concurring: The only theory upon which the legal conclusion of the trial court and of the dissenting opinion can be supported may be boldly stated as follows: Reynolds Dawkins was conducting the Gospel Tabernacle as a commercial enterprise for his own monetary advancement. True, he gave the people certain psychological and spiritual benefits in return for their church contributions, but legally, all of the alms of these people — who were often very poor people — became the personal property of Daw-kins. That being true, Mrs. Dawkins, after twenty-seven years of married life, is entitled to alimony from this commercial enterprise of her husband. This theory of commercial enterprise, is the theory adopted by the Dawkins daughter in the statement mentioned by ■the trial court in its findings and quoted in the dissenting opinion.
No church law or secular law which would uphold a minister of the gospel in so “milking” his followers, however untutored they may be, has been found. Mr. Dawkins made no such claim, and the lower court found no fraud upon his part.
The dissenting opinion quotes one sentence from the opinion of *334the trial court which reads: “Justice in this case demands that plaintiff have the right to occupy this home which was built for her out of the goodness of the hearts of the members of this congregation.”
Neither this nor the quotation from the memorandum of the trial court on motion for new trial would seem to be a finding that the “members” intended that the title of the house should be in the parsons wife. We do not think the learned trial judge went so far as to make such a finding. There is no dispute that much of the money used to build the house was contributed or borrowed by the members of the church.
There were a comparatively few former members who did testify they did have such an idea at the time they made their contributions for the building of the parsonage that it would be the wife’s own house. But there were many who testified the house was built as a parsonage for the church. The trial court did not find to the contrary, but simply found “that the church and Reverend Daw-kins are one and the same — that neither the church nor the Board of Trustees had an independent identity separate and apart from the minister.”
The record appears to show without cavil that the parsonage property stood in the name of the church trustees at all times; that it was built with the help of a loan from defendant bank in the sum of $10,000. This mortgage was signed by the trustees of the church. The building was marked by a sign reading “Parsonage.” When it was placed on the building we think is somewhat in doubt, but there is evidence which would definitely refute the statement in the dissenting opinion. The trial court made no finding on that point. On completion of the tabernacle, all of the church debt was consolidated in a mortgage by the church trustees in the sum of $45,000, which covers the church building itself and the parsonage.
Thus, in granting alimony to the wife, the trial court was compelled to say:
“Title to the real property commonly known and designated as 903 Argentine Boulevard will be ordered deeded to LaVerne Dawkins, and upon the failure of defendants to execute such a deed to the plaintiff, this decree shall stand in lieu thereof.” (Italics supplied.)
It may be noted that the trial court avoided the possibility of having to hold the church trustees in contempt should they refuse to deed the church property to the divorced wife of the minister *335by noting that its decree might operate in rem as the statute provides.
It is true the trial court was much interested in a sum of $7,000 which seemed to belong to Dawkins. The court said Dawkins lied concerning the use of this fund. The only evidence that any of this money went into the 903 Argentine property seemed to come from Dawkins himself. He testified he made a contribution to the building fund.
In the end, the trial court said:
“Now, I think Reverend Dawkins has a conscience; I am not convinced that he made away with church funds.”
As I understand, this court is not holding that Mrs. Dawkins may not have alimony and child support from funds and property belonging to Dawkins. What it does say is that the rights of the members of the Gospel Tabernacle must be considered. One of those members testified in relation to the fund raising campaign to build the parsonage:
“When Reverend Dawkins returned from the camp-ground, he made the statement that he wanted to build a home, but that it would be a parsonage and whoever succeeded might be living in it. It was theirs as long as he was the pastor and she was his wife. He made this statement from the pulpit. I was there and heard it. I contributed to the parsonage, probably two or three hundred dollars. At the time I made the contribution I didnlt even own the bed I slept in, so I don’t believe I would have been stupid enough to give a home personally for one woman. I knew it belonged to the church. I didn’t intend for my contribution in any way to enrich Reverend Dawkins and his wife personally. I wanted them to have the comforts of home, but it belonged to the church.”
We do not believe tbat under the findings of the trial court, this property standing in the name of the church trustees should be transferred to the wife of the minister upon the theory that this church was only a commercial enterprise belonging to Mr. Daw-kins. Mrs. Dawkins was a minister’s wife for twenty-seven years and she is entitled to no more right to the church property than the wife of any other minister.
The dissenting opinion notes that Dawkins often took title to real estate in his own name, sold it under contract, and had no adequate bookkeeping system. Most of these transactions were made during the period of the post 1951 flood days, when the minister is conceded to have played an important part in the rehabilitation of the area around the church. Many of the people he helped were *336members of his flock or became members. While there is no reason to especially defend the Reverend Mr. Dawkins in making this decision of the court, it may be noted that the dissenting opinion quotes from only one side of a disputed question of fact as to the method of issuance of insurance policies to the members of the church. The trial court made no specific finding in reference thereto. At best, it would only be evidence that the church and Dawkins were one — that the church is a commercial enterprise. If Mr. Dawkins were fraudulent — which the trial court found he was' not-r — this court of equity should impose a trust for the benefit of the church, not destroy the trust.
I refuse to be a party to. holding that any man’s church — whatever may be its church government or doctrine — shall be considered by-a court of law and equity to be merely a commercial enterprise for the benefit of the preacher. I also refuse to enter into the doctrinal disputes between the Reverend Messrs. Dawkins and Jolly.