The majority opinion concedes that the statements taken at
*718the station house from defendant were secured in violation of the rules announced in Escobedo v. Illinois, 378 U.S. 478 [12 L.Ed.2d 977, 84 S.Ct. 1758], and People v. Dorado, 62 Cal.2d 338 [42 Cal.Rptr. 169, 398 P.2d 361], and that the rules of those cases apply to this appeal. It is admitted that it was therefore error to introduce those statements. But then it is held that the statements were attempted exculpatory statements and their introduction was not prejudicial error. With this conclusion I cannot agree.
This is not a case where the evidence of guilt is overwhelming. The testimony of the prosecuting witness, while it may not be inherently improbable, was subject to doubt. Defendant took the stand and testified to a story, which, if true, exonerated him. It is not an inherently improbable story. The ease turned almost entirely on the credibility of the prosecutrix and of defendant. The improperly admitted statements completely shattered defendant’s defense as testified to by him. It demonstrated that he had denied the crime until Officer Stan-field, at the improper interrogation, suggested the very story defendant then told and repeated on the witness stand. Nothing said at the properly admitted interrogation at the time of his arrest related to this problem. The improper introduction of the statements taken at the station house was devastating and shattering to defendant’s defense. It completely destroyed the credibility of defendant’s story. To hold that it is not reasonably “probable” (People v. Watson, 46 Cal.2d 818 [299 P.2d 243]) or reasonably “possible” (Fahy v. Connecticut, 375 U.S. 85 [11 L.Ed.2d 171, 84 S.Ct. 229]) that such error was prejudicial is to close one’s eyes to reality.
I would hold that the admission of the statements at the station house was error and such error was prejudicial, and for this reason I would reverse the judgment.