipients of money payments for Old Age Assistance, Aid to the Blind, *69Aid to Dependent Children (including all children and adults included in the Aid to Dependent Children payment) and Aid to the Permanently and Totally Disabled; (7-1-66).
(2) Individuals, who upon application would be eligible for money payments under any of the above categories. * * * (9-15-69).
(3) Children under 21 in foster homes or private institutions for whom the Department is assuming financial responsibility in whole or in part (4-1-70).”
Section 3163.2, Manual of Operating Policies and Procedures, provides:
“The test of eligibility for Medical Assistance is the test of eligibility under one of the four assistance categories. * * * ”
The foregoing quoted provisions from the department’s Manual of Operating Policies and Procedures is a clear indication of the interpretation the department has made of I.C. § 56-209b, the questioned statute. These rules were adopted pursuant to the legislative authority of I.C. § 56-201 (o),1 § 56-202,2 and I.C. 56-203.3
That the legislature itself has accepted the department’s interpretation of I.C. § 56-209b that medical assistance is to be furnished only to the “categorically needy” is demonstrated by the fact that since enactment of I.C. §§ 67-5217 and 52184 in 1969 the department’s rules and regulations have been submitted to the legislature and no action has been taken by that body.5
Further proof of the legislature’s acceptance of the department’s statutory inter*70pretation of I.C. § 56-209b is to be found in the Executive Budget 1972-73 at page 163 thereof, wherein there is set forth the breakdown of the average number and average monthly payments for the four categories of recipients. On that page it is specifically stated that
“The following items are not included in the budget as presented but should be considered:
1. The following programs would be beneficial to the health and well-being of Idahoans :
a. Unemployment parent program under the Aid to Dependent Children program.
b. Medically needy program for all Idahoans.
c. General Assistance program. * * * >»
The legislature in making the appropriation to the Department of Social and Rehabilitation Services, did not expand the department’s request. S.L.1972, Ch. 363, p. 1069.
It is my conclusion that the majority opinion has failed to consider the legislative and departmental interpretation of the statute and is imposing upon the department demands beyond its fiscal capacity to fulfill, and further that the trial court was in error in its interpretation of I.C. § 56-209b.
While the majority opinion by reason of its conclusion did not reach another issue presented by the appellant in this case, under my view that the trial court erred in its determination, I am obligated to consider it.
This additional issue is the contention by the appellant that the district court erred in its ruling that sections 3161 and 3150.1 of the department’s regulations, arbitrarily, capriciously and unreasonably excluded from medical assistance persons who did not qualify under one of the four categories for public assistance. This same argument attacks the district court’s ruling that the exclusion of medical needy who do not otherwise qualify for assistance is likewise arbitrary, capricious, unreasonable, and violative of I.C. § 56-209b, and is an abuse of administrative discretion by the department. In considering this argument, it is to be pointed out that the legislature by statute required that medical assistance be granted to any one who was eligible under the four categories mentioned in I.C. § 56-209b, and provided it should also be awarded “to such other persons as may be defined under the authority of this act”. (Emphasis added.) As previously pointed out, I am of the opinion that the legislature then left it to the department itself to make this definition by rule. The department under this authority then adopted the rules in question which make ineligible anyone with a monthly income in excess of $152.80. In effect the trial court ruled that this income standard is an unreasonable and discriminatory classification and hence constitutionally impermissible.
The Supreme Court of the United States in Dandridge v. Williams, 397 U.S. 471, 90 S.Ct. 1153, 25 L.Ed.2d 491 (1970), involving the question of whether a Maryland statute providing for aid to dependent children was unconstitutional in fixing a maximum amount to be paid to any family regardless of the number of children in the family, stated:
“In the area of economics and social welfare, a State does not violate the Equal Protection Clause merely because the classifications made by its laws are imperfect. If the classification has some ‘reasonable basis,’ it does not offend the Constitution simply because the classification ‘is not made with mathematical nicety or because in practice it results in some inequality.’ Lindsley v. Natural Carbonic Gas Co., 220 U.S. 61, 78, 31 S.Ct. 337, 340, 55 L.Ed. 369. ‘The problems of government are practical ones and may justify, if they do not require, rough accommodations — illogical, it may *71be, and unscientific.’ Metropolis Theatre Co. v. City of Chicago, 228 U.S. 61, 69-70, 33 S.Ct. 441, 443, 57 L.Ed. 730. A statutory discrimination will not be set aside if any state of facts reasonably may be conceived to justify it.’ McGowan v. Maryland, 366 U.S. 420, 426,
