I concur in the result.
Through its Mount Diablo Council, the Boy Scouts of America denied Timothy Curran membership as a “Scouter,” that is, an adult troop leader with the position of scoutmaster or assistant scoutmaster, because of his sexual orientation—specifically, because of his homosexual status and/or conduct and/or advocacy.
Thereupon, Curran brought an action in the superior court against the Boy Scouts, specifically, the Mount Diablo Council, claiming in substance that, by denying him membership, it violated section 51 of the Civil Code (hereafter section 51), the so-called Unruh Civil Rights Act, which prohibits discrimination on bases including sexual orientation. Determining that section 51 covered the Boy Scouts in the formulating and implementing of membership policies as to members and potential members, but that its application would infringe its members’ right of expressive association under the First Amendment to the United States Constitution, the superior court rendered judgment in favor of the Mount Diablo Council and against Curran.
The Court of Appeal affirmed. It agreed with the superior court as to the infringement of the First Amendment right of expressive association. But it disagreed as to the coverage of section 51. It gave judgment accordingly.
I agree with my colleagues that we must affirm. For, as I shall explain, I am of the view that section 51 does not cover the Boy Scouts in the formulating or implementing of membership policies as to members or potential members.
My conclusion, I hasten to add, is compelled by section 51. Here, that is the beginning and the end of the matter. But let us not ignore what lies behind. That the law does not prohibit the Mount Diablo Council from shutting Curran out cannot obscure the fact that he is the very kind of person whom it should receive most eagerly—a person whom it has itself honored as an Eagle Scout. Regrettably, the situation will remain such until the law changes. (But see cone. opn. of Kennard, J., post, at pp. 722-729.) Or, perhaps, until the ideals of scouting transform its conduct.
I
In part pertinent here, section 51 expresses a policy against discrimination, on certain bases, in the general area of relationships between private persons and entities: “All persons within the jurisdiction of this state are free and *703equal, and no matter what their sex, race, color, religion, ancestry, national origin, or disability are entitled to the full and equal accommodations, advantages, facilities, privileges, or services in all business establishments of every kind whatsoever.” In addition to those listed, the prohibited bases of discrimination have been construed to include sexual orientation. (See, e.g., Harris v. Capital Growth Investors XIV (1991) 52 Cal.3d 1142, 1154-1162 [278 Cal.Rptr. 614, 805 P.2d 873]; In re Cox (1970) 3 Cal.3d 205, 213-216 [90 Cal.Rptr. 24, 474 P.2d 992]; Hubert v. Williams (1982) 133 Cal.App.3d Supp. 1, 5 [184 Cal.Rptr. 161].)
By its terms, section 51 covers “all business establishments of every kind whatsoever.”
But what does the phrase “business establishments” mean?
“It is common ground that, in ‘undertak[ing] to construe a statute,’ ‘courts . . . “ask only what the statute means.” (Holmes, Collected Legal Papers (1920) p. 207.) And when they consider that question, they ask only what its words mean. For a statute, as it were, is a complete integration. Within its scope, it is the final and exclusive statement by the legislative body of its intent, superseding all prior and contemporaneous expressions and implications, not only those that are directly contrary but even those that are altogether consistent. Perhaps more accurately, it is the legislative body’s final and exclusive enactment, displacing all terms and conditions of whatever sort that could, would, or might have been passed. To seek the meaning of a statute is not simply to look up dictionary definitions and then stitch together the results. Rather, it is to discern the sense of the statute, and therefore its words, in the legal and broader culture. Obviously, a statute has no meaning apart from its words. Similarly, its words have no meaning apart from the world in which’ ”—and the purpose for which—“ ‘they are spoken.’ ” (People v. Hazelton (1996) 14 Cal.4th 101, 117 [58 Cal.Rptr.2d 443, 926 P.2d 423] (conc. opn. of Mosk, J.), quoting Kopp v. Fair Pol. Practices Com. (1995) 11 Cal.4th 607, 672-673 [47 Cal.Rptr.2d 108, 905 P.2d 1248] (conc. opn. of Mosk, J.), italics omitted.)
The phrase “business establishments” is not defined in section 51, either in express terms or by implication. Moreover, it has not been given a consistent or satisfying reading in our decisions. It accordingly demands a full and fresh reconsideration.
In 1905—as explained by Professor Harold W. Horowitz, its leading commentator (Horowitz, The 1959 California Equal Rights in “Business Establishments” Statute—A Problem in Statutory Application (1960) 33 *704So.Cal.L.Rev. 260 (hereafter Horowitz))—section 51 was added to the Civil Code. (Stats. 1905, ch. 413, § 1, p. 553.) It did not mention “business establishments.” Rather, it spoke of “places of public accommodation or amusement”—which, for convenience’ sake, we shall refer to simply as “places of public accommodation”—listing certain particular classes thereof. It provided: “All citizens within the jurisdiction of this state shall be entitled to the full and equal accommodations, advantages, facilities, and privileges of inns, restaurants, hotels, eating houses, barber shops, bath houses, theaters, skating rinks, and all other places of public accommodation or amusement, subject only to the conditions and limitations established by law and applicable alike to all citizens.” (Stats. 1905, ch. 413, § 1, p. 553.) In 1919, it was amended through, among other things, the addition of “public conveyances” to the list. (Stats. 1919, ch. 210, § 1, p. 309.) In 1923, it was further amended through the addition to the list of “places where ice cream or soft drinks of any kind are sold for consumption on the premises.” (Stats. 1923, ch. 235, § 1, p. 485.)
In its original form, section 51 was, by its terms, what Professor Horowitz has called a “ ‘public accommodations’ statute.” (Horowitz, supra, 33 So.Cal.L.Rev. at p. 263, fn. omitted.)
The proximate source of section 51 in its original form was an uncodified Statute (Stats. 1897, ch. 108, § 1, p. 137) enacted in 1897. (Horowitz, supra, 33 So.CaLL.Rev. at p. 263.) It was virtually identical to that statute, which provided in pertinent part: “[A]ll citizens within the jurisdiction of this State shall be entitled to the full and equal accommodations, advantages, facilities, and privileges of inns, restaurants, hotels, eating-houses, barber-shops, bathhouses, theaters, skating-rinks, and all other places of public accommodation or amusement, subject only to the conditions and limitations established by law and applicable alike to all citizens.” (Stats. 1897, ch. 108, § 1, p. 137.)
