(dissenting) — The hearing officer recommended a 2-year suspension which would be suspended for 2 years. At the end of this 2-year probation if certain terms and conditions were met by Ms. Saulnier the action by the bar association would be dismissed. I believe this would be adequate discipline and thus dissent.
In response to the majority, I make three comments: (1) Contrary to the majority, the facts show the taking of the items of merchandise was an isolated incident. Even though three stores were involved, they were all adjacent department stores at a large shopping mall and the taking of the merchandise occurred in a period of not more than 1 hour. *679The record is clear the incident was isolated in time and place as well as with reference to the prior conduct and activities of Ms. Saulnier.
2. As to whether there were mitigating factors, the hearing officer listened to the testimony, observed Ms. Saulnier, and was in a far better position than anyone merely reading the record to make a determination on this question. The findings of fact by the hearing officer, which were also adopted by the Disciplinary Board, state there was a "demonstration of mitigating factors surrounding [Ms. Saulnier’s] arrest". There was sufficient evidence in the record for the experienced hearing officer to make this finding. The majority ignores this finding and without either testimonial observation or the citation of evidence to the contrary declares there were no mitigating circumstances. This is an unwarranted action. No citizen and certainly not a member of the bar regulated by this court should be given this kind of treatment.
3. Finally, the majority justifies its quantum of punishment by "the need to assure public confidence in our legal system". I continue to question from what mysterious soundings this court obtains its understanding of the public temperament. See In re Rosellini, 97 Wn.2d 373, 646 P.2d 122 (1982) (Dolliver, J., dissenting). Rather than pursue the will-o'-the-wisp of public confidence, the court ought to concentrate on the individual in front of it and determine the degree of punishment needed to protect the public. Nothing in the order of the Disciplinary Board or in the majority opinion intimates the public will somehow be better protected by a straight 2-year suspension. The words of the hearing officer are instructive:
I am convinced that the incident described in the findings was a solitary aberration, for which the respondent has already paid dearly, which does not reflect on her ability to practice law, indicate any danger to the public and has not the slightest possibility of recurrence.
Although public confidence is desirable and indeed indispensable, it cannot be pursued; it must be earned. It is dif*680ficult for me to conclude the discipline imposed here will in any way help to accomplish that end. While some may noisily demand the maximum punishment for all offenders, the confidence of the public is not gained by becoming captive to these sentiments. "Rather, public confidence is built by a Supreme Court which views each litigant as that litigant comes before it; which takes reasonable and appropriate action to protect the public interest and brings appropriate punishment to the offender; and which makes those judgments openly, fearlessly, and without regard to the winds of public opinion." In re Rosellini, supra at 384 (Dolliver, J., dissenting).
Utter, Williams, and Dimmick, JJ., concur with Dolliver, J.