OPINION
CONTRERAS, Presiding Judge.This special action came on regularly for oral argument on April 21, 1992, before Presiding Judge Joe W. Contreras with Judges Ruth V. McGregor and Noel Fidel participating. The matter was taken under advisement and it was determined that an opinion should issue without delay.
After consideration, a majority of the court has concluded that the respondent judge erred in ordering that dual juries be empaneled in this first degree murder case in which the state has requested the imposition of the death penalty. In State v. Lambright, 138 Ariz. 63, 673 P.2d 1 (1983), the Arizona Supreme Court clearly prohibited the use of dual juries1 in the *567absence of approved guidelines. In doing so, the court specifically stated that dual juries should not be used in death penalty cases:
[Bjecause this procedure is unauthorized by our rules, trial courts must obtain the approval of the Supreme Court before conducting further trials in this manner. If proposed guidelines are presented for approval, we will then consider whether they successfully minimize the risks of this procedure while maintaining the benefit of conserving judicial resources.
We note that although courts have utilized the dual jury procedure in other murder cases, including one in which the death penalty was given and affirmed, we feel that death penalty cases are inappropriate vehicles for experimentation with new procedures, and the practice should be avoided in the future.
Id. at 70, 673 P.2d at 8 (emphasis added).
In the present special action, the respondent judge based his ruling that dual juries be empaneled upon article 2, section 2.1 of the Arizona Constitution (the Victims’ Bill of Rights). However, we note that this section does not provide crime victims with any substantive right to have dual juries empaneled. While it does afford victims the right to a speedy trial or disposition, it does not make any reference to the procedures by which this right is to be enforced.
Article 6, section 5 of the Arizona Constitution gives the Arizona Supreme Court the exclusive power to establish rules governing procedural matters in Arizona courts. Lambright, 138 Ariz. at 69, 673 P.2d at 7. A superior court may not supplement or supersede this rule-making power. Id. In Lambright, the supreme court found that the Arizona Rules of Criminal Procedure did not authorize the dual jury procedure. Id. The court has not promulgated any rules authorizing the procedure in the interim. Rule 39, which deals with victims’ rights, does not include any reference to dual juries.
We agree with many of the observations made in the dissent. We should encourage innovative efforts by the trial courts. We also note that the supreme court did indicate in In the Matter of the Rights to the Use of the Gila River, Salt River Project/Salt River Valley Water Users’ Ass’n, 171 Ariz. 230, 830 P.2d 442 (1992), that it might reexamine its Lam-bright decision in criminal cases. However, we further note that the supreme court has not done so and we cannot assume that the court will permit experimentation with dual juries, particularly in cases in which the death penalty is sought for each defendant. Supreme court decisions remain binding until the court itself decides to disaffirm them. State v. Eichorn, 143 Ariz. 609, 694 P.2d 1223 (App.1984). This court cannot ignore a supreme court decision and may not permit the superior court to do so. See State v. Davis, 108 Ariz. 75, 492 P.2d 1182 (1972) (superior court may not review or overrule supreme court decision).
As the respondent judge observed, Justice Feldman specially concurred in Lambright and stated that he would not have required the trial court to obtain the supreme court’s approval before utilizing the dual jury procedure. The majority opinion in Lambright is still the law, however, and it has not become less binding because the authoring judge and the judges who concurred in the decision are no longer members of the court. Changes in court personnel do not affect the validity of a court’s prior ruling. 21 C.J.S. Courts § 144 (1990).
We conclude that the dual jury issue is a purely legal question of statewide importance which Lambright controls and that the petitioners have no plain, speedy, or adequate remedy by appeal from the trial court’s order. Accordingly, a majority of the court in the exercise of its discretion, *568accepts jurisdiction of that portion of the petitioners’ special action that seeks relief from the trial court’s order that dual juries be empaneled. The majority of the court has determined that it is appropriate to grant relief and vacates the trial court’s March 18, 1992, order that dual juries be empaneled and remands this matter to the trial court for such further proceedings as may be appropriate. The court also vacates our prior order staying all proceedings in this matter.
McGREGOR, J., concurs.. As stated in Lambright, this concept contemplates "a single ‘dual jury’ trial in which two *567separate juries [are] empaneled, each to decide the guilt or innocence of only one defendant, and each permitted to hear only evidence admissible against that one defendant.” 138 Ariz. at 67, 673 P.2d at 5. However, the concept also contemplates that the two juries would simultaneously hear evidence which was relevant to and admissible against both defendants.