The ultimate source of section 51 in its original form was the federal Civil Rights Act of 1875 (18 Stat. 335), which had been held unconstitutional in pertinent part by the United States Supreme Court in the Civil Rights Cases (1883) 109 U.S. 3 [3 S.Ct. 18, 27 L.Ed. 835]. (Horowitz, supra, 33 So.Cal.L.Rev. at p. 263.) It was substantially similar to the federal statute, which provided in its first section: “[A]ll persons within the jurisdiction of the United States shall be entitled to the full and equal enjoyment of the accommodations, advantages, facilities, and privileges of inns, public conveyances on land or water, theaters, and other places of public amusement; subject only to the conditions and limitations established by law, and applicable to citizens of every race and color, regardless of any previous condition of servitude.” (18 Stat. 336.)
*705In its original form, section 51 generally prohibited discrimination. That is plain from its words, which generally protected “[a]ll citizens.” (Stats. 1905, ch. 413, § 1, p. 553.) Section 51 specifically prohibited racial discrimination. That is plain from its ultimate source in the Civil Rights Act of 1875, which was “applicable to citizens of every race and color, regardless of any previous condition of servitude.” (18 Stat. 336.) Section 51 prohibited discrimination, however, only in “places of public accommodation”—which are areas that are explicitly in “public view” at physical locations (Horowitz, supra, 33 So.Cal.L.Rev. at p. 279), and that are implicitly given over to activity encompassing the relationship between a proprietor and a patron, which involves the providing of goods or services, “nongratuitous[ly],” for a price or fee, in the course of “relatively noncontinuous, nonpersonal, and nonsocial” dealings (id. at p. 280).
Hence, the purpose of section 51 in its original form was “to prevent racial” and other “discrimination ... in those relationships between people which take place more or less in ‘public view . . .’ ” at physical locations, and “which are of a . . . nongratuitous” and “relatively . . . noncontinuous, nonpersonal, and nonsocial sort” (Horowitz, supra, 33 So.Cal.L.Rev. at p. 282)—“primarily because of the psychological injury to those discriminated against” (ibid.), “in the form of invasion of interests in dignity and self-respect, including interests in not being subjected to humiliation” (id. at p. 278), and, “more generally, . . . because of the adverse overall effect of [such] discrimination on the community as a whole” (id. at p. 282).1
As a consequence, section 51 in its original form effectively struck a balance between the potential “discriminatee’s interest in not being subjected to racial” or other “discrimination” and the potential discriminator’s “interest ... in having freedom of choice in the utilization of his property or facilities and in the selection of those persons with whom he wishes to deal.” (Horowitz, supra, 33 So.Cal.L.Rev. at p. 280.)
In 1959, section 51 was amended into its present form to speak of “business establishments” and not “places of public accommodation”: “All *706citizens within the jurisdiction of this State are free and equal, and no matter what their race, color, religion, ancestry, or national origin are entitled to the full and equal accommodations, advantages, facilities, privileges, or services in all business establishments of every kind whatsoever. . . .” (Stats. 1959, ch. 1866, § 1, p. 4424.) In 1961, it was further amended, in pertinent part, with the substitution of “persons” for “citizens.” (Stats. 1961, ch. 1187, § 1, p. 2920.) In 1974, it was amended still further in the same part through the addition of “sex” to the list of prohibited bases .of discrimination. (Stats. 1974, ch. 1193, § 1, p. 2568.) In 1987, it was amended yet further in the same part through the addition to the list of “blindness or other physical disability.” (Stats. 1987, ch. 159, § 1, p. 1094.) In 1992, it was amended for a final time in the same part with the substitution of “disability” for “blindness or other physical disability.” (Stats. 1992, ch. 913, § 3, p. 4283.) As it now stands, it provides in pertinent part: “All persons within the jurisdiction of this state are free and equal, and no matter what their sex, race, color, religion, ancestry, national origin, or disability are entitled to the full and equal accommodations, advantages, facilities, privileges, or services in all business establishments of every kind whatsoever.”
In its present form, section 51 is, by its terms, what Professor Horowitz has called a “business establishments” statute. (Horowitz, supra, 33 So.Cal.L.Rev. at p. 262.) At its enactment almost 40 years ago, it was “unique” in “expressing its policy against racial and other discrimination in this general area of relationships between private persons [and entities] . . . without the use of the word ‘public,’ and with the use of the words ‘business’ and ‘establishments.’ ” (Ibid.) It remains the same in this regard today.
The meaning of the phrase “business establishments” in section 51 is not declared by its words. We must therefore seek to discern its sense beyond.
In order to determine what the phrase “business establishments” means in section 51, let us first consider the background of the provision. When we do so, we meet the courts’ construction and application of section 51 in its original form, which spoke of “places of public accommodation.” To use Professor Horowitz’s words, such construction and application were often “fortuitous” and “inconsistent.” (Horowitz, supra, 33 So.Cal.L.Rev. at p. 276.) The reason may be found in the fact that courts often attempted to determine whether the “place” in question was one of “public accommodation” by a kind of superficial ejusdem generis analysis that turned, as it were, on appearance and not reality—that is to say, on whether the “place” looked like one or more of those listed in the provision, and not on whether it was like them in view of the provision’s purpose. (Id. at pp. 272-276.)
*707Thus, in James v. Marinship Corp. (1944) 25 Cal.2d 721 [155 P.2d 329, 160 A.L.R. 900], we apparently accepted an argument that a craft union did not operate as a “place of public accommodation” under section 51 in its original form in the formulating or implementing of membership policies as to members or potential members. We gave no reason. (James v. Marinship Corp., supra, 25 Cal.2d at p. 740.) Our result, however, seems to have been sound. Strictly speaking, the craft union was not in public view at a physical location. (See Horowitz, supra, 33 So.Cal.L.Rev. at p. 284, fn. 86.) Moreover, the relationship between the craft union and the member or potential member in the formulating and implementing of membership policies was not that of proprietor and patron: notwithstanding the payment of dues, it did not, in actuality, involve the providing of goods or services, nongratuitously, for a price or fee; moreover, the dealings in question were not relatively noncontinuous, nonpersonal, and nonsocial. (See id. at p. 284.)
