I concur in the views expressed by Mr. Justice Edmonds. It may also be observed that the majority opinion does not mention, but proceeds inconsistently with, the long established rule that “When language which is reasonably susceptible of two constructions is used in a penal law ordinarily that construction which is more favorable to the offender will be adopted. In other words, criminal statutes will not be built up ‘by judicial grafting upon legis*708lation ... [I] t is also true that the defendant is entitled to the benefit of every reasonable doubt, whether it arise out of a question of fact, or as to the true interpretation of words or the construction of language used in a statute. ’ ’ ’ (People v. Ralph (1944), 24 Cal.2d 575, 581 [150 P.2d 401]; see, also, People v. Valentine (1946), 28 Cal.2d 121, 143 [169 P.2d 1]; Ex parte Rosenheim (1890), 83 Cal. 388, 391 [23 P. 372]; People v. Sayre (1937), 26 Cal.App.2d Supp. 757, 761 [70 P.2d 546].)
The trial court reached its judgment by following well established law; that judgment should be affirmed.
Respondents’ petition for a rehearing was denied March 6, 1950. Edmonds, J., and Schauer, J., voted for a rehearing.