(dissenting) — The majority fails to distinguish between the commission of a crime and the disposition to be made when one is found guilty of having committed a crime. An adult is convicted of having committed a crime. From that conviction will flow the results prescribed in the statutes, including the ability of a court to suspend the sentence. RCW 9.92.060.
To state as the majority does that juvenile offenses have been treated as analogous to adult crimes, while true, is irrelevant. The characteristics of the offense are not dependent upon the age of the offender. The character of the penalty, however, is dependent upon the age of the offender. The thrust of the Juvenile Justice Act of 1977 (RCW 13.40) is directed toward the kind of punishment to be meted out to the juvenile offender after the commission of the offense. In contrast to the language of the criminal code (see, e.g., RCW 9.92), under which an offender found guilty of committing a crime is convicted, under the juvenile code:
An order of court adjudging a child delinquent or dependent under the provisions of this chapter shall in no case be deemed a conviction of crime.
(Italics mine.) RCW 13.04.240.
" [A] juvenile has not committed a crime, including a felony, when he has committed an offense, 'an act designated as a crime if committed by an adult.'” In re Frederick, 93 Wn.2d 28, 30, 604 P.2d 953 (1980).
The majority position that the omission of provisions for a suspended sentence in the juvenile code should somehow bring RCW 9.92.060 into operation, both betrays its confusion between commission and disposition and completely *92misses the point of the juvenile code. In our examination of the new juvenile code, we have consistently adhered to the view that it was "designed to provide a new sentencing framework for the state's juvenile justice system". State v. Bryan, 93 Wn.2d 177, 183, 606 P.2d 1228 (1980). We have stated that "The legislature, through the Department of Social and Health Services, has established the standards [disposition ranges for juvenile offenders] with the expectations that they will be followed." State v. Rhodes, 92 Wn.2d 755, 758, 600 P.2d 1264 (1979). We have stated that "[W]e believe the legislature did not intend to accuse, treat and sentence juveniles the same as adult offenders" and that "the legislature has changed the philosophy and methodology of addressing the personal and societal problems of juvenile offenders, but it has not converted the procedure into a criminal offense atmosphere totally comparable to an adult criminal offense scenario." State v. Lawley, 91 Wn.2d 654, 656, 659, 591 P.2d 772 (1979).
At no time has there been the slightest suggestion by this court that the Juvenile Justice Act of 1977 was other than a comprehensive act to take care of juvenile offenders or that it was in any way related to the criminal statutes insofar as the punishment for juvenile offenders was concerned. See Becker, Washington State's New Juvenile Code: An Introduction, 14 Gonz. L. Rev. 289 (1978). This consistent understanding of the act has now been discarded by the majority.
The majority says, at page 90, a suspended sentence "does not appear to conflict with the purpose of RCW 13.40 as stated in RCW 13.40.010(2)". See especially RCW 13.40.010(2)(d) and (g). No doubt this is true. But, again, it is irrelevant. There may be any number of things which this court in its wisdom could declare to be consistent with the purposes of portions of RCW 13.40. However, the court need not draw on this reservoir of knowledge. The legislature has already stated the source of legislation relating to juvenile justice:
*93(2) It is the intent of the legislature that a system capable of having primary responsibility for, being accountable for, and responding to the needs of youthful offenders, as defined by this chapter, be established. It is the further intent of the legislature that youth, in turn, be held accountable for their offenses and that both communities and the juvenile courts carry out their functions consistent with this intent. To effectuate these policies, it shall be the purpose of this chapter to: [listing the purposes of the chapter].
(Italics mine.) RCW 13.40.010(2).
The policies of the juvenile justice act are to be effectuated by the provisions of the act, not by reference to other statutes concerning the sentencing disposition to be made of convicted criminals. The sentencing options are carefully and comprehensively spelled out in the statute. See RCW 13.40.020, .030, .160, .200. It is both unnecessary and improper to go outside of the act to dispose of the offender. There is no warrant for this court, using a misplaced analogy to the criminal statutes, to override the disposition policies of the juvenile code and thus to destroy the carefully wrought disposition procedures of RCW 13.40.
The majority relies on State v. Norton, 25 Wn. App. 377, 606 P.2d 714 (1980). That case is simply in error and should be either ignored or overruled. The Norton court stated correctly that the Juvenile Justice Act of 1977 "is part of a comprehensive revision of the juvenile justice system through which the legislature has substantially restructured the manner in which juvenile offenders are to be treated". Norton, at 379. So far so good. But then to hold as does the Norton court that because the compromise of misdemeanor statute RCW 10.22 is consistent with the purposes of the juvenile justice act and therefore the criminal disposition act can be transposed to the juvenile justice act, ignores the language and entire purpose of the juvenile justice act, not to mention the unwavering prior construction of the act by this court. Just as RCW 10.22 should not apply to the disposition of juvenile offenders, so should the *94impact of RCW 9.92.060 be confined to adults who have been convicted of a crime.
I dissent.
Utter, C.J., and Brachtenbach, J., concur with Dolli-ver, J.
Reconsideration denied May 20, 1981.