(dissenting)-:
I dissent. In my view, two of defendant’s assignments of error have merit and accordingly, this case should be reversed and remanded for new trial.
The portion of the statute under which defendant was convicted is set forth in the majority opinion. I would note that one of the elements is that the false entry be made "relating to any moneys so received by him.” Of the five subsections of the statute, this is the only one making such requirement of receipt. We must presume this specific requirement is there as a material element of the offense, and not as mere surplusage. Among the many rules of statutory construction one is that every word, sentence or provision was intended for some useful purpose, and has some force and effect and that some effect must be given to each. Ex Parte Higgs, 97 Okl.Cr. 338, 263 P.2d 752 (1953). When all statutes regarding embezzlement and related crimes are examined,1 this requirement of receipt stands out as forming a part of the particular crime defined by this section of 21 O.S.1971 § 341.
The State has failed to make a sufficient showing that defendant had receipt of the moneys of Mr. Warren. It was the uncon-tradicted testimony of the defendant that at the time of the Warren offense (the offense for which he was convicted) he was not yet responsible for the daily balancing of the receipts, although, if he were present, he might have actually done the balancing on that day. The State should be charged with placing the defendant at work where he could carry out his normal duties, on either March 19, 1973, the date J. N. Warren paid his utilities bill, or on March 20, 1973, the date the moneys were forwarded to the treasurer of the City of Oklahoma City. While it is not necessary for the State to show that the money was actually paid to defendant, in order to complete its chain of circumstantial evidence, it must put him at the office before it shows even constructive receipt. On that basis alone, I would reverse and remand with instructions that unless the State can place defendant at work at the time in question, the case should be dismissed.
Defendant’s third assignment of error, that admission of the evidence of “other crimes” was error, also has merit. In the view of my colleagues, the admission of this evidence was not error under the rule enunciated in McCluskey v. State, Okl.Cr. 372 P.2d 623 (1962). Assuming, arguendo, that this is the type of evidence contemplated in McCluskey, it is still subject to a showing that these were, in fact, offenses prohibited by statute and that they were committed by defendant. In this regard, the evidence of “other crimes” suffers from the same flaw as the State’s evidence on the instant charge; that is, the failure to place the defendant at work or on the premises on the dates the moneys were paid. Unless it could be established that defendant had an opportunity of at least constructive receipt of the funds allegedly manipulated by these entries, this evidence should have been excluded.
In addition, I find that the sheer volume of the evidence introduced here reaches a prejudicial level. Throughout the trial, some fifty exhibits were brandished about, and the record reflects continuing confu*786sion on the part of the trial judge, the prosecutor, defense counsel, the clerk and the reporter. It is most unlikely that the confusion encountered by officers of the court in four and one half days of trial, when they had the exhibits in hand at the time, could be cured by the jury during deliberation. Rather, it is more likely that the mound of cancelled checks, cashier’s stubs, receipts and journal entries piled before them caused the jury to believe that where so much “evidence” was present, some crime must have been committed by defendant.
These requirements on the State that it place defendant at the scene in order to prove its case and to introduce the evidence of other crimes may be seen by some as mere technicalities. However, in my view it is not the function of the Court to waive portions of statutes passed by our legislature.
Accordingly, I would reverse and remand this conviction for a new trial with instructions that the State be required to show defendant’s presence at work on either March 19 or 20, 1973, or in the absence of that proof that the charge be dismissed. The same requirement of presence should be required before the evidence of “other crimes” could be admitted.
. In 21 O.C.1971 § 341 et seq., embezzlement and related crimes against the State are treated ; embezzlement and related crimes against an individual or private corporation or partnership are treated in 21 O.S.1971 § 1451 et seq.