ON REHEARING
SHEPARD, Justice.The State filed a petition for rehearing which was granted and argument was heard thereon.
It is to be noted at the outset that the complaint is poorly framed in that no specific act was stated as having been performed by the accused, but rather only the statutory language was parroted. We do not, however, reach the issue of the effectiveness of the complaint since we hold that the statute is void-for-vagueness and violates appellant’s constitutional right to due process of law.
It is the essence of the State’s position that prostitution is as old as man and everyone knows what it is. Inherent therein is the assumption that Lopez performed some act which everyone knows or should know constitutes the crime of prostitution. The record available to the Court consists only of documents indicating that Lopez was charged with a crime by usage of the statutory language and that she has been convicted following a verdict of guilty by the jury. The record contains no evidence or even allegations which in any manner indicates what specific act she performed. Contrary to the position of the State, State v. Carringer, 95 Idaho 929, 523 P.2d 532 (1974), and the cases cited therein, are clearly distinguishable from the case at bar. As stated by the Court in Carringer:
“ * * * the words of the questioned statute should not be evaluated in the abstract, but should be considered with reference to the particular conduct of the defendant.” (Emphasis supplied.)
*589In Carringer, unlike the case at bar, the ugly facts of the specific conduct of the defendant were before the Court and it was on that basis that the Court in Carringer stated:
“It is beyond doubt that the defendant’s acts fall squarely within the very core of I.C. § 18-6605 as uniformly construed for 58 years.”
As previously indicated, we have no knowledge of the acts allegedly performed by Lopez.
Prior to 1971 the Model Penal Code of the American Law Institute contained language attempting to define “sexual activity.” Section 207-12 of Tentative Draft No. 9 (May 9, 1958) contained the following subsection:
“(6) Definitions. Sexual activity means carnal knowledge, deviate sexual intercourse, and sexual contact, as these terms are defined in Sections 207.4(6), 207.5(6) and 207.6(4), or any lewd act defined in Section 207.9, whether or not it is openly done as required in that Section * * (at 169)
In addition, the comments of the A.L.I. Reporter as contained in the Ninth Tentative Draft stated as follows:
“2. Sexual Activity. This term as defined in Subsection (6) covers not only sexual intercourse but also other lewd acts. Some existing laws confine themselves to offering or receiving the body for ‘intercourse.’ Since commercial prostitution offers and even features abnormal forms of sexual gratification, it is important to include this. Male as well as female prostitution is covered. The Section extends to sexual display not involving contact with the customers, for example, catering to the perverse desire to observe others in sexual activity (‘voyeurism’), since this would fall within the definition of ‘lewd act’ in Section 207.9.
“3. Hire; Promiscuity Without Hire Not Criminal. * * *
A case might be made for limiting the offense of prostitution to ‘promiscuous’ sexual activity for hire. Requiring promiscuity as well as hire would, for example, bar prosecution of a mistress who is supported by her lover. Such situations fall somewhat outside the target evils of our Section, but the ‘hire’ requirement itself is probably a sufficient safeguard, since the lover’s financial contributions in these relationships are more likely to be interpreted as gifts out of general affection rather than ‘hire’ for sexual activity * * (at 174-75)
In the final draft of the Code, the subsection defining sexual activity was dropped without explanation. See, A.L.I., Model Code, Pinal Draft, § 251.2 at 233-35 (May 4, 1962). It was that modified version that was adopted in Idaho’s 1971 Penal and Correctional Code. Ch. 143, Idaho Sess. Laws 1971. That Penal and Correctional Code of 1971 was shortlived and amended in 1972, Ch. 381, § 19, Idaho Sess. Laws 1972. That amendment of 1972 reinstated only subsection 1 of the original act deleting the other five subsections. That such elimination of the remaining subsections was probably legislative error is demonstrated by the inclusion of the parenthesized number “(1)” for the single section act under consideration here.
