concurs in result only:
I concur in the result but, for the guidance of trial courts in future cases, would hold that in the special circumstances here presented, the trial court had no discretion. Where the persons who have paid the tap fees in dispute, or their representatives, are readily ascertainable and may assert rights to the tap fees, they must be joined in a declaratory judgment action. Otherwise, the trial court’s order that Denver receive the tap fees collected by Arvada may dispose of money belonging to nonparties without giving them any notice or opportunity to be heard.
When read together, C.R.C.P. 19(a) and 57(j) mandate that those who have paid the tap/ees, or their representatives, be made parties.
This result is clearly indicated by People ex rel. Inter-Church Temperance Movement v. Baker, 133 Colo. 398, 408, 297 P.2d 273, 279 (1956), where we said:
“The indispensable and necessary parties in any declaratory judgment action are those who have conflicting legal interests in the controversy to be adjudicated and whose rights will be affected thereby, and the trial court should insist that jurisdiction be obtained of all such parties either personally or in an appropriate class action under the provisions of Rule 23, R.C.P.Colo.; otherwise the court should dismiss the action, for a declaratory judgment action is intended to completely terminate the controversy, and if the court does not have jurisdiction of such interested parties, its - judgment would not settle the questions presented and thus lead to multifarious litigation.”
If the entire action is not to be dismissed without prejudice (and without awarding the tap fees to either Denver or Arvada), those who have paid the tap fees must be joined.