In Evans v. Fong Poy (1941) 42 Cal.App.2d 320 [108 P.2d 942], the Court of Appeal concluded that a bar operated as a “place of public accommodation” under section 51 in its original form in the serving of beverages to drinkers. (Evans v. Fong Poy, supra, 42 Cal.App.2d at p. 321.) It gave no reason, stating only that the quoted phrase “obviously covers” such premises. {Ibid.) Its result, however, was sound. The bar was in public view at a physical location. (See Horowitz, supra, 33 So.Cal.L.Rev. at p. 282.) Furthermore, the relationship between the barkeeper and the drinker in the serving of beverages was that of proprietor and patron, since it involved the providing of goods or services, nongratuitously, for a price or fee, in the course of relatively noncontinuous, nonpersonal, and nonsocial dealings. (See ibid.)
In Suttles v. Hollywood Turf Club (1941) 45 Cal.App.2d 283, 286 [114 P.2d 27], the Court of Appeal similarly concluded that a racetrack operated as a “place of public accommodation” under section 51 in its original form in the taking of bets from wagerers. (Suttles v. Hollywood Turf Club, supra, 45 Cal.App.2d at p. 286.) It gave no reason, merely quoting a statement in a legal encyclopedia that a “ ‘general clause in a civil rights statute, such as “any other place of public accommodation . . . ,” includes ... a racetrack ....’” {Ibid., italics omitted.) Its result, however, was sound. The racetrack was in public view at a physical location. (See Horowitz, supra, 33 So.Cal.L.Rev. at p. 282.) Moreover, the relationship between the racetrack and the wagerer in the taking of bets was that of proprietor and patron, since it involved the providing of goods or services, nongratuitously, for a price or fee, in the course of relatively noncontinuous, nonpersonal, and nonsocial dealings. (See ibid.)
In Long v. Mountain View Cemetery Assn. (1955) 130 Cal.App.2d 328 [278 P.2d 945], the Court of Appeal concluded that a cemetery did not *708operate as a “place of public accommodation” under section 51 in its original form in the furnishing of burial ground to survivors of decedents. (Long v. Mountain View Cemetery Assn., supra, 130 Cal.App.2d at p. 329.) It gave no reason, simply relying on the authority of other courts in other jurisdictions under other statutes. (Ibid.) Its result was unsound. The cemetery was in public view at a physical location. (Horowitz, supra, 33 So.Cal.L.Rev. at p. 283.) Furthermore, the relationship between the cemetery and the survivor in the furnishing of burial ground was that of proprietor and patron, since it involved the providing of goods or services, nongratuitously, for a price or fee, in the course of relatively noncontinuous, nonpersonal, and nonsocial dealings. (Ibid.)
In Coleman v. Middlestaff (1957) 147 Cal.App.2d Supp. 833 [305 P.2d 1020], the appellate department of the superior court similarly concluded that a dentist’s office did not operate as a “place of public accommodation” under section 51 in its original form in the rendering of professional services to patients. (Coleman v. Middlestaff, supra, 147 Cal.App.2d at pp. Supp. 834-835.) It gave little reason, relying essentially on the authority of Long v. Mountain View Cemetery Assn., supra, 130 Cal.App.2d 328, and on the authority of another court in another jurisdiction under another statute. (Coleman v. Middlestaff, supra, 147 Cal.App.2d at pp. Supp. 834-835.) Whether or not its result was sound is unclear. The dentist’s office was at a physical location, but it was not in public view, at least not fully. (Horowitz, supra, 33 So.Cal.L.Rev. at p. 285.) Moreover, the relationship between the dentist and the patient in the rendering of professional services was somewhat like, and somewhat unlike, that of proprietor and patron: it involved the providing of goods or services, nongratuitously, for a price or fee; but, although the dealings in question were relatively nonsocial, they were not relatively noncontinuous and nonpersonal. (Ibid.)
In Lambert v. Mandel’s of California (1957) 156 Cal.App.2d Supp. 855 [319 P.2d 469], the appellate department of the superior court concluded that a shoe store operated as a “place of public accommodation” under section 51 in its original form in the selling of footwear to customers. (Lambert v. Mandel’s of California, supra, 156 Cal.App.2d at pp. Supp. 856-857.) It gave a reason, to the effect that a shoe store is “open to the public generally for the purchase of goods.” (Id. at p. Supp. 857.) Its reason was valid. Hence, its result was sound. The shoe store was in public view at a physical location. (See Horowitz, supra, 33 So.Cal.L.Rev. at p. 282.) Furthermore, the relationship between the shoe salesperson and the customer in the selling of footware was that of proprietor and patron, since it involved the providing of goods or services, nongratuitously, for a price or fee, in the course of relatively noncontinuous, nonpersonal, and nonsocial dealings. (See ibid.)
*709Finally, in Reed v. Hollywood Professional School (1959) 169 Cal.App.2d Supp. 887 [338 P.2d 633], the appellate department of the superior court concluded that a private school did not operate as a “place of public accommodation” under section 51 in its original form in the formulating or implementing of admissions policies as to students or potential students. (Reed v. Hollywood Professional School, supra, 169 Cal.App.2d at p. Supp. 890.) It gave a reason, to the effect that a private school is not a public accommodation because it is privately owned. (Id. at pp. Supp. 890-892.) Its reason was invalid. Most public accommodations were privately owned (see Horowitz, supra, 33 So.Cal.L.Rev. at p. 274.)-such as the “inns, restaurants, hotels, eating houses, places where ice cream or soft drinks of any kind are sold for consumption on the premises, barber shops, bath houses, theaters, skating rinks, [and] public conveyances” listed in the provision (Stats. 1923, ch. 235, § 1, p. 485). They were not rendered nonpublic as a consequence. (See Horowitz, supra, 33 So.Cal.L.Rev. at p. 274.)2 Nevertheless, whether or not the result was sound is unclear. The private school was at a physical location, but it was not in public view, at least not fully. (Horowitz, supra, 33 So.Cal.L.Rev. at pp. 285-286.) Moreover, the relationship between the headmaster and the student or potential student in the formulating and implementing of admissions policies was somewhat like, and somewhat unlike, that of proprietor and patron: it involved the providing of goods or services, nongratuitously, for a price or fee; but the dealings in question were not relatively noncontinuous, nonpersonal, and nonsocial. (Ibid.)
