The problem herein presented to this court is not the sufficiency of the evidence to sustain the determination of the issues involved and the reasonableness of the penalty imposed by the real estate commissioner. Upon the issuance of a writ *871of mandate those questions have been adjudicated in the trial de novo in the superior court. The task assigned to this court is to consider the findings of the superior court and examine the evidence in the light of the sufficiency thereof to sustain such findings,—in brief, to conclude if the trial court was correct in determining that under the provisions of section 10176 of the Business and Professions Code there was no substantial misrepresentation (subd. (a)) and no fraud or dishonest dealing (subd. (i)).
Any statement which does not place the buyer or the seller at a disadvantage should not be classified as a “substantial misrepresentation.” Here it is not the making of a statement but the failure to make all the details known to the seller that is the basis of the charge of dishonesty. It is not claimed that any statement made or not made was with intent to defraud or take an undue advantage of the seller. The evidence does not disclose that the seller was in fact injured. The seller, with reference to a conversation had with an attaché of the agent’s office, testified as follows: “As far as I am concerned, I even told her so—as far as I am concerned I will still stand behind the deal even if his time limit had expired to increase his deposit on the purchasing price.”
In support of the claim that the agent was dishonest, the real estate commissioner states that it is not the custom to accept a promissory note in lieu of a check or cash as a deposit on the purchase price. There is the testimony of the agent that in some cases he had adopted the practice and custom of accepting promissory notes. There was no cross-examination to indicate that the testimony to that effect was untrue and no evidence was presented indicating it was not a custom followed under certain circumstances by agents generally. In this connection the trial court stated: “To the contrary, it only appears that the agent followed a practice that has been carried on by brokers, and believed that he was accepting the note for cash and was responsible to the seller therefor. In view of these facts there is no basis whatsoever for the findings and decision made by the Commissioner. They are not supported by the evidence.” There is substantial evidence to support the finding of the trial court. This court may not revalue, nor substitute its opinion for, the findings of the trial court when such findings are supported by the evidence.
The trial court may have concluded that although the penalty imposed by the period of suspension indicated only a *872technical, if any, violation of the act, the findings and “Determination op Issues Presented, ’ ’ as set forth by the commissioner, branded the agent as a dishonest agent, a stigma that never could be lived down. The trial court may have concluded that the power of revocation and suspension of a license to practice a profession or conduct a business should be used only in “justifiable cases” (Jones v. Real Estate Commissioner, 80 Cal.App.2d 592, at p. 600 [182 P.2d 289]).
I am satisfied that the order of the trial court should be affirmed.
A petition for a rehearing was denied March 4, 1950, and respondent’s petition for a hearing by the Supreme Court was denied April 3, 1950. Shenk, J., and Carter, J., voted for a hearing.