This is an appeal from a judgment of the District Court, Summit County, allowing the claim of Respondent H. Wayne Wads-worth, a member of the Utah State Bar, against the Estate of William L. Orris, of which Bradley Hasper is the executor and appellant.
William L. Orris, a medical doctor, moved to Utah in 1961, and became acquainted with respondent about that time. Respondent and Dr. Orris subsequently agreed to exchange professional services, and did so until Dr. Orris left the State in March, 1968, moving first to Arizona, and then to California. Although Dr. Orris no longer provided medical services to respondent, respondent continued to perform legal services relating to the property and business that Dr. Orris had in Utah. Dr. Orris was never billed for these services, and made no payment for them at the time the services were rendered.
On September 20, 1974, respondent submitted to Dr. Orris a draft of a will which Dr. Orris executed on October 17,1974, and delivered back to respondent. This will appointed respondent as executor, made a specific bequest to him of the testator’s interest in certain BLM lands near Park City, and further provided:
IV. Of the rest, residue and remainder of my estate, whether real, personal or mixed, tangible or intangible, wheresoever situated, I devise and bequeath one-half thereof to my friend, H. Wayne Wadsworth of Salt Lake City, Utah in consideration for his friendship and personal services to me over the past several years, and in the event he should predecease me, to his estate; and the remaining one-half thereof, I devise and bequeath to the Tulane University Medical School.
In January, 1976, Dr. Orris became acquainted with Bradley Hasper, the appellant, who moved into Dr. Orris’ home near the end of May, 1976. Subsequently, Dr. Orris executed two new wills. The first, an holographic will dated June 11, 1976, left Dr. Orris’ entire estate to the appellant, but also provided: “Of my monies, I charge Bradley Hasper to pay to my attorney, H. Wayne Wadsworth of Salt Lake City, Utah, any appropriate amount, not to exceed $10,-000, for legal services he has rendered me.” On September 15, 1976, Dr. Orris executed a new formal will, leaving his entire estate to the appellant, and omitting any reference to the respondent (who was not then informed that these wills had been executed).
Dr. Orris committed suicide February 20, 1977, in California. The will dated September 15, 1976, was admitted to probate in California on April 15, 1977, and appellant Hasper was appointed executor. Respondent filed a petition for probate of the 1974 will in the District Court of Summit County, but after appellant filed an objection to probate, the petition for probate of that will was dismissed on stipulation of counsel for the parties. On petition by appellant, the District Court later entered an order allowing ancillary probate of the will dated September 15, 1976, and appointing Hasper as personal representative. Respondent duly filed a claim with appellant, asserting that the 1974 will constituted an irrevocable contract under which he had a right to one-half of the estate. Appellant denied the claim, whereupon respondent filed a petition for allowance of the claim in the District Court, asking specific enforcement of the claimed contract. The District Court, after a trial, found that paragraph IV of the 1974 will, ante, constituted a *339binding, irrevocable contract and allowed respondent’s claim, ordering specific performance of the contract by requiring conveyance of one-half of the estate to respondent.
Appellant claims there was no contract, but that if there were a contract, specific performance was not the proper remedy. Further, he claims any contract was voidable and Dr. Orris voided it, and finally that certain evidence of respondent, including appellant’s deposition, was inadmissible as barred by the Utah Dead Man’s Statute, Utah Code Ann. 78-24-2,1958, as amended. We discuss only the matter of contract as that issue is dispositive.
It is well settled that a will may contain a contract, and thus one document may serve in a dual capacity.1 Although a will is revocable, a contract within the will is irrevocable, and such a contract can be enforced even though the will containing it is revoked or not enforceable as a will.2
The problem in determining whether paragraph IV of the will in question is a contract must be resolved in the same way as making that determination about any putative contract. Thus:
[t]he inquiry is limited to evidence of the expressed intention of the parties by words or acts, or both, as it is only from the words and conduct of the parties that a court can form any conclusion as to their intention.3
This general rule is somewhat modified in this case because the Deadman’s Statute4 forbids the admission of any extrinsic evidence by respondent for the purpose of showing the intent of the parties. We thus are limited to consideration of the language of paragraph IV itself.
