dissenting:
I dissent from that portion of the majority opinion which holds that the widow’s interest should be taxed only to the extent of the value of her life estate, because in my view the codicil neither directly nor by necessary implication negates what is to me a singularly clear proviso in the testator’s will that “in addition to the payment of income from this share A, my Trustees shall pay to my wife such sums from principal as she may from time to time request in writing [and] it is my intention that no limitation be placed on my wife as to either the amount of or reasons for such invasion of the *110principal.” And, as the majority opinion states, in Colorado the “unqualified power given a life tenant to dispose of property devised by will enlarges the life estate to a fee simple title.” See, for example, McLaughlin v. Collins, 109 Colo. 377, 125 P.2d 633.