In order to determine what the phrase “business establishments” means in section 51, let us now turn from the background of the provision to its genesis. As Professor Horowitz has stated, “[t]here are no published committee hearings, committee reports, or floor debates” concerning its source, which was Assembly Bill No. 594, 1959 Regular Session (hereafter Assembly Bill No. 594); “the only available legislative materials are the several drafts of the statute, with no contemporaneous explanations of the terms used in the bill or of the changes made in the bill as it progressed toward passage.” (Horowitz, supra, 33 So.CaLL.Rev. at p. 265.) Because these “drafts” are all that we have, they will be set out at length.
As introduced on January 21, 1959, Assembly Bill No. 594 would have amended section 51 in its original form, through the addition of the language printed in italics and the deletion of the language printed in “strike-out,” to read in pertinent part as follows:
*710. . All citizens within the jurisdiction of this State, no matter what their race, color, religion, ancestry, or national origin, are entitled to the full and equal admittance, accommodations, advantages, facilities, membership, and privileges in, or accorded by, all public or private groups, organizations, associations, business establishments, schools, and public facilities; to purchase real property; and to obtain the services of any professional person, group or association.
. . of inns, restaurants,--hotels; eating houses, places where ice cream or soft drinks of-any kind are-sold for consumption on the premises, barber shops, bath houses—theatersr-skat-i-ng rinks, public conveyances and all other places of public accommodation or amusement, subject only- to the condi - tions and limitations established by law, and applicable alike-to-all citizens.” (As printed in Horowitz, supra, 33 So.Cal.L.Rev. at p. 265, fn. 31.)
On March 24, 1959, Assembly Bill No. 594 was amended in this part through the addition of the language printed in italics:
“All citizens within the jurisdiction of this State, no matter what their race, color, religion, ancestry, or national origin, are entitled to the full and equal admittance, accommodations, advantages, facilities, membership, and privileges in, or accorded by, all public or private groups, organizations, associations, business establishments, schools, and public facilities, except those institutions organized primarily for the purpose of, and which practice, the furthering of a specific sectarian religious belief or a specific national culture, and which limit their membership or affiliations to only those persons with a corresponding religious belief or national derivation; to purchase real property; and to obtain the services of any professional person, group or association.” (As printed in Horowitz, supra, 33 So.Cal.L.Rev. at p. 266, fn. 32.)
On March 30, 1959, Assembly Bill No. 594 was further amended through the addition of the language printed in italics and the deletion of the language printed in strike-out:
“All citizens within the jurisdiction of this-State, no matter what their race? color, religion, ancestry, or national origin[,j are entitled to the full and equal-admittance, accomodations [ric]—advantages-,- facilities, membership, and privileges iip-or-accorded by-, all public or private groups, organizations? associations, business establishments, schools-,-and public facilities, except-those institutions organized primarily for the-purpose of, and-which practice^ the-furthcring of a-specific-sectarian religious belief or a specific national culture, and-which limit their membership o^a-ffi-liations to only-those persons with—a- corresponding religious belief or national derivation; to *711purchase-real property; and to obtain the services of any professional person-, group or association.
“. . . All citizens within the jurisdiction of this State are free and equal, and no matter what their race, color, religion, ancestry, or national origin are entitled to the full and equal admittance, accommodations, advantages, facilities, membership, privileges, services or benefits set out, but not limited, by this section:
“(a) To all business establishments of every kind whatsoever;
“(b) To all schools of every kind whatsoever, except those schools organized for the purpose of, and which practice, the furthering of a specific sectarian religious belief;
“(c) To the benefits administered or offered by any organization or institution receiving any tax advantage or exemption, or receiving any form of assistance from the Federal Government, or the State of California, or any municipality or any political subdivision of either;
“(d) To membership in any and all business or professional organizations formed or maintained primarily for the protection or advancement of the business or professional interests of the members;
“(e) To obtain the services of any professional person, group or association licensed or certified by the State of California, any municipality or political subdivision or agency of either.” (As printed in Horowitz, supra, 33 So.Cal.L.Rev. at pp. 266-267, fn. 33, except as to added brackets and bracketed material.)
On April 24,1959, Assembly Bill No. 594 was again amended through the addition of the language printed in italics:
. . All citizens within the jurisdiction of this State are free and equal, and no matter what their race, color, religion, ancestry, or national origin are entitled to the full and equal admittance, accommodations, advantages, facilities, membership, privileges, services or benefits set out, but not limited, by this section:
“(a) To all business establishments of every kind whatsoever;
“(b) To all schools of every kind whatsoever, except those schools organized for the purpose of, and which practice, the furthering of a specific *712sectarian religious belief [,] insofar as the facilities of any such school so organized and following such practice are made available primarily to persons who subscribe to such beliefl;]
“(c) To the charitable benefits administered or offered by any organization or institution receiving any tax advantage or exemption, or receiving any form of assistance from the Federal Government, or the State of California, or any municipality or any political subdivision of either;
“(d) To membership in any and all business or professional organizations formed or maintained primarily for the protection or advancement of the business or professional interests of the members;
“(e) To obtain the services of any professional person, group or association licensed or certified by the State of California, any municipality or political subdivision or agency of either.” (As printed in Horowitz, supra, 33 So.Cal.L.Rev. at pp. 267-268, fn. 34, except as to added brackets and bracketed material.)
