dissenting.
I concur in all aspects of the court’s decision except for its rejection of the teachers’ equal protection challenge to their exclusion from the strike and binding arbitration provisions of the Public Employment Relations Act.
The teachers claim that their exclusion from the strike and binding arbitration provisions of PERA violates their right to equal protection of the law under art. I, section 1 of Alaska’s constitution. The challenged exclusion involves a double classification: unlike other educational employees such as principals and counselors who are apparently given a limited right to strike under AS 23.40.200(c)1 the teachers are prohibited from striking; unlike other public employees such as police and firefighters, who are denied the right to strike but who are granted binding arbitration,2 the teachers have neither strike rights nor binding arbitration. Thus the equal protection issue here is whether the exclusion of school district teachers is “substantially related” to the purposes of PERA.
One of the primary purpose of PERA is to provide rational and effective guidelines for public employment relations.3 While providing for public employee participation in the determination of wages and working conditions, PERA attempted to balance the employees’ need for effective means of bargaining with the state’s need to maintain uninterrupted services in certain essential governmental operations. The result of this balancing process was that certain “non-critical” public employees were granted a general right to strike, “semi-critical” public employees were allowed a limited right to strike, and “critical” public employees were denied any right to strike.4 AS 23.40.200. In return “critical” employees were given the right to enter binding arbitration if negotiations reached an impasse. AS 23.40.200(b). Given these provisions the *999question which must be answered is whether the exclusion of public school teachers from any of the foregoing categories is reasonable in light of the purposes of PERA.
The court concludes that the exclusion of teachers from the strike-binding arbitration provisions of PERA is constitutional on the rationale that the legislature could constitutionally “have found that teachers, although necessary to the functioning of society so as to not forbid strikes, were not so essential as to require compulsory arbitration.”5 In my opinion this distinction is based on a mistaken view of the purpose behind the compulsory arbitration provisions. Under PERA the category of “critical” employees was granted the right to binding arbitration to compensate for the total denial of a right to strike. In essence the legislature realized that while a ban on strikes for “critical” public employees was necessary, such a ban placed these employees in a disadvantageous bargaining position. Therefore, in the interest of fair and meaningful negotiations these employees were given the right to binding arbitration. It follows that in situations where negotiations were deadlocked, the state would be assured that essential services would continue to be provided and the employees would be assured of a viable means of resolving labor disputes with the state. Viewed in this perspective, the denial of binding arbitration to teachers, coupled with the ban on strikes seems at odds rather than “substantially related” to the purposes of PERA in that it significantly handicaps public school teachers in their collective bargaining efforts.
If public school teachers are so essential to society that they must be denied the right to strike then they should also be given the right to compulsory arbitration. On the other hand, if teachers are not as essential as the “critical” employees then they should enjoy the same limited strike rights given to other “semi-critical” public employees. The court’s recognition of a separate category of public employees occupying a position between these two groups is in my judgment mistaken.
The majority acknowledges that the teachers are disadvantaged by their exclusion from PERA but concludes that while binding arbitration would improve the teachers bargaining position, it is not a required means for furthering the purposes of PERA. The question is not, however, whether the legislature is required to grant arbitration rights to public employees; rather, it is whether the legislature, having granted strike or binding arbitration rights to a substantial portion of public employees, can lawfully deny these same rights to a particular sub-class of public employees. In order to justify the exclusion of a particular group of citizens from the benefits of a legislative act it must be shown that there is a substantial difference between the group excluded and the group covered by the act. The suggested difference must be such that it is reasonable to treat the group differently with respect to the legislation in question. State v. Erickson, 574 P.2d 1, 11 (Alaska 1978); Isakson v. Rickey, 550 P.2d 359, 362 (Alaska 1976). In my view, no persuasive reason has been advanced for the exclusion of public school teachers from the limited right to strike — binding arbitration provision provided for in AS 23.40.200.
Thus, I conclude that the exclusion of the teachers from the strike and arbitration provisions of AS 23.40.200 violates the equal protection clause of Alaska’s constitution.6
.The majority states that it is not deciding the question of whether other certificated public school employees have the right to strike. The majority acknowledges, however, that if these employees are also denied the right to strike then the term public school employees in section 200(c) is meaningless.
. AS 23.40.200(b).
. AS 23.40.070.
. The term “semi-critical” employees include public utility, snow removal, sanitation, public school and educational institution employees. AS 23.40.200(c). “Critical” workers include police, fire protection, correctional and hospital employees. AS 23.40.200(b). The “non-critical” class consists of all public employees who are not included in the other two classes. AS 23.40.200(d).
. Citing Hortonville Ed. Ass’n v. Hortonviile Joint School Dist., 66 Wis.2d 469, 225 N.W.2d 658 (1975).
. Implicit in my position is the rejection of the District’s argument that the legislature’s provision for mediation (AS 14.20.570) and binding arbitration in grievance proceedings (AS 14.20.-590), as well as requiring the state to negotiate in good faith (AS 14.20.550) legitimizes that failure of PERA to grant public school teachers either the right to strike or to binding arbitration.