Pierce v. Superior Court

LANGDON, J., Concurring and Dissenting.

I concur in the above order in so far as it prohibits the lower court from striking from the great register the names of electors who were not served and did not appear in the superior court proceeding. I dissent from the order because of its manifest failure to grant the full appropriate relief to which petitioners are entitled, namely, the prohibition of all further proceedings in the court below.

This is an application for an alternative writ of prohibition, to restrain the respondent superior court from making contemplated orders, the effect of which would be to deprive defendants and petitioners in an action pending therein of the right to vote at the general election on November 6, 1934.

However pure and patriotic the motives behind it, this proceeding should never have been commenced. It should have been stayed immediately by this court on application for the alternative writ of prohibition, in accordance with the uniform practice of this court. A peremptory writ of prohibition should now issue, restraining all further activities in the respondent court in this matter; and all orders heretofore made should be annulled. It is perfectly clear now that the action below is a sham proceeding and a perversion of court process, absolutely void, and it can have no effect 'other than to intimidate and prevent eligible voters from *771going to the polls. It outrages every principle of justice and fair play. In brief, it attempts, in a personal action in the superior court, to adjudicate and cut off the constitutional right to vote of over 24,000 defendants, without personal service of any kind upon said defendants and upon a purported service by publication of this mass of names, without addresses, and not even in alphabetical order, on a single occasion, in a newspaper of some 1500 circulation.

It was admitted in open court by counsel for respondent that its order does not mean what it says. The respondent court now declares that, notwithstanding its threat to cancel all registration of defendants who failed to appear and answer before a date fixed, it will not prevent any of them who do not appear before it from voting at the November election. Counsel state that the effect of this order is merely a “challenge in gross” of the right of petitioners to vote. The proceeding, either as originally instituted by the attorney-general or as now interpreted by the respondent court, is admitted by the respondent to be and, in so far as the reported decisions show, is without precedent or parallel in this or any other state of the Union.

The proceeding is contrary to law, to good morals, and to sound statesmanship. It is contrary to law because the court has no jurisdiction over the subject matter or the persons of the defendants. It is contrary to good morals because it will unjustly deprive citizens of the right to vote, many of whom have no actual notice that their rights are in any way questioned. It is contrary to sound statesmanship because it seeks to prevent large numbers of citizens of this state from freely expressing their will at the polls, without a proper or legal determination of their rights, thereby striking at the very heart of free government. It is, moreover, unnecessary, because the law as it now stands contains ample safeguards against fraudulent voting. There will not be one fraudulent vote cast in the state of California, if the facts concerning fraudulent registration are presented to the election officers, and they perform their duties as prescribed by law. The legal presumption is that these officers will do their duty.

I make no criticism of the activities of any citizen or group of citizens, in conducting investigations to discover false registrations. Whether official or otherwise in origin, *772such investigations are in the public interest. If the results of these efforts are made the basis of a challenge at the polls, they will fully accomplish their legitimate purpose. It is within the power of the election officers, and it is a duty inherent in their offices, to report to the district attorney cases of false swearing. It is safe to say that the challenged’ voter, with knowledge of these investigations, will not take the oath required of him and place himself in peril of criminal prosecution for perjury, unless he is able to justify his claim of right to vote. The election rolls should of course be purged of false registrations. The opportunity to do this has always been present and is still present. But the method prescribed by law should be followed, and the method of challenge set forth in the Political Code bears not the remotest similarity to the action taken by the court below.

There was no ground whatever to justify the invention of this unique and drastic equity proceeding. While I do not question the good faith of respondent court and counsel, it is clear that they have mistaken their remedy.

In times of stress, public excitement and hysteria, this court, the highest tribunal in the state, must stand as a bulwark in protecting the rights of every citizen within its borders. Its duty is clear and it must not falter. If today, without due process of law, the vested right of the qualified citizen to exercise his 'franchise at the polls is taken from him, tomorrow, without due process of law, the vested right of ownership of property may be taken away. While the Constitutions of this state and of- the United States stand, this court cannot permit such action.

