(concurring in the result).
The defendant Commission based its denial of compensation to the plaintiffs upon Section 42-2a-5, U. C. A. 1943, which provides a worker shall be ineligible for benefits if:
“(a) * * * he has left voluntarily without good cause, * *
The denial of compensation was apparently based on this f inding:
“You were unemployed because in accordance with your union principles you did not choose to cross the picket line which had been established by the Switchmen’s Union.”
The opinion of the CHIEF JUSTICE affirms the ruling on that ground.
It seems to me that such finding and determination rests upon an entirely false premise: “That the claimants actually had freedom of choice.” To say that claimants re*561fused to work “voluntarily and without good cause” is a fiction which wholly ignores realities. The question, Did they have “good cause” for not working? should be correlated to the facts of life. The correct test to be applied is: Was the cause such as would justify a reasonable person in leaving his work?
A forthright and intelligent exposition of the question of voluntariness in refusing to work is contained in Bliley Electric Co. v. Unemployment Compensation Board of Review, 158 Pa. Super. 548, 45 A. 2d 898, 903:
“When therefore the pressure of real not imaginary, substantial not trifling, reasonable not whimsical, circumstances compel the decision to leave employment, the decision is voluntary in the sense that the worker has willed it, but involuntary because outward pressures have compelled it. Or to state it differently, if a worker leaves his employment when he is compelled to do so by necessitous circumstances or because of legal or family obligations, his leaving is voluntary with good cause, and under the act he is entitled to benefits. The pressure of necessity, of legal duty, or family obligations, or other overpowering circumstances and his capitulation to them transform what is ostensibly voluntary unemployment into involuntary unemployment.”
See also Schindler-Collective Bargaining and Unemployment Insurance Legislation, 38 Col. L. Rev. 858; Lesser, Eligibility and Disqualification, 55 Yale L. J. 115, 158, Lesser, after discussing a number of the positions that administrative bodies have taken in interpreting unemployment compensation acts, comes to the conclusion that “good cause” as used in such acts means such “cause” as would justify a reasonable person in leaving his work.
In order to make a fair analysis of the situation, it is necessary to consider it from the point of view of the claimant. According to the evidence in this proceeding, union members generally are bound by an oath that they will not violate picket lines. It is a well known fact that this obligation is seriously and universally accepted by members of organized labor and that they do not and will *562not go through picket lines. After being advised that his union was honoring the picket line, the claimant had two choices: (1) to attempt to go through the picket line and work; and (2) to honor the picket line and refuse to work. Either choice would have compelled him to deal with the eventualities. If he abided by the admonition of his union and kept faith with his obligations to it, the likelihood was that the dispute would be ironed out within a reasonable time and he would be back to work with no great harm done. If he chose the other alternative, to refuse to honor the picket line, he was faced with certain other serious considerations.
First and most immediate of these would have been the fear of actual violence. There was testimony that a large group of union men were there; that they resented and were emotionally disturbed by men crossing picket lines; that the claimants feared such violence; and that some thought they would have been stopped somehow. It is plausibly argued, and perhaps correctly as a matter of law, that in the absence of evidence to the contrary, we must assume that the picketing would be carried on peaceably and within the limits permitted by law. This assumption has an element of danger in it which should be pointed out. If men are to be denied unemployment compensation for refusing to go through peaceful picket lines, it requires only a second thought to suggest, that where the families of workers may be threatened with hunger or want merely because the picket line is peaceful, it wouldn’t take much of a disturbance to change that situation into a picket line that would not be regarded as peaceful and the employee would then be justified in not crossing it and compensation could be awarded. I doubt the wisdom of establishing a rule which might tempt men at the expense of their family’s welfare to try to cross picket lines or otherwise cause disturbances which may render the picket line other than peaceful. Unsatisfactory as the situation existing above would be, there are other reasons, which seem more im*563portant still, why it would be unrealistic to expect a workman to cross the picket line.
The second matter of serious concern to the claimant would have been the economic consequences. From that point of view, it would seem inadvisable because he would in all likelihood lose his union membership, and as soon as the dispute was settled, lose his job. Not only would he lose that employment, but also be unable to procure other similar employment where union men were used. Even if he continued to work on this same job, he would have engendered the ill will and disapproval of his fellow workers and always thereafter suffer the stigma of being regarded as a man who would not abide by his obligations and keep faith with the group; be known as and called a “scab” and other epithets still less complimentary in character. Such disapproval might bring all manner of ill treatment and reprisals from his coworkers who kept faith with the union and honored the picket line so that it would be virtually impossible to work with them.