On May 12, 1959, Assembly Bill No. 594 was amended yet again as to the language quoted in the preceding paragraph through the addition of the language printed in italics and the deletion of the language printed in strike-out:
“. . . All citizens within the jurisdiction of this State are free and equal, and no matter what their race, color, religion, ancestry, or national origin are entitled to the full and equal admittance, accommodations, advantages, facilities, membership, privileges, services or benefits set out, but not limited by this section:
“(a) To all business establishments of every kind whatsoever;
“(b) To all schools of every ldnd-whatsoever, except those
“(b) To all schools which primarily offer business or vocational training; schools organized for the purpose of,-and-which practice, the furthering of a specific sectarian religious belief, insofar as the facilities-of-any such school so organized and following such practice are made available primarily to persons who subscribe to such belief;
“(c) To the charitable benefits administered or offered by any organization or institution receiving any direct subvention tax -advantage or exemption, or receiving any form of assistance from the Federal Government, or *713the State of California, or any municipality or any political subdivision of either;
“(d) To membership in In any and all business or professional organizations formed or maintained by licensees of the State of California primarily for the protection or advancement of the business or professional interests of the members;
“(e) To obtain the services of From any professional person, group or association licensed or certified by the State of California, any municipality or political subdivision or agency of either.” (As printed in Horowitz, supra, 33 So.Cal.L.Rev. at p. 268, fn. 35.)
On June 11, 1959, Assembly Bill No. 594 was further amended as to the language quoted in the preceding paragraph through the deletion of language printed in strike-out:
“. . . All citizens within the jurisdiction of this State are free and equal, and no matter what their race, color, religion, ancestry, or national origin are entitled to the full and equal admittance, accommodations, advantages, facilities, membership, privileges, services or benefits set out by this section:
“(a) To all business establishments of every kind whatsoever;
“(b) To all schools which primarily offer business or vocational training!;.]
“(c) To the-charitable benefits-administered or offered by- any organization-or institution receiving any-direct- subvention from the Federal Government, or the-State of-Galifomia, or any municipality-or any political subdivision of either;
“(d) In any and all business-or professional organizations formed or maintained by licensees of the -State of - Galifomia primarily for the protection- or advancement of-the business or professional-interests of the members-;
“(c) From any professional-person^ group or association licensed or certified by the-State of-Galifor-nia, any municipality-or political subdivision- or agency of either.1* (As printed in Horowitz, supra, 33 So.Cal.L.Rev. at p. 269, fn. 36, except as to added brackets and bracketed material.)
On June 15, 1959, Assembly Bill No. 594 was amended as to the language quoted in the preceding paragraph through the addition of the language *714printed in italics and the deletion of the language printed in strike-out, and, as amended, was subsequently passed:
“AH: This section shall be known, and may be cited, as the Unruh Civil Rights Act.
“. . . All citizens within the jurisdiction of this State are free and equal, and no matter what their race, color, religion, ancestry, or national origin are entitled to the full and equal admittance,-accommodations, advantages, facilities, membership, privileges, services or-benefits set out by this section:
“(a) To all business- establishments of every kind whatsoever;
“(b) To all schools which primarily-offer business or vocational training; accommodations, advantages, facilities, privileges, or services in all business establishments of every kind whatsoever.” (As printed in Horowitz, supra, 33 So.Cal.L.Rev. at pp. 269-270, fn. 37.)
To summarize: As introduced on January 21, 1959, Assembly Bill No. 594 “prohibited discrimination against citizens on the basis of race, color, religion, ancestry, or national origin” “(1) in the extension of facilities by ‘public or private groups, organizations, associations, business establishments, schools, and public facilities,’ ” “(2) with respect to the purchase of ‘real property,’ ” and “(3) in obtaining ‘the services of any professional person, group or association.’ ” (Horowitz, supra, 33 So.Cal.L.Rev. at p. 266.) Its March 24th version “introduced ... a broad religious and ‘national’ exception . . . .” (Ibid.) Its March 30th version “eliminated the references to prohibition of discrimination by ‘private groups[, etc.]’ and with respect to the purchase of real property”; it also “prohibited discrimination ... by ‘all business establishments of every kind whatsoever’; ‘all schools of every kind whatsoever,’ except religious schools; ‘any organization or institution receiving any tax advantage or exemption,’ or ‘receiving any form of [government] assistance’ . . . ; ‘business or professional organizations’ formed primarily for the advancement of the business or professional interests of the members; and ‘any [licensed] professional person.’ ” (Id. at pp. 266-267.) Its April 24th version “more specifically defined” the “religious schools exception” and limited the prohibition of discrimination by “ ‘organization^] or institution^] receiving any tax advantage or exemption’ ... or any form of [government] assistance” to “charitable” benefits. (Id. at pp. 267-268.) Its May 12th version “changed the prior reference to schools to include ‘all schools which primarily offer business or vocational training . . it changed its coverage from organizations or institutions receiving “ ‘any tax advantage or exemption ... or any form of’ ” government *715“ ‘assistance’ ” to those receiving “ ‘any direct [government] subvention.’ ” (Id. at pp. 268-269.) Its June 11th version “eliminated a number of the persons or organizations who were prohibited from discriminating, leaving . . . only ‘all business establishments of every kind whatsoever,’ and ‘all schools which primarily offer business or vocational training . . . .’” (Id. at p. 269.) Its June 15th version, the final one, “eliminated . . . ‘all schools which primarily offer business or vocational training,’ ” “leaving . . . only ‘all business establishments of every kind whatsoever.’ ” (Ibid.)
In view of the background and genesis of section 51, we can arrive at the following conclusions bearing on the meaning of the phrase “business establishments.”