On October 18, 1934, the action which is under review here was filed in the Superior Court of Los Angeles County, entitled' “People of the State of California on relation of U. S. Webb, Attorney-General, vs. Paul O. Pate” and others. Approximately 24,130 persons were named as defendants. The registrar of voters was also joined as a defendant. The plaintiffs alleged that defendants were guilty of fraudulent practices in obtaining registration and that the public interest required' that their names be stricken from the election rolls. The prayer was that the court appoint a master with power to recommend deputies, to hear and determine the right of the various defendants to vote at the next *773general election; and that the court issue an order to show cause, directing each and every defendant to appear before these officers, and providing that the name of any defendant not appearing shall be stricken from the great register. No attempt was made to serve any of said parties, but the court, over the objection of counsel appearing as amici curiae, issued the order to show cause as prayed, directing defendants to appear on or before October 25, 1934, and ordering that all failing to appear should have their names stricken from the register and be restrained' from voting. The court also directed that its order to show cause be published once in the “Los Angeles Daily Journal”, and that copies be posted in three public places.

Shortly after the rendition of the order to show cause, five of the said defendants, acting on behalf of themselves and the others in a representative character, filed this application for a writ of prohibition, charging that the contemplated action of the lower court will be in excess of its jurisdiction. The position of petitioners is sound: The court lacks jurisdiction, both of the subject matter and the parties.

Jurisdiction of the subject matter, the power of the court to consider the class of eases to which the particular cause belongs, is of course essential to the validity of any proceeding. Without it, the court’s judgment is wholly void; and, unlike jurisdiction over the person, it cannot be conferred by any form of voluntary appearance or consent. (Harrington v. Superior Court, 194 Cal. 185 [228 Pac. 15] ; 1 Freeman on Judgments, 5th ed., 674, sec. 337.)

The proceeding by the attorney-general purports to be brought under the general equity powers of the superior court. No provision for it is found in the statutes of this state, which of course govern our whole procedure, regardless of whether the form of the action was originally “equitable” or “legal”. Hence the court is without jurisdiction unless it can be established that there is first, a serious wrong or evil which calls for judicial action; and' second, that existing statutes provide no procedure to remedy it, or, as commonly stated, that there is no adequate remedy at law. But the unverified document filed by the attorney-general, and labeled “Complaint for Injunction” makes no pretense of meeting this basic test. It alleges “that there is no plain, *774speedy, or any adequate remedy at law for the correction of said false and fraudulent registrations; that there is no practical remedy except through the interposition of a court of equity”. Apart from the bald assertion of the pleader, repeatedly held insufficient (Streator v. Linscott, 153 Cal. 285 [95 Pac. 42]), there is no showing whatever of absence or inadequacy of legal remedy, and, indeed, the complaint would convey the impression that no appropriate legal remedy for the alleged fraudulent acts exists at all. This is, of course, untrue; there are two legal remedies quite appropriate to the circumstances, and their adequacy is attested by the fact that the legislature has written them into the statutory law of this state, to apply in precisely the situation presented in the complaint. One remedy is the action provided' by section 1109 of the Political Code; an action by any person to compel the county clerk to cancel illegal or improper registrations. The other remedy is the challenge of the voter at the polls, by any elector of the county, followed by a summary determination by the election board of the legality of his registration and right to vote, as provided in sections 1230 to 1243 of the Political Code. In the case of each of these remedies, the legislature has established a procedure adequate in all respects to provide a speedy determination of the issue. The sufficiency and appropriateness of these proceedings have never been questioned, and their practicability has been demonstrated by time and experience. A statutory grant of jurisdiction of this character should be exercised within the limits prescribed by the statute, and strictly in conformity therewith. (Collier v. Carter, 100 Md. 381 [60 Atl. 104].) It has been held in California that the county clerk has no power to cancel certificates of registration, or withhold them from use in an election, except as authorized by the appropriate sections of the Political Code. (Pohlmann v. Patty, 33 Cal. App. 390 [165 Pac. 447].)

This would seem to dispose of the suggestion made by members of this court that the proceeding below was, in fact, an action under Political Code section 1109, and therefore within the court’s jurisdiction. The proceeding, in the first place, does not purport to be brought under said section; secondly, it seeks an injunction and section 1109 authorizes no such relief; thirdly, section 1109 requires per*775sonal service on each defendant, whereas none was intended or attempted here. Counsel for respondents, fully aware of their failure to meet the requirements of said section, have strenuously insisted in briefs and oral argument that this is an entirely different proceeding, brought by the people of the state in their sovereign capacity. Accepting, as we must, their, characterization of the action, let us examine the cases submitted to establish jurisdiction over it.

