dissenting:
I respectfully dissent.
The rule enunciated in prior cases is that whether a product is in a defective condition unreasonably dangerous to a user or consumer because of the manufacturer’s failure to warn is an issue for the jury. Anderson v. Heron Engineering Company, Inc., 198 Colo. 391, 604 P.2d 674 (1979); Union Supply Co. v. Pust, 196 Colo. 162, 583 P.2d 276 (1978). The adequacy of the warning given, or the requirement that one be given at all, is determined by considering the nature of the product, the likelihood of accident and the seriousness of the consequences of a failure to warn. Hiigel v. Genera] Motors Corp., 190 Colo. 57, 544 P.2d 983 (1975). These, too, are questions of fact for the jury. See Anderson v. Heron Engineering Company, Inc., supra.
The majority concludes that there is no evidence in the record here showing that the saw and attached skid were in a defective condition because of a failure to warn, and therefore, there was no factual basis for submitting the ease to the jury under a theory of strict liability. My reading of the record leads me to a different conclusion.
The saw which injured the plaintiff was sixteen feet long, seven feet high, and weighed over seven thousand pounds. A wooden skid with roller tables strapped to it was attached to the saw’s feet. The foreman for the defendant manufacturer testified that the weight of the machine, skid, and roller tables was about nine thousand pounds. An expert witness for the plaintiff testified that most of the saw’s surface area above its center of gravity was covered with sheet metal, and that the saw’s appearance of stability was deceiving. The *914plaintiff lifted the saw with a forklift placed under the lowest horizontal beam of the saw. Expert testimony indicated that the saw’s center of gravity was probably below the lift point as long as the skid remained attached. When the skid was removed, however, the center of gravity shifted upward, and the remaining mass on the lift became unstable. The expert testified that even had the plaintiff lowered the saw and skid to the floor before attempting to remove the skid, the skid could not have been taken from the saw without lifting the saw by itself, and that the saw alone could not have been lifted in a stable manner with the forklift under the lower beam.
The truck superintendent for Duffy’s testified that in many years with the company he had seen numerous large, open, uncrated machines, the majority of which had instructions or warnings about hoisting, moving, slinging or lifting. He stated that he would have loaded this saw with a forklift as the plaintiff did unless he was told otherwise by the manufacturer because the saw looked stable.
The general foreman at Kysor Corporation’s plant where the saw was made testified that this saw was moved within the plant by an overhead crane attached to the saw with three chains, two attached around the columns that held the upper beam along which the cutting head travels, and the other, a steadying chain, attached to the lower horizontal beam. The crane also was used to load the saw on a truck for shipment.
When the plaintiff’s attorney questioned the Kysor foreman, the following colloquy ensued:
Q. “Do you believe that the use of a crane is a proper way to lift the ST 1500 [the saw]?”
A. “Definitely.”
Q. “In fact, it’s your belief, isn’t it, that it’s the only proper way to lift it, is that right?”
A. “Yes.”
The same witness testified that while a crane was not essential for movement of the saw, if a forklift were used, the saw should be suspended from the forklift in a sling position, using the same lift points as those used for movement of the saw in the factory.'
Finally, the plaintiff testified that he would have followed lifting instructions had there been any. He also testified that he had no difficulty moving the saw with a crane or moving it with a forklift while the skid was attached. His testimony was consistent with what the other witnesses said he should have expected. When he lowered the forklift to remove the skid, his two helpers began to work at one end of the saw. The plaintiff went to the center of the saw to cut the bands holding the spare pieces. He heard a crash, and the machine tipped forward onto him.
The existence of an unreasonably dangerous defect is a question of fact. It is a general rule of law that factual determinations made upon conflicting evidence are not set aside on appeal. As we stated in Peterson v. Ground Water Commission, 195 Colo. 508, 579 P.2d 629 (1978),
The sufficiency, probative effect and weight of the evidence, and the inferences and conclusions to be drawn therefrom, will not be disturbed unless so clearly erroneous as to find no support in the record.
Similarly, we said in Vigil v. Pine, 176 Colo. 384, 490 P.2d 934 (1971),
Colorado appellate courts are bound by the jury’s findings where there is sufficient competent evidence in the record to support the finding, where the jury makes the finding on conflicting evidence, and where the jury has been correctly instructed by the trial court.
See Gebhardt v. Gebhardt, 198 Colo. 28, 595 P.2d 1048 (1979); Page v. Clark, 197 Colo. 306, 592 P.2d 792 (1979). I think the evidence in the record here was sufficient to support the jury verdict.
Therefore, I would affirm the Court of Appeals’ holding that the application of a section 402A theory of recovery to the facts of this case was appropriate and that there was sufficient evidence for the jury to find *915a failure of adequate instruction, thereby creating an unreasonably dangerous defective condition.1
I am authorized to say that Justice LOHR and Justice QUINN join me in this dissent.
. I note that products liability actions filed after July 1, 1981, are governed by section 13-21 406, C.R.S.1973 (1981 Supp.) which provides:
“(1) In any product liability action, the fault of the person suffering the harm, as well as the fault of all others who are parties to the action for causing the harm, shall be compared by the trier of fact in accordance with this section.
The fault of the person suffering the harm shall not bar such person, or a party bringing an action on behalf of such a person, or his estate, or his heirs from recovering damages, but the award of damages to such person or the party bringing the action shall be diminished in proportion to the amount of causal fault attributed to the person suffering the harm. ... ”