(dissenting) :
Insofar as the result reached by the court’s decision is concerned, it gives me no displeasure that my colleagues are able to conclude that the plaintiff should have an award of compensation. But 'because I am unable to reconcile that conclusion with foundational principles of law I am compelled to dissent.
Undoubtedly the evidence as set forth in the main opinion could have justified the Commission in making a finding that the plaintiff’s injury occurred in the course of her employment; and if it had done so the decision would have been sustained. But the question for this court on review is not, would the evidence support an award, but rather, does it compel an award?
It is fundamental that the plaintiff has the burden of proving the facts which entitle her to an award, that is, that she suffered an injury from an accident in the course of her employment. It is the prerogative of the Industrial Commission to find the facts;1 and if there is any basis in the evidence upon which it fairly and reasonably could remain unconvinced of that fact, it may refuse an award. When it has made its findings they should be presumed to be correct; and it is our duty to review the evidence in the light most favorable to supporting them.
In approaching the question whether the evidence compels an award, it should be clearly understood that there are two separate issues relating to the defendant’s disability: (1) did she have an injured back; and (2) did the injury occur in her employment. As to (1), it is not disputed that she *146•did. It is only as to (2) that we are obliged to examine the evidence to determine whether it compels an affirmative answer. The incident is supposed to have occurred on Friday, May 8, 1964 at about 4 p. m. Even though the rupture of an interverte-bral disc ordinarily involves a substantial trauma which, to put it mildly, should be at least noticeable to the victim, the plaintiff made no mention of having a pain or anything about this alleged incident to anyone, but worked right on until quitting time. And except for the claim of telling her sister in a telephone conversation that evening, she did not say anything to anyone about it until the following week. She finished out the day Friday, worked all day Monday; and it was not until Tuesday that she mentioned this incident as is shown by the following testimony:
Q. What did you say to any of the employees or your supervisors down there, concerning this back pain?
A. I believe I told Mr. Douglas Smith. (The sales supervisor)
******
Q. All right. About when did you have a conversation with him concerning your back?
A. I believe it was Tuesday morning.
* * * * * *
Q. When did you first seék medical attention ?
A. Not until Tuesday or Wednesday. I call Dr. Hawkins, to get him to help me, if he possibly could. He is a chiropractor. ' '
That she had a pain there is no reason to doubt and with it we are all duly sympathetic. But upon the basis of the evidence in this record I would not presume to say with any degree of assurance just when and how it originated. About that fact there seems to be room for some uncertainty, as indicated by the plaintiff herself in her testimony:
Q. Now I take it that you do not know exactly what caused this problem with your back?
A. No, I don’t. Except that it occurred while I was filing in the office. And I hadn’t done anything out of the ordinary either at home or at work, or after work, to have caused it. Very definitely.
It is appreciated that an injury suffered in employment is compensable even if it is only the lighting up or aggravation of an old injury,2 but under the Workmen’s Compensation Act this is true only where it is the result of something which can be classified as an accident.3 The just quoted por*147tion of the plaintiff’s own testimony does not so indicate, but suggests to the contrary or at the very least it seems to leave enough room for doubt that the fact-trier could fairly and reasonably be left in uncertainty as to how and when her injury occurred.
The most significant point in this case is that the plaintiff herself is the only person. who had any knowledge whatsoever about whether the claimed injury to her back occurred in connection with her work; and the only information the plaintiff’s other witnesses had about that particular matter came solely from what the plaintiff told them. Upon close consideration it will be seen that every word of the testimony of these witnesses could be. accepted as true, that is, that the plaintiff told me that she had a pain in her back which “I must have got” while filing in the office, without such testimony having, any greater . probative value than as literally stated “that is what she told me.” Whatever value this evidence may have relates solely to the fact that she had an injured back. But as to the critical question: whether it originated from an accident in her work, the testimony of the other witnesses is simply using them as a conduit to proliferate plaintiff’s own statement. The fact that she successively told several others about her injury, who in turn testified that she had so stated to them, amounts to no more than an attempt to “lift oneself by one’s own bootstraps.” If this method could be used to cause proof to become more substantial, it would be a simple matter to obtain such proof of any claimed fact.
It thus seems quite inescapable to me that the question whether the plaintiff suffered an accident in her work, must depend upon her own testimony which, as recited above, leaves sufficient uncertainty that the Commission was not compelled to so find. However, if by some process of reasoning incomprehensible to me her testimony may be regarded otherwise, nevertheless under the established rules of review the Commission should be sustained.