These are, without exception, inapplicable. Thus, in Gibson v. Board of Supervisors, 80 Cal. 359 [22 Pac. 225], a bond election was contested on grounds of fraud. The opinion expressly states that there was no statutory procedure applicable, and that for this reason the court could inquire into it. In Pagosa Springs v. People (Patterson v. People), 23 Colo. App. 479 [130 Pac. 618], a certain special election had been held and the result declared. The complaint alleged conspiracy by the judges of election to prevent qualified electors from voting, and other illegal acts. The court said that it could grant relief under its general equity powers, “there being no statutory provision for contesting the validity of an election under the local option statute”. Wright v. McKinney, 287 Ill. 529 [122 N. E. 813], is a similar case. In Elkins v. Milliken, 80 Colo. 135 [249 Pac. 655], initiative petitions were fraudulently altered by the sponsors after signatures had been obtained, and it was held that the court had power to order the Secretary of State not to place the measure on the ballot. The basis for equity jurisdiction was found where it appeared that the only other proceeding which the law provided was a protest before the Secretary of State, who had no power to summon witnesses and hence could not establish the fraudulent character of the petitions. Thus it was a case of an absolute lack of adequate remedy at law. In Aichele v. People, 40 Colo. 482 [90 Pac. 1122], petitioner, a taxpayer, alleged that the respondent county clerk and his deputies had unlawfully conspired to make false registrations, and the only relief asked was to prevent him from certifying to the judges of election the fraudulent and fictitious registrations which he and his subordinates had unlawfully made. In People v. Tool, 35 Colo. 225 [86 Pac. 224, 117 Am. St. Rep. 198, 6 L. R. A. (N. S.) 822], the complaint charged a conspiracy of judges of election to place false names on the lists; by *776threats of violence to prevent members of an opposing political party from serving as judges of election; by use of police officers and toughs to intimidate voters and prevent them from casting ballots; and with ballot stuffing and similar practices. It was held that the court could by injunction direct that the election officials comply with the law governing elections on pain of punishment for contempt. In Shaw v. Circuit Court, 27 S. D. 49 [129 N. W. 907], an election was held on the question of removal of a county seat, and was contested. The court held that it had jurisdiction to issue a temporary injunction to restrain removal of the county offices pending the outcome of the election contest. Boren v. Smith, 47 Ill. 482, is a similar case. Gilmore v. Waples, 108 Tex. 167 [188 S. W. 1037],.dealt with the power of the executive committee of a political party to nominate a candidate for office, and the court merely construed and gave effect to a specific statute.

These are the authorities chiefly relied upon to establish the jurisdiction of the superior court over this extraordinary type of proceeding. In no case was the action brought against individual electors to cancel illegal registrations, or otherwise to determine their rights as voters; the suits were ordinarily against election officials, to make them obey the laws. In all the cases the court proceeded in accordance with statutory authority, except where there was no statutory provision at all governing the situation, and in those cases the court acted under its inherent equity power to prevent the consummation of a wrong which would otherwise go unredressed. The reasoning of this latter group of cases demonstrates their inapplicability to the situation before us, where a complete statutory procedure offering dual remedies exists. It follows that the lower court did not, by filing of the complaint, obtain jurisdiction over the cause. This being so, the orders made and contemplated are void, and are not binding or conclusive as to the rights of any defendants, regardless of whether they were served with summons or voluntarily appeared.

The second aspect of jurisdiction is that over the parties, and it is plain that the court had no personal jurisdiction over the defendants. Jurisdiction over the person is obtained by service of process in the manner prescribed by statute, or by voluntary appearance. (Cal. Code Civ. Proc., *777sec. 416; see Chaplin v. Superior Court, 81 Cal. App. 367 [253 Pac. 954].) How does the lower court justify its assumed jurisdiction in the present proceeding, in which personal service of process was not attempted 1 Counsel’s argument is that the action was brought to determine the civil status of certain defendants and was therefore in rem; that in an action in rem, any reasonable constructive service ordered by the court is sufficient. Numerous cases are cited, and again none is in point, nor is either proposition correct.