A third sphere in which he would suffer serious disadvantage is the social consequences. It must be realized that one of the strongest motivations of human conduct is the desire for approval by one’s associates, not only in his work, but more important, socially, for himself and his family. The town of Garfield and other adjacent towns where these employees reside are union towns. The claimant and his family would be subject to social disgrace and ostracism in all their social contacts, even the church and the children in school. It may be difficult for persons who are not acquainted with this atmosphere to sense the full implication of the social sanctions aimed against one who is regarded as disloyal and traitorous to the group interests. Union members would undoubtedly rather go to work, suffering from a serious illness, or even a broken leg, than go through a picket line, and could do so with less dire consequences to themselves and their families.
*564Not presuming to pass upon such matters at this time, I venture that if a confession in a criminal case were exacted, or a contract procured to be signed, or a will to be executed, under pain of the consequences which threatened claimants if they passed this picket line, such documents would be invalid because of duress and undue influence. Yet in this area of the law, we are asked to accept the idea that these men, voluntarily and without good carne, failed to go to work.
Even if the employee had the moral courage and fortitude to go against the whole organization of men with which he worked, most reasonable men would believe it foolhardy to do so in view of the possible consequences. To require a man to suffer the indignity, disgrace and risk, socially and economically, involved in going through a picket line, places a burden on them that they will not bear.
A sound rule of law cannot be established upon the false assumption that because men have a technical legal right to go through a picket line, that they will do it and suffer the consequences. Whether the law regards it as “good cause” or not, the cause is just sufficient that union men uniformly are controlled in their conduct by it. I, therefore, think it manifest beyond peradventure of doubt that there is no basis in fact or reason for the finding that the refusal of these claimants to work could properly be classified as “voluntary and without good cause”.
The finding of the Commission seems to clearly indicate that its determination was based on the freedom of choice of the individual. However the same reasoning applies if it be contended that the choice not to cross the picket line was made by the union for the claimant.
The foregoing has been set out because I believe the order of the Commission and the prevailing opinion affirming it are based upon the wrong statute and erroneous reasoning.
*565Notwithstanding what has been said above, it seems unquestionable that the claimants are disqualified from receiving unemployment compensation under another section of our statute which applies to them. Section 42-2a-5, U. C. A. 1943 provides:
“An individual shall be ineligible for benefits * * *
“(d) For any week in which it is found by the commission that his unemployment is due to a stoppage of work which exists because of a strike involving his grade, class, or group of workers * *
Although the inquiry did not proceed upon the theory that claimants engaged in the strike, the undisputed facts show that this was the case. Neither the fact that they had no dispute with the employer, nor that their work stoppage was not called a strike, are controlling. A strike is generally defined to be a concerted action of employees in withholding services from their employer. Any such concerted action in refusing to perform services is a strike, no matter what the action may be called, nor for whatever purpose it may have been initiated.
The executive board of the union, when informed that the Switchmen’s Union was going to establish a picket line, voted to honor it, and to refrain from reporting to work and so notified its members. A committee of union members, representing the union, went into the plant for the purpose of informing employees therein that they should leave their work because of the picket line. There is no theory under which such concerted action in refusing to work can be interpreted and classified as anything other than a strike. The legislature has expressly provided in Section 5 (d) hereinabove referred to that under such circumstances unemployment benefits shall not be awarded. The wisdom and purpose of that provision is not our present concern.
It will be noted that the determination made in the case of Bodinson Mfg. Co. v. California Employment Comm., 17 Cal. 2d 321, 109 P. 2d 935, 940, cited in the main opin*566ion, was grounded on the fact that claimants left their work because of a trade dispute. The court said:
“Fairly interpreted, it [the statute] was intended to disqualify those workers who voluntarily leave their work because of a trade dispute. Co-respondents in this proceeding in fact ‘left their work because of a trade dispute’ and are consequently ineligible to receive benefit payments.”
In American Brahe Shoe Company v. Annunzio, 405 Ill. 44, 90 N. E. 2d 83, 85, claimants who did not cross a picket line set up by members of another union were held disqualified, the courts saying,
“* * * that they were either participating in the labor dispute * * * or voluntarily remained away from their employment, * * * ”
The statutes of both California and Illinois include the term “trade dispute” with “strike” as a disqualification. Note also the Oregon Appeals Referee case referred to in the prevailing opinion which states clearly that the basis of the holding is that the claimant honoring the picket line is participating in the dispute. It is submitted that most of the cases cited by defendants are actually decided on that ground, which as I have attempted to demonstrate, is the logical basis upon which the award is denied.
From the undisputed facts as shown by the claimants themselves, there can be no escape from the facts that they were engaged in conduct which must be classified as a strike. Therefore, no purpose could be served by sending the matter back for further inquiry upon the matter of whether a strike existed as contrasted to refusing to work “voluntarily and without good cause”.
For the reason that the conduct of the claimants involved a strike of the grade, class or group of workers to which they belonged, I concur in affirming the order of the Commission.
HENRIOD, J., not participating.