McDonald v. State

NIX, Judge

(specially concurring).

Defendant contends that some of the previous convictions complained of were entirely too remote to test defendant’s credibility. In fact, one of the inquiries concerned Larceny of Chickens twenty-eight years prior to the offense for which defendant was being tried. This does create the question of whether the introduction of such crimes has any bearing upon the defendant’s truth and veracity. We are inclined to believe the admissability of prior convictions to impeach defendant’s credibility, should be vested in the discretion of the trial Court, under the rationale that a defendant’s prior convictions would be admissable to impeach unless the defendant could persuade the trial Court that the prejudicial effect of the impeachment far outweighs the probative relevance of the prior conviction to the issue of credibility, or that even if relevant, the “cause of truth would be helped more by letting the jury hear the defendant’s story than by defendant’s foregoing that opportunity because of the fear of prejudice founded upon a prior conviction.” Luck v. United States, 121 U.S.App.D.C. 151, 348 F.2d 763. Also, see Gordon v. United States (1967) 127 U.S.App.D.C. 343, 383 F.2d 936.

In relating the holding in Luck and Gordon, supra, it is noted that the court points out that in considering the exercise of the District Court’s discretionary power, it will look to the “legitimate purpose” of impeachment — which is not to show that the defendant-witness is a “bad person”, but rather to show background facts which bear directly on whether the jury should believe him as opposed to other witnesses.

A “Rule of Thumb” proposed by the Court is that convictions which rest on dishonest conduct relate to credibility, whereas those for violent or assaultive crimes do not. The Court also suggests that old convictions even for crime such as fraud or larceny should be generally excluded on the grounds of remoteness, when followed by a legally blameless life. Where the prior conviction or convictions are for the same or substantially same conduct for which the accused is on trial, there are, the Court notes, strong reasons for exclusion — mainly because of the temptation of the jury to conclude that if defendant did it before, he probably did it this time. In Luck, supra, the Court suggests a solution that impeachment in this area be limited to a single conviction, and then only where circumstances indicate strong reasons for disclosure and the conviction is for a crime which directly relates to veracity. And last, the Court suggests as a final factor which the trial Court should consider, is the effect on the fairness of the trial of the defendant not testifying out of fear of being prejudicial because of impeachment by prior conviction. In such situations, the Court suggests that the trial Judge hear the defendant’s testimony, both direct and cross, outside the presence of the jury and then make a decision as to its admissibility. We are advised that some District Judges in the Western part of Oklahoma are now following this procedure and as a member of this Court, I feel that this type procedure as to prior convictions as they pertain to a witness’ truth and veracity should be followed from this date forward.

A thorough discussion of the standards to be applied by the trial Judge is to be found in the Gordon case, supra. However, in the instant case, the trial Court *781followed the old procedure and in the absence of this decision, did not err in permitting evidence of other offenses. However, it was error to permit the District Attorney to ask defendant if he had been convicted of other crimes about which the State offered no proof and said convictions were denied by defendant, for that reason we feel that the judgment of the trial Court should be modified, that justice may be best served.

Therefore, I concur that the judgment and sentence of said Court as modified be affirmed.