Actions to determine personal status are in the nature of proceedings in rem, the status being considered a “res” within the territorial jurisdiction of the state of domicile. The example of divorce proceedings is most common. (See Haddock v. Haddock, 201 U. S. 562 [26 Sup. Ct. 525, 50 L. Ed. 867, 5 Ann. Cas. 1]; 17 Cal. L. Rev. 160.) But the present action has not as its object the determination of a status. The right to vote in this state is granted, and the qualifications of voters are prescribed, in our Constitution, article II, section 1. The status of the voter, if we must call it that, is established by the Constitution, and not by legislative enactment. The legislature has prescribed certain regulations by the registration laws, which must be followed before the voter having the constitutional qualifications can exercise his franchise. But registration is not an element which determines the status of a voter; he may be a qualified voter, though unable to vote in a particular election because improperly registered. (Bergevin v. Curtz, 127 Cal. 86 [59 Pac. 312]; Minges v. Board of Trustees, 27 Cal. App. 15 [148 Pac. 816].) The present action, therefore, is not to determine status, but to cut off the personal right to vote on the ground of failure to conform to the statutory regulations governing the exercise of the right. This has none of the characteristics of a proceeding in rem, and it falls within the accepted definition of an action in personam, for it seeks “to bar some individual claim”. (Tyler v. Judges of the Court of Registration, 175 Mass. 71 [55 N. E. 812, 51 L. R. A. 433].)

This conclusion was the basis of the decision in Ash v. Superior Court, 33 Cal. App. 800 [166 Pac. 841], wherein it was held that the person whose registration is sought to be canceled is a necessary party defendant in any action, *778and must be brought in by personal service of summons unless he appears voluntarily; and that even the mailing to him of a copy of an order to show cause why his registration should not be canceled could not confer jurisdiction over his person. The court declared (33 Cal. App. 804) : “We may say here, as was said by the Supreme Court of New York in a similar case, that if the statute may be properly construed to give a judge the right to prevent any person from voting by striking his name from the register—as, under the existing law, the names of voters must be registered for a specified period of time prior to an election—■ without adequate procedure to bring such person before the court, ‘then the provision is of a sweeping and revolutionary character and dangerous in the extreme . . . Such a power so construed would be unconstitutional as to its exercise, would deny the right of suffrage granted by the Constitution of the state, and would leave the election . . . entirely within the power of state judicial officers.’ (In re Ward, 20 N. Y. Supp. 606.)”

But even if the action were in rem, the second proposition stated by counsel, that in such an action the court may determine its own reasonable method of constructive service, is entirely unsound. They refer us to article VI, section 5, of the Constitution, giving jurisdiction in equity to the superior court; and to section 187 of the Code of Civil Procedure, providing that where jurisdiction is conferred on a court by Constitution or statute, any suitable process or mode of proceeding may be adopted, “if the course of proceeding be not specifically pointed out by this code or the statute”. Of course, this proviso destroys the force of their contention, for section 187 is available only where existing statutes fail to provide a procedure and process. (McKendrick v. Western Zinc Min. Co., 165 Cal. 24, 30 [130 Pac. 865].) It should also be borne in mind that the constitutional provision above referred to “does not confer any rights on the parties; it merely designates the courts where such rights as they may - have in equity shall be enforced . . . ” (Estate of Barnett, 97 Cal. App. 138, 141 [275 Pac. 453].)

It has long been settled in practically every state in the Union that constructive service, unknown at common law, is wholly dependent upon statute. It is permissible only in *779the circumstances specified by statute, and can be valid only when in strict compliance with the express terms thereof. (Columbia Screw Co. v. Warner Lock Co., 138 Cal. 445 [71 Pac. 498]; Matter of Tracey, 136 Cal. 385 [69 Pac. 20]; 50 C. J. 496, sec. 105; 50 C. J. 497, see. 106; 50 C. J. 502, sec. 114.) In California the Code of Civil Procedure, in section 412, sets forth the grounds upon which an order for publication of summons may be had; for example, that the defendant cannot, after due' diligence, be found within the state, or has concealed himself to avoid service. The section requires that such facts appear by affidavit. Not only was there no affidavit in the present proceeding, but the unverified complaint does not even attempt to allege that any of the statutory grounds exist. The order for publication of summons was consequently void. And it was void for the additional reason that it did not provide for publication in the manner and for the period prescribed in section 413.

