dissenting.
I respectfully dissent.
A presumption of regularity attaches to an administration’s regulation when it is acting within its statutory power and within the parameters of its organic legislation as here. Citizens to Preserve Overton Park v. Volpe, 401 U.S. 402, 91 S.Ct. 814, 28 L.Ed.2d 136 (1971). A reviewing court may reverse an administrative ruling only when there is no rational basis to the agency’s decision and it is not “reasonably related to a legitimate use of state authority.” Peshel v. Motor Vehicle Division, 43 Colo.App. 58, 602 P.2d 875 (1979); see Overton Park, supra. This is not the case here.
*156Here, the enabling statute explicitly authorizes the Commission to set emission standards and ambient air standards and to issue permits based on these standards. Section 25-7-101 et seq., C.R.S.1973. Section 25-7-112(4)(d), C.R.S.1973 is the pertinent section here. It sets up a two-pronged test for the issuance of permits which incorporates both the emission standards and the ambient air standards. It states: “The division [of administration of the department of health] shall grant the permit unless it determines that the proposed project or activity would not meet applicable emission standards or regulations of the Commission or would interfere with the attainment or maintenance of the then existing federal primary or secondary ambient air standards.” In reaching its conclusion the majority ignores the second and equally important element of using the ambient air standard in its issuance of a permit.
Section 25-7-112(4)(d) goes on to state: “Any permit issued by the division may contain such terms and conditions as it deems necessary for the proposed project or activity to qualify for a permit.” In this instance the Commission was acting well within its legislative mandate when it attached the condition pertaining to the ambient air standards. See Air Pollution Control Commission v. District Court, 193 Colo. 146, 563 P.2d 351 (1977).
Section 25-7-106, C.R.S.1973, directs that: “[T]he commission shall have maximum flexibility in developing an effective air pollution control program and may promulgate such combination of regulations as may be necessary or desirable to carry out the legislative purpose set forth in § 25-7-102.” (emphasis added) Integral to the development of that program is the development and attainment of ambient air standards, § 25-7-108, C.R.S.1973, to ensure the goals of the statute, which include the “achieve[ment of] the maximum practical degree of air purity in every portion of the state, [and], [t]o that end, it is the purpose of this article to require the use of all available practical methods to reduce, prevent, and control air pollution throughout the entire State of Colorado.” One of the practical means available to the Commission is the attaching of conditions to permits.
When addressing the constitutionality of the Air Pollution Control Act, the Supreme Court specifically acknowledged the complexity of the program, the wide discretion placed in the Commission, and the fact that precise standards in this area are impossible to administer. Lloyd A. Fry Roofing Co. v. Department of Health, 179 Colo. 223, 499 P.2d 1176 (1972); see also Colorado River Water Conservation District v. Colorado Water Conservation Board, 197 Colo. 469, 594 P.2d 570 (1979). In essence, measurement of the exact quality of the ambient air and the exact extent to which a certain pollutant contributed may not be precise, but it is ascertainable. See Lloyd A. Fry Roofing Co., supra; Air Pollution v. Western Alfalfa Corp., 191 Colo. 455, 553 P.2d 811 (1976).
Moreover, the majority’s reliance on the legislative history is misplaced. The testimony so voluminously cited to in the record is testimony which was before the Commission when it was in the process of promulgating the regulations and, as such, is only indicative of the basis of those regulations, but it cannot be retroactively imposed as evidence of the intentions of the General Assembly in framing the legislation. See Aparacor, Inc. v. United States, 571 F.2d 552, 215 Ct.Cl. 596 (1978); Friedman v. United States, 364 F.Supp. 484 (D.Ga.1973).
Further, in my view, the detailed analysis of the trial court’s exhaustive opinion correctly disposes of each of appellants’ arguments. I would affirm it in its entirety.