(concurring in part and dissenting in part).
I concur in the opinion of Chief Judge Wood insofar as it affirms the directed verdict in favor of Sue Bynum and the directed verdict in favor of the plaintiffs on the counterclaim. I dissent from the majority’s reversal as to Oliver Cohen because I think the opinion above departs too greatly from the accepted standards in this state regarding induced breach of contract.
The plaintiffs argued that the directed verdict in favor of Oliver Cohen for induced breach of contract was improper since the defendant offered the statute of frauds as a defense and that this is no defense to the tort alleged. The defendant insists that his defense consisted of more than a mere proffering of the statute of frauds, and included a defense on the merits.
The general rule in this state is that “ . . . one who, without justification or privilege to do so, induces a third person not to perform a contract with another, is liable to the other for the harm caused thereby.” Wolf v. Perry, 65 N.M. 457, 339 P.2d 679 (1959); Williams v. Ashcraft, 72 N.M. 120, 381 P.2d 55 (1963). Not every interference with the business relations of another is tortious, but only where the interference is without justification. The requisite justification exists “ . ■ . where the actor’s motive for doing so is to benefit himself, and it does not exist where his sole motive is to cause harm to such [other] person.” Williams v. Ashcraft, supra, quoting 30 Am.Jur., Interference, § 47 (1940).
The plaintiffs failed to prove any motive to cause harm on the part of the defendant. What is presented is simply the case of one man making a better offer than another. Absent a showing of motive on the part of the defendant to cause harm, the plaintiffs failed to prove that Cohen’s actions were unjustified under the Williams test. This test is the law in New Mexico and should not be departed from without a stronger showing on the record.
I would, therefore, affirm the directed verdict favoring Oliver Cohen.