Turning to the cases cited by respondents, Moyer v. Peabody, 212 U. S. 78, 84 [29 Sup. Ct. 235, 53 L. Ed. 410], states the familiar truism that due process of law depends on the circumstances. The case was concerned with an insurrection, and the right to vote was not involved. In Huling v. Kaw Valley Railway & Imp. Co., 130 U. S. 559, 564 [9 Sup. Ct. 603, 32 L. Ed. 1045], there was a condemnation proceeding, and service by publication under statutory authority was held binding on the owner of the real estate. In Title & Document Restoration Co. v. Kerrigan, 150 Cal. 289 [88 Pac. 356, 119 Am. St. Rep. 199, 8 L. R. A. (N. S.) 682], the court considered the California statute providing for an action by persons in possession to establish title to real estate, where the records were destroyed by fire. American Land Co. v. Zeiss, 219 U. S. 47 [31 Sup. Ct. 200, 55 L. Ed. 82], dealt with the same statute. In Shepherd v. Ware, 46 Minn. 174 [48 N. W. 773, 24 Am. St. Rep. 212], the statute was concerned with adverse claims to property, and provided for publication of summons in cases of necessity where claimants were unknown. State v. Guilbert, 56 Ohio St. 575 [47 N. E. 551, 60 Am. St. Rep. 756, 38 L. R. A. 519], also deals with property. In Security Sav. Bank v. State of California, 263 U. S. 282 [44 Sup. Ct. 108, 68 L. Ed. 301, 31 A. L. R. 391], the proceeding was to escheat bank deposits unclaimed for over twenty years. *780It was held that the statutory provision for service by publication was consistent with due process, the proceeding being quasi in rem. The court in Re Craven, 178 La. 372 [151 So. 625, 90 A. L. R. 973], held that disbarment of an attorney could be based on substituted service, where the matter was under the state Constitution governed by rules of court, and the rules provided for such service in cases where the accused concealed himself or could not be found. In re Holland, 96 Cal. App. 655 [274 Pac. 559], was a proceeding to revoke the license of an attorney, and it was held that jurisdiction was acquired by publication for the period specified in disbarment proceedings, where it appeared by affidavit that the attorney could not after due diligence be found within the state. United States v. Knight, 291 Fed. 129, involved a suit to cancel a certificate of citizenship for fraud or illegality. It was held that service by publication was proper in cases where the defendant lived abroad. In short, the published summons in every ease was authorized by established procedure, and in no ease did the court itself determine, without reference to the controlling statutes, what type of service should be made.

Mention may be made here of the fact brought to our attention at the hearing that, after the application for the alternative writ of prohibition was filed, the lower court, on its own- initiative, decided that post cards should be mailed to the addresses of the various defendants, apprising them of the order, and made a supplemental order to this effect. It appears also that several newspaper advertisements and news items calling attention to the suit were published, that five copies of the order to show cause were mailed to the chairman of the county central committee of each political party, and that a copy of said order was sent to each public school building in the precincts where names were questioned, for posting. What additional validity this fantastic method of notification can give to the previous illegal and void service is beyond my comprehension. Inasmuch- as none of these forms of substituted service complies with our statutes, no jurisdiction can result from them under the principles already discussed. In particular, the insufficiency of mailed notices in a proceeding to cancel registration has been determined in Ash v. Superior Court, supra.

*781The orders of the court are, therefore,- void for lack of jurisdiction over the parties defendant.

Prom the foregoing, the right of petitioners to the remedy sought, a peremptory writ of prohibition to restrain the lower court from acting in excess of its jurisdiction in this matter, is clear. The writ lies to arrest judicial proceedings in excess of jurisdiction in all cases where there is no other plain, speedy and adequate remedy. (Cal. Code Civ. Proc., sec. 1103; Jardine v. Superior Court, 213 Cal. 301 [2 Pac. (2d) 756, 79 A. L. R. 291]; Havemeyer v. Superior Court, 84 Cal. 327, 401 [24 Pac. 121, 18 Am. St. Rep. 192, 10 L. R. A. 627] ; see 22 Cal. L. Rev. 537.) There are, however, objections raised by counsel which may be briefly • examined.