Clearly, the intent of the statute in question here was to make the practice of prostitution criminal. Among English speaking people the term prostitution has a meaning which is historic and may be said to be well understood by persons of common intellect. At common law, prostitution was generally understood to apply only as against women and usually only in connection with sexual intercourse for hire. 63 Am.Jur.2d, Prostitution § 1; State v. Clark, 78 Iowa 492, 43 N.W. 273 (1889). Therefore if our legislature had not attempted to define prostitution the position of the State might be sustainable. However, contrary to the position of the State, there is no longer in Idaho a traditional definition of prostitution since I.C. § 18-5613 clearly reflects a legislative attempt to redefine prostitution more expansively with application to male as well as female and to also expand the traditional definition to include a proscription against homosexual and other deviate conduct.
*590Although the State argues the difficulty if not impossibility of drafting legislation in this area which will accomplish the legislative purpose without infringing upon the void-for-vagueness doctrine, that argument is clearly rebutted by the action of the 1977 Idaho legislature in its enactment of S.B. 1196. That legislation amends I.C. § 18— 5613 to provide as follows:
“Prostitution. (1) A person is guilty of prostitution when he or she: (a) engages in or offers or agrees to engage in sexual conduct, or sexual contact with another person in return for a fee; or (b) is an inmate of a house of prostitution; or (c) loiters in or within view of any public place for the purpose of being hired to engage in sexual conduct or sexual contact.
(2) Prostitution is a misdemeanor, provided, however, that on a third or subsequent conviction for prostitution, it shall be a felony.
(3) Definitions:
(a) ‘Sexual conduct’ means sexual intercourse or deviate sexual intercourse.
(b) ‘Sexual contact’ means any touching of the sexual organs or other intimate parts of a person not married to the actor for the purpose of arousing or gratifying the sexual desire of either party. * * * ” (Emphasis added.)
The concept of void-for-vagueness arose from a common law practice of refusing to enforce legislation deemed too indefinite to be applied. See, Amsterdam, “The Void-for-Vagueness Doctrine in the Supreme Court,” 109 U.Pa.L.Rev. 67 (1960). It has evolved to a protection generally regarded as embodied in a Due Process Clause and prohibits holding a person “criminally responsible for conduct which he could not reasonably understand to be proscribed.” U. S. v. Harriss, 347 U.S. 612, 617, 74 S.Ct. 808, 812, 98 L.Ed. 989 (1954). In addition to this notion of “fair notice or warning” the doctrine is said to require reasonably clear guidelines to prevent “arbitrary and discriminating enforcement” and to prescribe a precise standard for the adjudication of guilt. Smith v. Goguen, 415 U.S. 566, 94 S.Ct. 1242, 39 L.Ed.2d 605 (1974). See also, Amsterdam, supra, at 76. The principle consistently followed is that “a statute which either forbids or requires the doing of an act in terms so vague that men of common intelligence must necessarily guess at its meaning and differ as to its application violates the first essential of due process of law.” Connally v. General Constr. Co., 269 U.S. 385, 391, 46 S.Ct. 126, 127, 70 L.Ed. 322 (1926); Lanzetta v. New Jersey, 306 U.S. 451, 453, 59 S.Ct. 618, 83 L.Ed. 888 (1939); Papachristou v. City of Jacksonville, 405 U.S. 156, 92 S.Ct. 839, 31 L.Ed.2d 110 (1972); State v. Pigge, 79 Idaho 529, 532, 322 P.2d 703, 705 (1957); State v. Thomas, 94 Idaho 592, 594, 494 P.2d 1036 (1972).
In the instant statute as it existed at the time in question here, the legislature sought to define the term “prostitution” but failed to use clear and unambiguous language to provide notice of the proscribed conduct. The statute as amended presently proscribes prostitution which is defined as engaging or offering to engage in defined sexual conduct or defined sexual contact with another person in return for a fee.
Conviction is reversed.
McFADDEN, C. J., and DONALDSON, J., concur.