First, a comparison of the coverage of section 51 in its present form, which prohibits racial and other discrimination “in all business establishments of every kind whatsoever,” with that of the provision in its original form, which prohibited such discrimination in a nonexclusive list of “places of public accommodation,” suggests that section 51 is presently broader in its prohibition than it was originally. Because it does not contain a list of any sort, it avoids the constraints that might otherwise be imposed through the kind of superficial ejusdem generis analysis in which courts had often indulged. More important, because it speaks of “business establishments,” it implies, as Professor Horowitz has explained, that it prohibits discrimination in areas of activity encompassing proprietor-patron relationships. (Horowitz, supra, 33 So.Cal.L.Rev. at pp. 287-289.) Because it does not even mention “places of public accommodation,” it implies, as Professor Horowitz has also explained, that it does not prohibit discrimination only in public view. (Id. at p. 287.) And because it does not even mention “places of public accommodation,” it implies, as Professor Horowitz has explained yet again, that it does not prohibit discrimination only at a physical location; it is not bound to “physically located places,” but extends as well to “nonphysically-located ‘enterprises’ or ‘organizations.’ ” (Ibid.)
Second, a comparison of the coverage of section 51 in its present form as enacted by the final version of Assembly Bill No. 594, which prohibits racial and other discrimination “in all business establishments of every kind whatsoever,” and with that of the provision in the bill’s earlier unenacted versions, which prohibited such discrimination by, among other persons and entities, “all . . . private groups, organizations, associations, . . . [and] schools,” suggests that section 51 is presently narrower in its prohibition than it might otherwise have been. Because it speaks of “business establishments” and does not even mention any “private” persons or entities, it implies, as Professor Horowitz has explained, that it does not prohibit *716discrimination in areas of activity that do not encompass proprietor-patron relationships. (See Horowitz, supra, 33 So.Cal.L.Rev. at pp. 289-294.)
Third, a comparison of the coverage of section 51 in its present form as enacted by the final version of Assembly Bill No. 594, which prohibits racial and other discrimination “in . . . business establishments,” and with that of the provision in the bill’s earlier unenacted versions, which, broadly speaking, prohibited discrimination “by businesses,” among other persons and entities, suggests that section 51 is presently different in its prohibition than it might otherwise have been. What might have been material was whether the discriminator was a “business.” What is in fact material is whether the discrimination occurs in a “business establishment.”
It follows that the phrase “business establishments” in section 51 means areas of activity, whether or not in public view, and whether or not at a physical location, that encompass proprietor-patron relationships.3
Therefore, the purpose of section 51 in its present form is like that of the provision in its original form—to prevent racial and other discrimination within its coverage to the benefit of the potential discriminatee and, more generally, the community as a whole. The coverage, however, is now broader than it was previously.
As a result, section 51 in its present form, like the provision in its original form, effectively strikes a balance between the interests of the potential discriminator and those of the potential discriminatee. The balance, however, is now more favorable to the potential discriminatee than it was previously.
But the fact remains, as we stated in Alcorn v. Anbro Engineering, Inc. (1970) 2 Cal.3d 493, 500 [86 Cal.Rptr. 88, 468 P.2d 216], and do well to restate here, “there is no indication that the Legislature intended to broaden the scope of section 51 to include discriminations other than those made by a ‘business establishment’ in the course of furnishing goods, services or facilities to its clients, patrons or customers.”
Over the years, we have considered section 51, but have not given the phrase “business establishments” a consistent or satisfying reading.
Thus, in Burks v. Poppy Construction Co. (1962) 57 Cal.2d 463 [20 Cal.Rptr. 609, 370 P.2d 313], we concluded that a commercial developer and *717builder of tract housing operated as a “business establishment” within the meaning of section 51 in the selling of the units to buyers. (Burks v. Poppy Construction Co., supra, 57 Cal.2d at pp. 468-469.) Our reason was to the effect that the words “business” and “establishment” each carried a broad meaning, and that the phrase “business establishments” “was used in the broadest sense reasonably possible.” (Id. at p. 468.) Our result was 4 The relationship between the commercial developer and builder of tract housing and the buyer in the selling of the units was that of proprietor and patron, since it involved the providing of goods or services, nongratuitously, for a price or fee, in the course of relatively noncontinuous, nonpersonal, and nonsocial dealings. What we said, and what we did, were consistent with the definition of “business establishments” as areas of activity encompassing proprietor-patron relationships.
In O’Connor v. Village Green Owners Assn. (1983) 33 Cal.3d 790 [191 Cal.Rptr. 320, 662 P.2d 427], a majority of the court concluded that a condominium owners association operated as a “business establishment” within the meaning of section 51 in the managing of the development for the owners. (O’Connor v. Village Green Owners Assn., supra, 33 Cal.3d at pp. 794-796.) The reason was that, in so doing, it “performs all the customary business functions which in the traditional landlord-tenant relationship rest on the landlord’s shoulders.” (Id. at p. 796.) The majority’s reason was arguably valid.5 Hence, their result was arguably sound.6 The relationship between the condominium owners association and the individual owner in the managing of the development was that of proprietor and patron, since it involved the providing of goods or services, nongratuitously, for a price or fee, in the course of relatively nonpersonal and nonsocial dealings, albeit relatively continuous ones. Again, what the majority said, and what the majority did, were arguably consistent with the definition of “business establishments” as areas of activity encompassing proprietor-patron relationships.
