Dollison v. Fireman's Fund Insurance Company

OPINION

LaFEL E. OMAN, Judge, Court of Appeals.

This is an appeal from an order entered March 29, 1965 sustaining the defendant’s motion to dismiss the plaintiffs’ complaint pursuant to the provisions of Rule 41(e) of the Rules of Civil Procedure for the district courts of the State of New Mexico, which appears as § 21-1-1(41) (e), N.M.S.A.1953.

This rule has been the subject of many decisions by this court. For a comment on a number of these decisions see Comment, 6 Natural Resources J., 159 (1966).

We shall not herein endeavor to summarize, distinguish, or reconcile the holdings in the numerous prior decisions involving the application of this rule, but shall confine ourselves to the facts in this particular case and what we conceive to be the proper application of the rule to these facts.

The record in this case, exclusive of matters which we consider of no importance to our decision, reflects that the complaint was filed on September 25, 1961. An amended complaint and a jury demand were filed on February 20, 1962. Answer to the amended complaint was filed April 23, 1962. On May 21, 1963 there were filed a number of interrogatories propounded by defendant to plaintiffs. Answers to these interrogatories were filed on February 20, 1964. The defendant’s motion to dismiss was filed on December 23, 1964.

By affidavit of one of plaintiff’s attorneys filed January 7, 1965 in opposition to the motion to dismiss, which affidavit is not controverted, it appears that the case was scheduled for pre-trial conference on May 15, 1963. This pre-trial setting was vacated by the court. The case was set for trial on November 17, 1964, but this trial setting was vacated by the court at a pre-trial conference which was conducted prior to November 17, 1964. At this pretrial conference defendant’s counsel indicated that defendant desired to take depositions prior to trial.

There are attached to the affidavit a number of letters by the trial court addressed to counsel for both sides, and copies of a number of letters addressed to the trial court by counsel for plaintiffs. However, we have consistently held that correspondence between the court and counsel, not reflected in the court file prior to the filing of the motion to dismiss, is not to be considered in determining the question of diligence. Sarikey v. Sandoval, 75 N.M. 271, 404 P.2d 108; Lovato v. Hicks, 75 N.M. 611, 409 P.2d 130; Trujillo v. Harris, 75 N.M. 683, 410 P.2d 401; Briesmeister v. Medina, 76 N.M. 606, 417 P.2d 208 filed July 28, 1966. Therefore, we shall not consider these letters.

The case of Martin v. Leonard Motor-El Paso, 75 N.M. 219, 402 P.2d 954 is distinguishable from this case only in one factor which may be considered material, and that difference is that in the Martin case the plaintiff filed a motion requesting a trial setting prior to the filing of the defendant’s motion to dismiss. Here we have no such motion filed by the plaintiffs, but a pre-trial conference was conducted and the case was actually set for trial prior to the filing of the defendant’s motion to dismiss.

We are unable to perceive how a motion for a trial setting can have greater efficacy in the expedition of litigation than a pretrial conference and an actual trial setting. It is true the trial setting was vacated, but the court, and not the parties, of necessity had to vacate the setting.

In Beyer v. Montoya, 75 N.M. 228, 402 P.2d 960, we held that under the facts of that case the motion to dismiss made at the opening of the trial on the merits came too late. We now hold that the motion of the defendant in the present case came too late. Action was taken by the trial court and by both parties toward a final determination of this case, and such action was taken before the defendant filed its motion to dismiss.

It follows from what has been said that the order of the trial court dismissing the plaintiffs’ amended complaint with prejudice must be reversed, and the amended complaint and this cause be reinstated upon the docket of the district court.

'It is so ordered.

CHAVEZ arid NOBLE, JJ., concur.

ON MOTION FOR REHEARING