(dissenting) — Binding arbitration may well be the best solution to resolution of a labor negotiations impasse. It is not the only alternative. See 21 Stan. L. Rev. 340, 377 (1969). The method for resolving such an impasse is a question of public policy, however, which should be settled by the legislature rather than being created by an administrative regulation.
If one thing is clear from the manner in which the legislature has dealt with labor negotiations and arbitration, it is that when the legislature intended that arbitration be available it said so, and provided the mechanisms to implement it. E.g., RCW 41.56.122(2) and .450; RCW 41.59.130; RCW 49.66.090. In contrast, the statute applicable here, together with the supporting material cited by the majority, never even mentioned the word "arbitration."
*122The sole source of the majority's support for a regulation mandating binding arbitration is RCW 28B.16.100. That section enumerates 19 matters which are the proper subject of rules governing personnel administration. The only section which remotely bears on the issue is subsection 12, which authorizes rules regarding the basis and procedures for "Agreements between institutions or related boards and certified exclusive bargaining representatives providing for grievance procedures and collective negotiations . . ." (Italics mine.) The single issue then is whether the power to promulgate rules concerning collective negotiations included the authority to impose mandatory arbitration upon the parties.
"Collective negotiations" is not a term of art which embraces arbitration within its accepted meaning. "Collective" simply means that it is carried on on behalf of a group of employees. "Negotiations” is merely a matter of communications, conferences or discussions in an effort to reach an agreement. Grammer v. Skagit Valley Lumber Co., 162 Wash. 677, 682, 299 P. 376 (1931). At best, the phrase is ambiguous. It may well differ in meaning from collective bargaining. Lullo v. International Ass'n of Fire Fighters Local 1066, 55 N.J. 409, 262 A.2d 681 (1970).
The regulations adopted by the Higher Education Personnel Board do not define "collective negotiations", but do define "collective bargaining." WAC 251-04-020(10). Even that definition is silent about arbitration.
The majority finds it significant that a legislative interim committee in its report entitled A Report on Higher Education in Washington (1969) recommended that the Higher Education Personnel Board assume a "third-party role" in collective bargaining. Again, the word "arbitration" is absent. However, it is clear that the purpose of the recommendation was to avoid the then existing conflict when trustees or regents also served as members of the personnel committee. The recommendation had nothing to do with the ultimate resolution of labor disputes.
The majority then employs a series of rules of statutory *123construction to conclude that collective negotiations must mean authority to impose mandatory arbitration. Those rules of statutory construction cannot provide the missing element, i.e., a statutory grant to the Board to mandate arbitration.
Absent an agreement to arbitrate, or the imposition of a statutory duty, there is no obligation to arbitrate. Alameda County Employees' Ass'n v. County of Alameda, 30 Cal. App. 3d 518, 534, 106 Cal. Rptr. 441 (1973); United Steelworkers v. Westinghouse Elec. Corp., 413 Pa. 358, 196 A.2d 857 (1964).
In light of the legislature's history of unequivocally mandating arbitration when it so intended, usually with some specificity concerning the mechanics thereof, I would hold that the general and ambiguous language of the statute did not give the Higher Education Personnel Board the authority to compel arbitration. One need only read RCW 41.56.450, requiring arbitration for certain uniformed personnel, to appreciate the detail with which the legislature acts when it intends to impose arbitration. The ambiguous statute in this case clearly does not satisfy the degree of specificity with which legislative power must be delegated to an administrative agency. Barry & Barry, Inc. v. Department of Motor Vehicles, 81 Wn.2d 155, 500 P.2d 540 (1972). Even an enactment as detailed as RCW 41.56.450 has been challenged. Spokane v. Spokane Police Guild, 87 Wn.2d 457, 463, 553 P.2d 1316 (1976).
This court should not supply what the legislature omitted. The majority does just that.
I dissent.
Stafford and Hicks, JJ., concur with Brachtenbach, J.
Reconsideration granted March 30, 1981.