I dissent.
Is a person who devotes 46 hours per week to law studies, keeps an irregular and inflexible schedule, maintains a home, and cares for three children “available for work” within the statutory definition? By answering yes, the majority reduce to a nullity the “availability for work” requirement of Unemployment Insurance Code section 1253, subdivision (c).
Although the majority set forth claimant’s school requirements, they refuse to give full effect to them. During her . first quarter of law school, *507she attended classes from 9 a.m. to 2 p.m. on Monday and Tuesday, 10 a.m. to 4 p.m. on Wednesday, and 11 a.m. to 4 p.m. on Thursday and Friday. She studied four hours a day. Her law school activities required more of her than the ordinary full time worker spends on the job. In addition to her schooling, claimant has time burdens of transportation, caring for herself, and maintaining her three children. While claimant had worked part-time during undergraduate school, there is nothing to indicate the school time burdens were nearly so great as her present law school burdens.
The claimant stated that if offered a full-time job she would not be willing to forego her schooling in order to accept unless paid at least $1,000 per month. Obviously, claimants should not be able to remain eligible while rejecting all jobs paying less than $1,000 per month.
Given the claimant’s responsibilities and undertakings apart from employment, it is obvious that accepting substantial employment would be a herculean undertaking. In the circumstances, there is no basis for a finding that she was “available for work” within the meaning of Unemployment Insurance Code section 1253, subdivision (c). The instant case differs substantially from Sanchez v. Unemployment Ins. Appeals Bd. (1977) 20 Cal.3d 55 [141 Cal.Rptr. 146, 569 P.2d 740], where the claimant’s family duties rendered her unable to work on Saturdays and Sundays. There is substantial difference in the limited unavailability in Sanchez compared to the unavailability in the instant case.
Awarding benefits in the instant case and others like it means employers must effectively subsidize education. This is not the function of the Unemployment Compensation Act. The statute “is fundamentally designed to act as a buffer or hedge against the ravages of sudden and unexpected loss of one’s livelihood.” (Zorrero v. Unemployment Ins. Appeals Bd. (1975) 47 Cal.App.3d 434, 439 [120 Cal.Rptr. 855].) The program is not one funded out of general taxes but through compulsory contributions by employers.
In an attempt to minimize the employer subsidization of education, the majority assert that granting the present claim does not require equal treatment for the typical student worker whose summertime employment terminates each fall with the start of classes. Yet, if anything, just the opposite should ordinarily be true. The typical student is much more “available for work” than the present claimant. Relatively few students must set aside as much as 46 hours per week for study commitments. Few *508have undertaken the additional child care and home responsibilities the present claimant has. As such students who wish to work are far more “available for work” during the school term than the present claimant, fairness would seem to require they be eligible for benefits if claimant is.
Moreover, today’s decision can only make it more difficult for students to secure part-time employment. Because employers are required to provide the benefits, they will be reluctant to hire either students or potential students. Faced with the choice between hiring students or others, employers can be expected to avoid the disproportionate exposure to increased unemployment insurance contributions.
I would reverse the judgment.