It is to be conceded that to allow the Commission to ignore or reject competent, credible, uncontradicted testimony would give it unrestrained and arbitrary powers inimical to our conception of justice. But where there is dispute as to issues of fact it is essential that there be a method of resolving them. This is the prerogative and the duty of the Commission and it includes judging the credibility of witnesses.4 Just as in cases where the facts are found by a court or jury, the Commission should be allowed some latitude in determining *148what witnesses and what testimony it will or will not believe. This is due to its advantaged position in seeing and hearing the witnesses.5 It is a cardinal rule that if there is any basis in the evidence upon which the fact-trier acting fairly and reasonably could refuse to believe it he is not compelled to do so.6 One well recognized variant of this rule to which this court has given its approval a number of times is that if the testimony serves the self-interest of the witness that fact may generally be regarded as a sufficient frailty to refuse to believe it.7 It is of more than casual interest here that if plaintiff’s injury occurred at work at about 4 p. m. on Friday, May 8, 1964 as she now claims, it is covered by Workmen’s Compensation Insurance, otherwise it is not.
The principle that the fact-trier is not compelled to believe the testimony of a witness who testifies in his own self-interest was adequately treated in the case of Smith v. Industrial Commission.8 There the question whether the applicant had suffered a hernia in his employment depended largely upon his own testimony. Justice Wade, speaking for the court, reiterated the rule I have stated above. He pointed out that “Prior to the 19th Century, the testimony of 'parties and interested witnesses were considered so unreliable that they were not allowed to testify at all” citing authorities. That rule is now out-moded. But for the same reason which justified that rule in former times, that a witness whose interest is at stake is more likely to color or falsify his testimony than a disinterested witness, the fact-trier is not bound to accept it unless he is convinced of its veracity. If he were, this would deprive the Commission of the prerogative given it as a trier of the facts and result in a loss of the advantages it has in doing so. Furthermore, in incidents such as this case where the vital fact is known only to the claimant and the injury is something which could be concealed, the employer could be held liable for a spurious claim without any possibility of defense.
For the reasons hereinabove set forth I am not persuaded that from the evidence all reasonable minds must find that the *149plaintiff’s injury resulted from an accident in her work. I therefore see no other alternative consistent with our rules of review than to affirm the decision of the Commission. All emphasis added.
McDONOUGH, J., concurs in the dissenting opinion of CROCKETT, J.. Original Sec. 35-1-85, U.C.A.1953, so provides. N.B. this section was neither amended nor repealed by S.B. 66, Chap. 67 S.L.U. 1965 and does not appear in the new pocket supplement. The new section relating to Depositions of Witnesses is erroneously given the number 35-1-85; it should be given some different designation, e.g., 35-1-85x; see also statement in Moray v. Industrial Commission of Utah, 58 Utah 404, 199 P. 1023 in regard to review.
. Graybar Electric Co. v. Industrial Commission, 73 Utah 568, 276 P. 161.
. This does not exclude an injury -which may come about gradually such as by *147over-exertion if it is something not normally to be foreseen and is thus classifiable as an accident, see Purity Biscuit Co. v. Industrial Commission, 115 Utah 1, 201 P.2d 961; Jones v. California Packing Corp., 121 Utah 612, 244 P.2d 640.
. Diaz v. Industrial Commission, 80 Utah 77, 93, 13 P.2d 307, 312 (1932).
. As to advantages of fact-trier see statement in Nokes v. Continental Mining & Milling Company, 6 Utah 2d 177, 308 P. 2d 954.
. See statement of Justice Straup in Kavalinakis v. Industrial Commission, 67 Utah 174, 246 P. 698, 703, that the Commission is required to take as true undisputed evidence unless it is “opposed to probabilities or common knowledge, or contrary to natural or physical laws, * * * or contradictory in itself, or * * * come from witnesses directly interested, and it is impossible to secure opposing testimony * * * ” which was quoted by the court with approval in Smith v. Industrial Commission, 104 Utah 318, 140 P.2d 314.
. For good statements as to the basis upon which the court is justified in reversing the Commission including, “That the uncontradicted evidence is not wholly that of interested witnesses” see Norris v. Industrial Commission, 90 Utah 256, 61 P.2d 413, 415; also Gagos v. Industrial Commission, 87 Utah 101, 48 P.2d 449.
. See footnote 6.