(dissenting) — All necessary facts herein are stated by the majority. The problem is that the majority is shocked by the result reached by enforcement of the statute according to its express terms. It has been said, “Harsh cases make bad law”.
*410The legislature, by RCW 18.27.080, has abolished any cause of action for compensation for the performance or breach of enumerated contracts unless the plaintiff has a valid certificate of registration as a contractor. The legislature has the right to abolish causes of action. State v. Mountain Timber Co., 75 Wash. 581, 135 P. 645 (1913), aff’d, 243 U.S. 219, 61 L. Ed. 685, 37 S. Ct. 260 (1917). Since the legislature was acting within the scope of its constitutional authority, we are not concerned with the possibility of respondents being unjustly enriched. Suburban Fuel Co. v. Lamoreaux, 4 Wn. App. 179, 480 P.2d 216 (1971).
The Supreme Court of the United States has said, “we must adopt the plain meaning of a statute, however severe the consequences.” Jay v. Boyd, 351 U.S. 345, 357, 100 L. Ed. 1242, 76 S. Ct. 919 (1956). To the same effect, we said in Walker v. Spokane, 62 Wash. 312, 318, 113 P. 775 (1911):
When the language of the act is plain, free from ambiguity, and devoid of uncertainty, it is unanimously held that there is no room for construction, and that inconvenience following the enforcement of the law as expressed can have no weight in the construction of the statute.
In another case we said: “The argument ab inconvenienti is put forth. This argument has no place before a court where the meaning of the statute is clear.” Davies v. Seattle, 67 Wash. 532, 535, 121 P. 987 (1912).
I agree with the majority view that the statute, RCW 18.27.080, bars actions by an unregistered subcontractor against a prime contractor. The language of RCW 18.27.080 is plain and unambiguous when it says:
No person engaged in the business or acting in the capacity of a contractor may bring or maintain any action in any court of this state for the collection of compensation for the performance of any work or for breach of any contract for which registration is required . . .
(Italics mine.)
I, however, disagree with the majority as to whether the work herein involved was within the agricultural exception in RCW 18.27.090 (10).
*411Cooperatives, and especially agricultural cooperatives, are well known in Washington. RCW 23.86, which is primarily derived from chapter 19, Laws of 1913, provides for the organization of such cooperatives. A cooperative is a corporation and, as such, has a legal existence independent of and apart from its members. Many cooperatives engage in a wide range of business activities, including, among others, the sale of gasoline and heating oil to their members. Had the construction here involved been the building of a gasoline or oil storage tank, would the majority still call it “agricultural”? To ask the question is to answer it.
The term “agricultural labor” has been construed in this state several times. While the cases thereon have related to other statutes, the facts are similar. In Squire v. Sumner Rhubarb Growers’ Ass’n, 184 F.2d 94 (9th Cir. 1950), it was held office workers employed by an agricultural cooperative were not “agricultural labor”. Even more pertinent is Cowiche Growers, Inc. v. Bates, 10 Wn.2d 585, 117 P.2d 624 (1941), in which the term “agricultural labor” is defined and such term is held not to apply to employees of a cooperative, even if they are actually engaged in working with fresh fruit. To the same effect is In re Yakima Fruit Growers Ass’n, 20 Wn.2d 202, 146 P.2d 800 (1944), in which Cowiche was cited with approval.
Another and equally strong reason for disagreement with the majority is the exception in RCW 18.27.090(10), which reads: “except when any of the above work is performed by a registered contractor;”. In this instance, respondent was registered.
The rule is well established that a statute should be so construed as to give effect to every part of the statute. In re Kent, 1 Wn. App. 737, 463 P.2d 661 (1969); Star Iron & Steel Co. v. Pierce County, 5 Wn. App. 515, 488 P.2d 776 (1971), adopted by the Supreme Court at 81 Wn.2d 680, 504 P.2d 770 (1972); State ex rel. Wilson v. King County, 7 Wn.2d 104, 109 P.2d 291 (1941); McKenzie v. Mukilteo Water Dist., 4 Wn.2d 103, 102 P.2d 251 (1940).
In McKenzie a proviso or exception was under considera*412tion. In that connection the court said in part at page 112: “Statutes must be construed as a whole, and, if possible, effect must be given to each word, phrase, clause and sentence of the act.”
Here the exception is consistent with the scheme of the whole statute. The exception should be given effect.
For the reasons stated, I believe the judgment of dismissal should be affirmed.
Stafford, J., concurs with Wright, J.
Petition for rehearing denied August 21, 1973.