The language of paragraph IV is at best ambiguous. It contains both testamentary language — “Of the rest, residue and remainder ... I devise and bequeath ...” —and, arguably, contractual language— “... in consideration for .. . ”. In the face of such ambiguity extrinsic evidence of the parties’ intent would normally be allowed. But as pointed out, ante, no such evidence is admissible here.
In other cases of this type, the fact that a later will was made on different terms from the claimed contract has been held to constitute evidence that there was no meeting of the minds and no contract.5 Without other evidence of contractual intent, this inconsistency has been enough to defeat a claim of contract. Such inconsistency exists here, since Orris made two wills after the 1974 will which were inconsistent with the terms of the earlier will.
The terms of an alleged contract in a will have to be so precise that neither party could reasonably misunderstand them.6 The will drafted by the respondent fails to meet this criterion, and we cannot say that there was an enforceable contract embodied in paragraph IV of the 1974 will.
Further militating against a finding that the language in question is contractual rather than purely testamentary is the rule that the language of an ambiguous instrument should be construed most strictly against the party who drafted the instrument.7 Where the draftsman is an attor*340ney, as well as a party strict construction against that party is particularly apt.8
Even assuming, arguendo, that paragraph IV is contractual rather than testamentary, we believe there is no consideration to support a contract. Respondent contends that the services he performed for Dr. Orris between 1968 and 1974 give rise to a past obligation still enforceable at the time the will was signed, and that such obligation provides consideration for the express “promise” found in paragraph IV. The record does not support this view.
Respondent reasons that his conduct and that of Dr. Orris shows that there was a contract between them which was implied in fact. Respondent points out that he and Dr. Orris exchanged professional services from 1963 through 1968 and characterizes such services as “gratis.” However, it is in connection with the legal services rendered by respondent for Dr. Orris after the latter left Utah that respondent seeks to establish an implied contract.9
To make out an implied in fact contract what must be shown is “mutual intent ... manifested by particular acts and attendant circumstances.”10 We are not convinced that such acts and circumstances appear in the record to show the formation of an implied contract. Friendship and mutual support appear to be the hallmarks of the relationship between Dr. Orris and respondent, even after Dr. Orris left the state. Indeed “friendship” is mentioned in paragraph IV of the will in question as a basis for a bequest of one-half of Dr. Orris’ estate.
Reversed. Costs to the estate.
HALL, J., concurs. STEWART, J., concurs in the result.. Ward v. Ward, 96 Utah 263, 85 P.2d 635 (1938); Van Houten v. Whitaker, 169 Cal.App.2d 510, 337 P.2d 900 (1959); Cf. Merrill v. Boal, 47 R.I. 274, 132 A. 721, 45 A.L.R. 830 (1926).
. Ellis v. Wadleigh, 27 Wash.2d 941, 182 P.2d 49 (1947); Potter v. Bland, 136 Cal.App.2d 125, 288 P.2d 569 (1955).
. Allen v. Bissinger & Co., 62 Utah 226, 231, 219 P. 539, 541, 31 A.L.R. 376 (1923). See, also, Oberhansly v. Earle, Utah, 572 P.2d 1384 (1977); 17 Am.Jur.2d, Contracts, § 19.
. Section 78-24-2, Utah Code Annotated, 1953, as amended.
. Clark v. Clark, 74 Utah 290, 279 P. 502 (1929); Widman v. Maurer, 19 Wash.2d 28, 141 P.2d 135 (1943).
. Ellis v. Wadleigh, supra.
. See, e. g., Wagstaff v. Remco, Inc., Utah, 540 P.2d 931 (1975); Seal v. Tayco, Inc., 16 Utah 2d 323, 400 P.2d 503 (1965); Huber & Rowland Construction Co. v. City of South Salt Lake, 7 Utah 2d 273, 323 P.2d 258 (1958).
. See Continental Bank and Trust Co. v. Bybee, 6 Utah 2d 98, 306 P.2d 773 (1957).
. If there were an enforceable obligation based on an implied in fact contract, there would be no need for respondent to rely on a subsequent express contract covering the same services. See, 1A Corbin on Contracts 354 (1963).
.Gleason v. Salt Lake City, 94 Utah 1, 5, 74 P.2d 1225, 1227 (1937).