I concur in the judgment. I do not, however, share the majority’s degree of confidence that the Legislature, by enacting Penal Code section 667.6, subdivision (c),1 could not possibly have intended to except sentences computed under subdivision (c) from the prohibition against double punishment for multiple violations of the Penal Code based on the “same act or omission.”
The Court of Appeal concluded below that, in several respects, the express language of section 667.6, subdivision (c) lends support to the People’s position that the Legislature did in fact intend subdivision (c) to authorize separate punishment for lewd and lascivious conduct and other forcible sex crimes—even where the latter offenses constitute the lewd and lascivious conduct charged in the case.2 At the very least then, the statute is ambiguous on this point.
*827I therefore write separately to emphasize that the Legislature, should it elect to do so, remains clearly empowered to except section 667.6, subdivision (c), from the “same act or omission” limitation on multiple punishment of section 654.
The majority correctly notes that section 654 “expresses a legal principle that has been a part of our penal jurisprudence for over a century.” (Maj. opn., ante, at p. 824.) But as the Court of Appeal aptly observed below: “Subject to constitutional restrictions, the Legislature may punish crimes in any manner it sees fit. (People v. Dillon (1983) 34 Cal.3d 441, 477 [194 Cal.Rptr. 390, 668 P.2d 697]; Keeler v. Superior Court (1970) 2 Cal.3d 619, 631 [87 Cal.Rptr. 481, 470 P.2d 617, 40 A.L.R.3d 420].) The rule against multiple punishment for a single act derives solely from section 654. (People v. Tideman (1962) 57 Cal.2d 574, 578, 585 [21 Cal.Rptr. 207, 370 P.2d 1007].) It is not the equivalent of the constitutional prohibition against punishment for included offenses or double jeopardy. (People v. Greer (1947) 30 Cal.2d 589, 601 [184 P.2d 512]; People v. Kehoe (1949) 33 Cal.2d 711, 713 [204 P.2d 321]; and see Gore v. United States (1958) 357 U.S. 386, 392 [2 L.Ed.2d 1405, 1410, 78 S.Ct. 1280].) Thus, the Legislature is free to modify this rule if it so desires. (People v. Greer, supra, 30 Cal.2d at p. 603.) In fact, Greer specifically noted there was no constitutional impediment to punishing the defendant once for statutory rape and once for lewd and lascivious conduct for the same act. (30 Cal.2d at p. 603.)”
Similarly, the United States Supreme Court has squarely held that multiple punishments may be imposed for a single act notwithstanding the double jeopardy clause if that is the Legislature’s clear intention. (See, e.g., Missouri v. Hunter (1983) 459 U.S. 359, 366-367 [74 L.Ed.2d 535, 542-543, 103 S.Ct. 673]; Albernaz v. United States (1981) 450 U.S. 333, 344 [67 L.Ed.2d 275, 284-285, 101 S.Ct. 1137].)
Fundamentally then, the Legislature is empowered to except the statutory scheme of section 667.6, subdivision (c) from the limitation on multiple punishment of section 654. Although unquestionably severe, such an exception would not be inconsistent with the Penal Code’s harsh treatment of certain sex offenders. Section 667.6 was enacted as part of a legislative *828package which dealt with violent sexual offenses. (Stats. 1979, ch. 944, § 10, p. 3258.) We have recognized the obvious legislative intent behind section 667.6 as authorizing much harsher sentences than are authorized under section 1170.1 for the enumerated sex offenses; e.g., violent sex crimes against the very young. (People v. Belmontes (1983) 34 Cal.3d 335, 343-344 [193 Cal.Rptr. 882, 667 P.2d 686].)
I agree with the conclusion of the Court of Appeal below that while imposition of multiple punishments is harsh, it is not per se unreasonable in the context of violent sex crimes against the very young. One who commits a violent sex act upon a yoxing child exhibits an aggravated culpability deserving of a heightened level of punishment. From the standpoint of punishment in this case, the majority’s rationale would appear to draw no distinction in the severity of sentence between forcible sex crimes committed against a nine-year-old child, as occurred here, and the same crimes committed against a person over the age of majority.
Given the much harsher sentences which can result under the alternative sentencing scheme of section 667.6, subdivision (c), it is particularly appropriate that the wording of its provisions be precise and clear. (See People v. Greer, supra, 30 Cal.2d at p. 603.) If the Legislature chooses to except aggregate sentences under section 667.6, subdivision (c), from the limitation on multiple punishment embodied in section 654, it can do so in plain, unambiguous language. An explicit reference in the subdivision exempting computation of sentences thereunder from application of section 654 would leave no room for ambiguity, and avoid the need for an overlay of judicial construction.
With these observations, I concur in the judgment.
All statutory references are to the Penal Code unless otherwise specified.
The Court of Appeal pointed out, inter alia: “Section 667.6, subdivision (c) may be applied ‘in lieu of section 1170.1 [fn. omitted]. Section 1170.1 is specifically limited by section 654; section 667.6, subdivision (c) is not. Even more telling, section 667.6, subdivision (c) *827provides 'a full, separate, and consecutive term may be imposed for each violation of [§§ 261, subd. (2)(forcible rape); 286, subd. (c)(sodomy with a person under 14 years of age or against the victim’s will by means of force) and 288, subd. (b)(lewd and lascivious conduct with a minor under 14 years of age by use of force)].’ (Italics added.) [[[] Recognition that the same act may violate more than one penal law is the very reason why section 654 was enacted. (See, People v. Beamon (1973) 8 Cal.3d 625, 636 [105 Cal.Rptr. 681, 504 P.2d 905].) Therefore, the Legislature’s use of the word ‘violation’ in section 667.6, subdivision (c) instead of the word ‘conviction,’ which it used in section 1170.1, subdivision (a), is convincing evidence subdivision (c) applies irrespective of the limitation on punishment contained in section 654."