81 S.Ct. 1101, 1105, 6 L.Ed.2d 393.
To be sure, the cases cited, and many others enunciating this fundamental standard under the Equal Protection Clause, have in the main involved state regulation of business and industry. The administration of public welfare assistance, by contrast, involves the most basic economic needs of impoverished human beings. We recognize the dramatically real factual difference between the cited cases and this one, but we can find no basis for applying a different constitutional standard. See Snell v. Wyman, D.C., 281 F.Supp. 853, aff’d, 393 U.S. 323, 89 S.Ct. 553, 21 L.Ed.2d 511. It is a standard that has consistently been applied to state legislation restricting the availability of employment opportunities. Goesaert v. Cleary, 335 U.S. 464, 69 S.Ct. 198, 93 L.Ed. 163; Kotch v. Board of River Port Pilot Com’rs, 330 U.S. 552, 67 S.Ct. 910, 91 L. Ed. 1093. See also Flemming v. Nestor, 363 U.S. 603, 80 S.Ct. 1367, 4 L.Ed.2d 1435. And it is a standard that is true to the principle that the Fourteenth Amendment gives the federal courts no power to impose upon the States their views of what constitutes wise economic or social policy.” 396 U.S. 485-486, 90 S.Ct. 1161-1162.
See also, Jefferson v. Hackney, 406 U.S. 535, 92 S.Ct. 1724, 32 L.Ed.2d 285 (1972).
Respondents, however, take exception to reliance upon Dandridge v. Williams, supra, as authority that the department’s rules are not constitutionally discriminatory. They claim the instant case is distinguishable from Dandridge on the basis that in Dandridge the case was dealing with a maximum limitation on aid to families with dependent children while in this case the question is whether the individual respondents are going to receive anything at all.
A similar contention to that of respondents was presented in the case of Fullington v. Shea, 320 F.Supp. 500 (D.C.1970), Rehearing Denied, 404 U.S. 963, 92 S.Ct. 345, 30 L.Ed.2d 282. In that case the opinion pointed to the following statement contained in McGowan v. Maryland, 366 U.S. 420, 81 S.Ct. 1101, 6 L.Ed.2d 393 (1961),
“A statutory discrimination will not be set aside if any state of facts reasonably may be conceived to justify it.” 320 F. 'Supp. at 506.
and also the statement in Dandridge,
“ * * * [I]t does not offend the Constitution simply because the classification ‘is not made with mathematical nicety or because in practice it results in some inequality.’ * * 320 F.Supp. at 506.
The Court in Fullington v. Shea found a rational basis on which discrimination was acceptable, i.e. “superimposition” of a program whereby needy recipients would be selected by an income formula which accounts for necessary monthly medical expenses — a “spenddown” formula 6 — could conceivably create significant administrative difficulties and uncertainties and also could encourage excessive medical expenses and resultant waste, factors affecting the state’s ever present need for preserving revenue. 320 F.Supp. at 506, 507.
What was said in Fullington v. Shea is applicable to the present case. At oral argument and in its brief, appellant alludes to the very complex problem facing the legislature when it considered the implementation of the Title XIX program of the Social Security Act in Idaho. It was pointed out that the cost of fully implementing it by bringing into its sphere of coverage persons other than those presently receiving payments under one of the *72four categories was unknown.7 During the course of the years since then the legislature has had an opportunity to change the rules and regulations, but has not seen fit to do so (see n. 4, 5), even though it has had to annually fund the various programs of the department.