It was suggested at the hearing that even though it be conceded that the publication of summons did not confer jurisdiction over the persons of the defendants, nevertheless a writ of prohibition should not be granted for the reason that some defendants may appear (and some have appeared) before the court to submit to its jurisdiction. This assumes, of course, that there is at least jurisdiction over the subject matter; but even making this assumption, the suggestion is untenable. In the leading case of Havemeyer v. Superior Court, supra, wherein the right to the writ of' prohibition was exhaustively discussed, the opinion states that “it never was the law that a court having jurisdiction to issue the writ had any discretion to refuse it when demanded by the real party in interest bringing himself clearly within the law”. (84 Cal. 327, 401.) Petitioners filed their application in a representative character, on behalf of themselves and other defendants; the petition makes the necessary allegations to justify a representative suit under section 382 of ( the Code of Civil Procedure. (See Jellen v. O’Brien, 89 Cal. App. 505 [264 Pac. 1115].) All of the defendants who have not appeared in the court below are, through the representation of these petitioners, seeking to restrain the lower' court from acting in a case where it has no jurisdiction over them. It is elementary that waiver of the objection of lafek of jurisdiction by one defendant does not operate as a waiver of the objection by other defendants. (Vian v. Hillberg, 111 Neb. 232 [196 N. W. 153].) Hence petitioners and the other nonappearing defendants whom they *782represent are entitled to the issuance of the writ, and under the rule laid down in Havemeyer v. Superior Court, supra, this court has no discretion to refuse their demand. The contrary view would mean that every defendant asserting lack of jurisdiction over his person would be compelled either to waive the jurisdictional objection by making an appearance and submitting to a trial on the merits, or to waive his right to a trial on the merits by ignoring the court’s order, and taking a chance that ultimately in some subsequent proceeding the order would be declared void. If the order were ultimately held valid, it would then be too late to secure a hearing on the merits. Must petitioners and the other defendants take this chance? We expressly held in Jardine v. Superior Court, supra, upon a full review of the authorities, that they do not have to do so.

'The contrary view would, indeed, eliminate the writ of prohibition entirely as a remedy to prevent unlawful exercise of jurisdiction over the person, since it is possible in any case to say that the writ should not issue because the defendant may appear and waive his objection. Is it conceivable that the lower court, by its order to show cause, which gave less than ten days to appear, can hasten the illegal proceeding and by taking action with respect to some of the defendants preclude the others from securing protection of their constitutional rights by the only remedy available? The answer can be found in Havemeyer v. Superior Court, supra, page 390: “ . . . the operation of the writ of prohibition is excluded only in cases where the action of the inferior tribunal is completed, and nothing remains to be done in pursuance of its void order. If its action is not completed and ended, its further proceedings may be stayed, and if it is necessary, for the purpose of affording complete and adequate relief, what has been done will be undone.

“If this were not so, the inferior court, by proceeding expeditiously and arbitrarily, could defeat the remedy. . . . ”

And further, on page 392, the court says:

“If such proceedings, conducted with such precipitate haste, can deprive the injured party of a remedy to Which he is clearly entitled, then our law must be lame and impotent indeed.
*783“But, happily, there is no foundation for the claim that an inferior court can by mere haste and precipitancy, defeat the appropriate remedy for excesses of jurisdiction, at least in a case where it may be intercepted before its action is fully completed. ’ ’

The other point made, at the hearing comes as a fitting conclusion to this amazing proceeding. Counsel for respondent declare that the lower court does not intend to make any order which shall deprive any person of the right to vote, and they add that it has jurisdiction but does not intend to exercise it. What does this mean? The order to show cause states that any defendant not appearing, or failing to establish his right on or before October 29, 1934, shall have his name stricken from the great register, and shall be enjoined and prohibited from voting. The amended and supplemental order states that such defendants may be enjoined and prohibited from voting “by a subsequent order to be made hereafter” by the court. On the record there are orders of the court, inconsistent it is true, but each indicating an intention to adjudicate and determine the right to vote of all defendants in the action. Now counsel state, off the record, that the court will not do what the complaint asks it to do and what it said it would do in its order. But even counsel are not sure of what the court will do. One of counsel suggested that it would be “a provisional order” striking the name of the voter from the election rolls unless he appears before the judges of election and establishes his right to vote. Another frankly declares that he does not know what the judge will do, but thinks he has in mind a “challenge in gross”. Thus, the election board would act as a court of appeal or review of the decision of the superior court. I had conceived the power of review as lodged in a different tribunal.

It is sufficient, I think, to point out that the right of petitioners to a writ of prohibition to correct excesses of jurisdiction cannot be defeated by counsel’s hope. According to counsel now, it would appear that the whole proceeding below is a subterfuge, intended to frighten and coerce voters, by raising the barrier of a legal action, and placing upon them the burden of searching the monumental black list of defendants to discover any attack upon their registration ; but not contemplating any effective judicial deter*784mination. If so, it is an abuse- of the process of the court, and should he dismissed.

The writ of prohibition which this court has granted does not constitute an effective bar, either to the present proceeding, or others threatened, and hence fails to grant petitioners the full relief to which they are entitled under the law of this state.

Rehearing denied.

Thompson, J., voted for a rehearing.