dissenting.
I agree with the majority that evidence may be offered which provides a basis to decide that an employe is acting within the scope of his employment even though he is going to or coming from work. However, I disagree with the majority’s conclusion that, as a matter of law, Eubanks’ travel was work related or employer sponsored and, as a matter of law, took him outside the coming and going rule. The determination of whether Eubanks was merely on his way to work or was acting within the scope of his employment is a question of fact which was properly left for the jury to decide.
The majority treats two facts, change in work place and mileage reimbursement, as legally controlling. Those facts are relevant, but neither, in isolation or in combination, *505is determinative of the issue of scope of employment. Other facts make the issue a question for the jury.
Despite the change in work place, the accident occurred when Eubanks was driving to work, not while he was at work. The majority relies on Calif. Cas. Ins. v. David Douglas School Dist., 71 Or App 549, 693 P2d 54, on reconsideration 74 Or App 270, 702 P2d 1115, rev den 300 Or 249 (1985), for the conclusion that Eubanks’ conduct was within the scope of his employment as a matter of law. That reliance is misplaced, because the evidence in this case is different. There, the employe’s job included making an additional trip back to school to supervise an evening dance. In this case, Eubanks was employed only to supervise, not to drive or to make a trip beyond his regular work day. Further, he was on the road, not because his employer required him to be, but because he elected to drive rather than to stay in Astoria. Presumably, he made that decision for his own convenience and not, as the majority states, “solely for Knappton’s purpose and at its direction.” 91 Or App at 504.
On the facts proved, the jury was not compelled to conclude that Eubanks was within the scope of his employment. Because more than one reasonable conclusion can be drawn from the facts, the issue was properly submitted to the jury for its resolution. See Stanfield v. Laccoarce, 284 Or 651, 655, 588 P2d 1271 (1978).
I dissent.