In Isbister v. Boys’ Club of Santa Cruz, Inc. (1985) 40 Cal.3d 72 [219 Cal.Rptr. 150, 707 P.2d 212] (hereafter sometimes Isbister), a majority of the court concluded that a private nonprofit charitable youth organization—in .support of whose position the Boy Scouts appeared as amicus curiae— operated as a “business establishment” within the meaning of section 51 in *718the formulating and implementing of membership policies as to members and potential members. (Isbister v. Boys’ Club of Santa Cruz, Inc., supra, 40 Cal.3d at pp. 78-86.) The majority’s reason seems to have been that the organization’s recreational facilities, which included a “gymnasium,” “swimming pool,” “snack bar,” and “craft and games areas” (id. at p. 77), looked like one or more of the “places of public accommodation” listed in section 51 in its original form and also in various federal and sister state statutes—all of which spoke of such “places.” Their reason was invalid. It was an instance of the old kind of superficial ejusdem generis analysis that turned on appearance and not reality. Worse still, it was one that turned on the wrong appearance. For it ignored the fact that it was not section 51 in its original form that was applicable, and certainly not any of the various federal and sister state statutes. Rather, it was section 51 in its present form that governed—a provision different from the former and unique among the latter in speaking of “business establishments.” Not only was the majority’s reason wanting, their result was unsound. The relationship between the private nonprofit charitable youth organization and the member or potential member in the formulating and implementing of membership policies was not that of proprietor and patron: notwithstanding the payment of dues, it did not, in actuality, involve the providing of goods or services, nongratuitously, for a price or fee; moreover, the dealings in question were not relatively noncontinuous, nonpersonal, and nonsocial. The majority nevertheless held to the contrary. In support, they asserted that the relationship was in fact “of a ‘relatively nongratuitous, noncontinuous, nonpersonal, and nonsocial sort.’ ” (Isbister v. Boys’ Club of Santa Cruz, Inc., supra, 40 Cal.3d at p. 81, incorrectly quoting Horowitz, supra, 33 So.Cal.L.Rev. at p. 288.) That blinks reality. True, the member or potential member had to pay dues to the organization. But the payment of dues hardly established a proprietor-patron relationship. Especially when the amount was only $3.25 a year. (Isbister v. Boys’ Club of Santa Cruz, Inc., supra, 40 Cal.3d at p. 77.) What the majority said, and what the majority did, were inconsistent with the definition of “business establishments” as areas of activity encompassing proprietor-patron relationships.
Similarly, and most recently, in Warfield v. Peninsula Golf & Country Club (1995) 10 Cal.4th 594 [42 Cal.Rptr.2d 50, 896 P.2d 776] (hereafter sometimes Warfield), a majority of the court concluded that a private social club operated as a “business establishment” within the meaning of section 51 in the formulating and implementing of membership policies as to members and potential members. (Warfield v. Peninsula Golf & Country Club, supra, 10 Cal.4th at pp. 607-623.) In dictum, they set out a number of “factors” that had been deemed “relevant” by various federal and sister state courts in determining whether such a club was covered by various federal and sister *719state “public accommodation” statutes, including the “selectivity of the group in the admission of members,” which was apparently considered “of prime importance,” the “size of the group,” the “degree of membership control over the governance of the organization (and particularly the selection of new members),” the “degree to which club facilities are available for use by nonmembers,” and “whether the primary purpose served by the club is social or business.” (Id. at p. 620.) In giving their reason for their conclusion, however, they did not undertake analysis based on this “multipronged standard.” (Id. at p. 621.) Rather, they simply asserted that “business transactions” which were “conducted regularly on the club’s premises with persons who [were] not members of the club” for the members’ benefit were “sufficient in themselves to” render the club a “business establishment.” (Ibid., italics omitted.) Their reason was invalid. Their result was unsound.7 Let us assume for argument’s sake that the relationship between the private social club and the nonmember in the conducting of some business transaction—say, the offering of tennis equipment at a club shop or tennis lessons by a club professional—was that of proprietor and patron, on the ground that it involved the providing of goods or services nongratuitously, for a price or fee, "in the course of relatively noncontinuous, nonpersonal, and nonsocial dealings. That would be immaterial. For the relationship between the private social club and the member or potential member in the formulating and implementing of membership policies was not that of proprietor and patron: notwithstanding the payment of dues, even substantial dues, it did not, in actuality, involve the providing of goods or services, nongratuitously, for a price or fee; moreover, the dealings in question were not relatively noncontinuous, nonpersonal, and nonsocial. It matters not whether the private social club, in the abstract, could be called a “business.” To the extent that it occupied an area of activity encompassing patron-proprietor relationships, it operated as a “business establishment.” But only to that extent. As we stated in Alcorn v. Anbro Engineering, Inc., supra, 2 Cal.3d 493, 500, “there is no indication that the Legislature intended to broaden the scope of section 51 to include discriminations other than those made by a ‘business establishment’ in the course of furnishing goods, services or facilities to its clients, patrons or customers.” Again, what the majority said, and what the majority did, were inconsistent with the definition of “business establishments” as areas of activity encompassing proprietor-patron relationships.8
At the end of the day, the question comes down to this: What do we do with section 51, on the one side, and Isbister and Warfield, on the other? The *720answer must be: Save the provision and overrule the decisions. Otherwise, we shall undermine the antidiscrimination policy that section 51 expresses in the general area of relationships between private persons and entities by undermining its coherence. This we cannot and must not allow.
In conclusion, the law is, and should be recognized to be, as follows: The phrase “business establishments” in section 51 means areas of activity encompassing proprietor-patron relationships—which involve the providing ' of goods or services, nongratuitously, for a price or fee, in the course of relatively noncontinuous, nonpersonal, and nonsocial dealings.
II
Turning from the construction of section 51 to its application, we must now determine whether or not the provision covers the Boy Scouts in the formulating and implementing of membership policies as to members or potential members.
At the threshold, we are presented with this question: On what level of the Boy Scouts as an organization do we focus—e.g., the local troop; the regional council, such as the Mount Diablo Council itself; or the national body?
It turns out, however, that, no matter what answer we may happen to give, we arrive at the same conclusion.
Section 51 does not cover the Boy Scouts, at any level of the organization, in the formulating or implementing of membership policies as to members or potential members. That is because at no level does it operate in that regard as a “business establishment”—that is to say, at no level does it occupy in that regard an area of activity encompassing proprietor-patron relationships. The record on appeal is unequivocal. For the relationship between the Boy Scouts and the member or potential member in the formulating and implementing of membership policies, at whatever level of the organization, does not, in actuality, involve the providing of goods or services, nongratuitously, for a price or fee, notwithstanding the payment of dues; moreover, the dealings in question are not relatively noncontinuous, nonpersonal, and nonsocial dealings, but quite the opposite.9
This, of course, does not negate the possibility that section 51 may cover the Boy Scouts, at some level of the organization, in some other regard. *721Indeed, the record on appeal shows that possibility to be a fact. For example, the provision covers the Mount Diablo Council in at least one respect. The council operates as a “business establishment” in the selling of camping equipment and similar merchandise to the general public at a “Scout Shop” in San Francisco. In so doing, it occupies an area of activity encompassing proprietor-patron relationships. Without doubt, the relationship between the council and the customer involves the providing of goods or services, nongratuitously, for a price or fee, in the course of relatively noncontinuous, nonpersonal, and nonsocial dealings.
