dissenting.
I cannot agree that either fundamental principles of justice and fair play or any violation of legal tenets requires the reversal and remand of this case. The licensee was first given an opportunity to correct his allegedly improper practices, then asked to explain, and finally to defend them before a board of his fellow doctors. At the hearing he was represented by two leading law firms that had previously filed a written response to the complaint indicating that he fully understood what he was expected to meet. Before any testimony was taken it was stipulated that proper notice had been given. A review of the record discloses both the objectivity and the sincerity of the doctors who took part in the unpleasant duty of administering discipline to one of their fellows, and the penetrating questions that the board members asked, sua sponte, reflected not only their own qualifications in the profession but also their recognition of the licensee’s improper practices and the long delayed reports, which were productive of and a cover for the misconduct. The malfeasance is readily apparent from the record, and it is surprising that the discipline resulting from the hearing should have been minimal, as it was.
Notwithstanding statements to the contrary, the findings of the board reported in the court’s opinion recited basic facts, sufficient in law under the requirements heretofore pronounced by the United States Supreme Court when Mr. Justice Cardozo said, “We must know what a decision means before the duty becomes ours to say whether it is right or wrong.” United States of America v. Chicago, Milwaukee, St. Paul & Pacific Railroad Company, 294 U.S. 499, 55 S.Ct. 462, 467, 79 L.Ed. 1023, 1032. In the instant situation the findings of the board are clear and any disparagement of the proceedings for their insufficiency is unwarranted.
Aside from the matter of findings, it would profit little to here present rebuttals for the reasons given as justifying the reversal and remand. Suffice to say that the statute authorizing the board to revoke or suspend the license of a person to practice medicine, § 33-340, W.S.1957, is most general, and prior to the time of this hearing *332neither the legislature nor this court had seen fit to establish applicable procedure. In the future, of course, such hearings will be governed by the Administrative Procedure Act and Rule 72.1, W.R.C.P.
The results of a fair and objective disciplinary proceeding, which has withstood the careful scrutiny of a trial court, should not be frustrated except for a most serious and patent miscarriage of justice — not disclosed by the record in this case. Certainly everyone will agree that professional men and women can more effectively and fairly police their own ethical behavior than can those from other walks of life or administrative agencies, and few should be willing to approve an arrangement whereby judicial bodies assume to be the arbiters of such internal problems or overthrow disciplinary action for technical reasons.
I would affirm the judgment of the trial court.