It is my conclusion that under Title XIX of the Social Security Act, it was optional with the states as to whether medical assistance would be furnished to other than those categories receiving public assistance; that the department rules and regulations were enacted pursuant to legislative authority and that the classification brought about by the application of such rules and regulations is founded upon a rational basis, and the state’s decision not to exercise the option is constitutionally permissible.
In conclusion, it is appropriate to repeat the language of the Court in Fullington v. Shea, statements I deem applicable to the instant appeals:
“The plaintiffs have presented a case in which gross inequity is apparent, especially in the extreme cases used to demonstrate the problem presented to this Court, but this fact cannot serve as a basis for our overturning a program on constitutional grounds.” 320 F.Supp. at 507.
The judgments of the district court should be reversed and the causes remanded for the district court to enter judgments in conformity with this opinion.
SHEPARD, J., concurs.. I.C. § 56-201(o). “As used in this act: (o) ‘Medical assistance’ shall mean payments for part or all of the cost of such care and services enumerated in section 1905(a)(1) through (15) of the Federal Social Security Act as amended by the Social Security Act amendments of 1965, Public Law 89-97, 89th congress, as may be designated by the department by rule and regulation.” (Emphasis added.)
. I.C. § 56-202. “The state department shall:
(a) * * *
(b) Establish and enforce such rules and regulations and such methods of administration as may be necessary or proper to carry out the provisions of this act; * *
. I.C. § 56-203. “The state department shall have the power to:
* * X *
(g) define medically needy individuals in such terms as will meet requirements for federal financial participation in medical assistance payments. * * *
. I.C. § 67-5217. “Transmittal of rules for legislative action — Referral to appropriate legislative committee.- — All rules heretofore or hereafter authorized or promulgated by any state agency, including all rules kept and maintained by the state law library, as provided in chapter 52, title 67, Idaho Code, shall be transmitted to the secretary of the senate and the chief clerk of the house of representatives by the law librarian of the state law library before the first day of file regular session of the legislature next following the promulgation or publication thereof. The law librarian of the state law library shall similarly file during any regular session of the legislature all rules promulgated between the first day of the session and adjournment sine die thereof. The secretary of the senate and the chief clerk of the house of representatives shall lay all such rules before the senate and house of representatives, respectively, and the same shall be referred to the respective standing committees in the same manner- as bills are referred to the committees.”
I.C. § 67-5218. “Effect of committee action. — If the committee to which any rule shall have been referred, or any member of the legislature, shall be of the opinion that such rule is violative of the legislative intent of the statute under which such rule was made, a resolution may be adopted rejecting, amending or modifying the same. Every rule promulgated within the authority conferred by law, and in accordance with the provisions of chapter 52, title 67, Idaho Code, shall be in full force and effect until the same is rejected, amended or modified by the legislature.” ,
.Senate Journal 2d Reg.Sess. 40th Legis. 1970, p. 10; House Journal 2d Reg. Sess., 40th Legis., 1970, p. 13; Senate Journal, 1st Reg.Sess. 41st Legis., 1971, p. 9; House Journal, 1st Reg.Sess. 41st Legis., 1971, p. 23; Senate Journal 2d Reg.Sess., 41st Legis., 1972, p. 9; House Journal 2d Reg.Sess. 41st Legis., 1972, p. 16.
. See 42 U.S.C.A. § 1396(a) (17).
. Congress clearly recognized the problem of limited state resources in funding the old-age assistance and medical assistance for the aged programs. 42 U.S.C.A. § 301 reads:
“For the purpose (a) of enabling each State, as far as practicable under the conditions in such State, to furnish financial assistance to aged needy individuals, (b) of enabling each State, as far as practicable under the conditions in such State, to furnish medical assistance on behalf of aged individuals who are not recipients of old-age assistance but whose income and resources are insufficient to meet the costs of necessary medical services * *
(Emphasis added.) See also, 42 U.S. O.A. §§ 1381, 1396.
The State has the authority to define the standard of need of individuals who could receive benefits. See 42 U.S.C.A. §§ 1382, 1396a(a) (5) ; King v. Smith, 392 U.S. 309, 88 S.Ct. 2128, 20 L.Ed.2d 1118 (1968) ; Dandridge v. Williams, supra.