But the fact that section 51 may, and in fact does, cover the Boy Scouts insofar as it is a “business establishment” to the extent that it occupies an area of activity encompassing proprietor-patron relationships in the selling of camping equipment and similar merchandise to the general public does not mean that it does, or even can, cover the organization insofar as it is not a “business establishment” to the extent that it does not occupy an area of activity encompassing proprietor-patron relationships in the formulating or implementing of membership policies as to members or potential members— with which alone we are concerned here.
Ill
The majority come to conclusions identical to those set out, viz., that section 51 does not cover the Boy Scouts in the formulating or implementing of membership policies as to members or potential members at any level of the organization, but does cover the Mount Diablo Council in the selling of camping equipment and similar merchandise to the general public at its “Scout Shop” in San Francisco.
The majority, however, do not engage in identical analysis—or, despite their many pages, in any substantial analysis as an alternative. They do little more than attempt to distinguish Isbister and Warfield.10 They do so essentially by stating that the Boys’ Club of Santa Cruz and the Peninsula *722Golf & Country Club are different from the Boy Scouts. Perhaps true.11 But unquestionably trivial. They apparently have as their object to salvage Isbister and Warfield, at any cost. Neither decision is worth the effort. In large part, each merely purports to apply the phrase “business establishments” in section 51 to the peculiar facts presented, and then asserts that its words are broad enough to reach the entity in question. Neither construes the phrase, except indirectly through the former’s superficial ejusdem generis analysis and the latter’s inapt “multipronged standard” and conclusory “business transactions” test. In this respect, however, the majority pass them over virtually in silence: they do not bring to bear either analysis or standard or test, and put nothing in their place. By proceeding as they do, they render their own discussion vague in its outline and ad hoc at its core, and hence fail to give guidance for lawful conduct outside of court or for principled decisionmaking within. In the end, they tell us only that the Boys’ Club of Santa Cruz, and the Peninsula Golf & Country Club operate as “business establishments,” and that the Boy Scouts do not. That is not nearly enough.
IV
For the reasons stated above, I join with my colleagues in affirming the judgment of the Court of Appeal.
The purpose of section 51 in its original form cannot be deemed to have been merely to codify the “common-law doctrine,” annunciated in decisions such as Willis v. McMahan (1891) 89 Cal. 156 [26 P. 649], and Turner v. N.B. & M.R.R. Co. (1868) 34 Cal. 594, that “innkeepers and common carriers had a duty to extend their facilities to all members of the public in the absence of some reasonable justification for not doing so.” (Horowitz, supra, 33 So.Cal.L.Rev. at p. 276, fns. omitted.) Such doctrine found its reason, as to innkeepers, in the “need for protection of travelers against brigands and for shelter,” and, as to common carriers, in the “need of the public for the facilities of a carrier, analogizing the carrier to an innkeeper, and, in some situations, [in] the monopoly status of a common carrier . . . .” (Ibid.) The provision reached beyond innkeepers and common carriers to “places of public accommodation,” such as skating rinks, that were not within the scope of the doctrine and did not implicate its reasons. (Id. at p. 277.) Moreover, it did not list common carriers until 1919, and then only under the rubric of “public conveyances.”
See Klein, The California Equal Rights Statutes in Practice (1958) 10 Stan.L.Rev. 253, 255 (stating that section 51 in its original form was “concerned . . . with the protection of equal rights with respect to facilities and services offered to the public by private persons” [italics added]).
See Colley, Civil Actions For Damages Arising out of Violations of Civil Rights (1965) 17 Hastings L.J. 189, 197 (implying that the phrase “business establishments” in section 51 means “commercial activities]”).
Notwithstanding the “eliminat[ion]” from section 51 in its present form of “reference^ to prohibition of discrimination . . . with respect to the purchase of real property” that appeared in certain unenacted versions of Assembly Bill No. 594. (Horowitz, supra, 33 So.Cal.L.Rev. at pp. 266-267.)
But see O'Connor v. Village Green Owners Assn., supra, 33 Cal.3d at pages 800-804 (dis. opn. of Mosk, J.).
See footnote 5, ante.
So I believe now. (But see Warfield v. Peninsula Golf & Country Club, supra, 10 Cal.4th at pp. 630-632 (conc. opn. of Mosk, J.).)
See footnote 7, ante.
In order to prevent subterfuge, we would doubtless have to hold that the Boy Scouts operated as a “business establishment” in the formulating and implementing of membership policies as to members or potential members if its sole purpose or effect was to limit the class of persons to whom it would provide goods or services, nongratuitously, for a price or fee, in the course of relatively noncontinuous, nonpersonal, and nonsocial dealings. (Cf. Daniel v. *721Paul (1969) 395 U.S. 298, 301-302 [89 S.Ct. 1697, 1699, 23 L.Ed.2d 318] [holding to such effect as to a “club” under the provisions for “placefs] of public accommodation” subject to title II of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 (78 Stat. 243, 42 U.S.C. § 2000a et seq.)].) We could make no such holding here: The condition is not satisfied.
And state broadly, and erroneously, in dictum that section 51 “clearly applies to any type of for-profit commercial enterprise, and to nonprofit entities . . . whose purpose is to serve the business or economic interests of its owners or members . . . .” (Maj. opn., ante, at pp. 696-697, fn. omitted.) As explained, the provision applies only to the extent that any such “enterprise” or “entity” occupies an area of activity encompassing proprietor-patron relationships.
Appearing in Isbister as amicus curiae, the Boy Scouts evidently did not consider itself different from the Boys’ Club of Santa Cruz, Inc. Neither did the majority therein, notwithstanding their assertion that they “reserve[d] judgment” on the issue. (Isbister v. Boys’ Club of Santa Cruz, Inc., supra, 40 Cal.3d at p. 81, fn. 8.) *733Cal.App.3d 370 [206 Cal.Rptr. 866] (nonprofit religious publisher of Christian Yellow Pages a business establishment).