concurring in result:
While I concur in the result of the majority opinion — that a writ of prohibition should issue to stop this unauthorized abdication of judicial duty — I disagree with its reasoning.
The majority bases its decision on the underlying premise that in equitable matters, compulsory reference is a discretionary power of the court. It sees this power as “inherited” from ancient chancellors and still existing as before, except where specifically restricted by statute. From this perspective, the majority finds the compulsory references before us unacceptable because they contravene “accepted equity practice” and 20 O.S.Supp.1978, § 123A. I disagree.
*247The power of compulsory reference is purely statutory. Title 12 O.S.1971, § 613 governs compulsory reference. It governs all actions whether at law or in equity, which are not otherwise controlled by specific statute.
Compulsory reference statutes are exclusive. There are no powers of reference independent of statutes. Whether the majority’s view of the historical origin of this “inherited” power is correct or not, the power is now clearly limited by the confines of statute. There is no separate power of compulsory reference in “equity practice.”
We have consistently recognized the rule that in all actions, equitable or legal, the power of the court to order a reference over the parties’ objections is governed exclusively by statute.1
Allen v. Allen, 85 Okl. 240, 205 P. 504 (1922), is controlling here. There also the trial court referred a divorce matter without consent of the parties. In reversing that action, it is true, as the majority points out, that the Allen court did not go into great historical detail on the subject of compulsory reference. It appears obvious to me that the court saw no need to do so, as it was a recognized fact at that time (and has remained so until this day) that in all actions, the power to refer by compulsion is derived from statute and the grounds are exclusively statutory.
The syllabus by the court states:
“The authority of a trial court to appoint a referee to take evidence, make findings of fact and conclusions of law, is derived from our statutes, and such provisions are included in sections 5018, 5019, R.L.1910 [now 12 O.S.1971, §§ 612, 613] and the provisions of the statute pertaining to the method and manner of the appointment of a referee must be complied with, otherwise such appointment is not legal and such referee has no authority to act.”
The error of the trial court in referring the matter without the parties’ consent was confessed by counsel and, noting that confession, the court stated:
“The grounds covered by the assignments of error which are confessed in the confession of error seem to be the error of the trial court in referring the matter to a referee without the written consent of the parties, or their oral consent given in open court, and entered upon the journal, as provided in section 5018, R.L.1910 [now 12 O.S.1971, § 612] and no such written consent of the parties is shown, and no oral consent in court appearing to have been entered upon the journal, and the nature of this cause not being such as the trial court can refer to a referee upon his own motion, as provided in section 5019, R.L.1910 [now 12 O.S.1971, § 613] and this being statutory, appears to go to the jurisdiction and authority of the referee to act.
“The rule controlling in such case is stated in 34 Cyc. 778, as follows:
*248‘Compulsory Reference. — 1. In General. Ordinarily the court has no power to order a compulsory reference to hear and determine all or any of the issues or questions of fact except where authorized so to by statute’ ” At 505.
The majority clearly misapprehends the holding of Allen. That case is not, in any manner, a condemnation of compulsory reference in divorce actions — in a proper case. It holds simply that in divorce, as in all other actions, the power to refer is statutory and the provisions of the statute (12 O.S.1971, § 613) are the exclusive criteria for a permissible reference.
The divorce actions before us were not properly the subject of compulsory reference to anyone — a special judge or any other person. The accounting contingencies authorizing compulsory reference are set forth in 12 O.S.1971, § 613. These actions do not even pretend to fall within the scope of the statute. It is for that reason the writ should issue.
I am authorized to state that Justice HODGES and Justice LAVENDER join with me in this opinion.
. See, e.g., Van Trees v. Territory, 7 Okl. 353, 54 P. 495 (1898); Board of Com’rs. v. McKinley, 8 Okl. 128, 56 P. 1044 (1899); Conley v. Horner, 10 Okl. 277, 62 P. 807 (1900); Hammer v. Rogers, 21 Okl. 367, 96 P. 611 (1908); Johnson v. Jones, 39 Okl. 323, 135 P. 12 (1913); Hale v. Marshall, 52 Okl. 688, 153 P. 167 (1915); Frear v. State, 76 Okl. 213, 184 P. 771 (1919); Grainola Bank v. Shellenberger, 81 Okl. 204, 197 P. 436 (1921); Grainola Bank v. Whitson, 81 Okl. 206, 197 P. 437 (1921); Patton v. First Natl. Bank & Trust of Muskogee, 176 Okl. 453, 56 P.2d 1181 (1936); North v. Byrnes, 183 Okl. 321, 82 P.2d 678, 117 A.L.R. 1269 (1938); State ex rel. Smith v. Dist. Ct. of Osage Co., 188 Okl. 663, 112 P.2d 381 (1941), subsequent appeal of Drummond v. Smith, 185 Okl. 613, 96 P.2d 42 (1939); Fernow v. Gubser, 196 Okl. 58, 162 P.2d 529 (1945). See also Holt v. Holt, 23 Okl. 639, 102 P. 187 (1909), recognizing the application of the reference statute in divorce action referred by consent of the parties.
For cases from other jurisdictions finding that compulsory reference statutes similar to ours are exclusive, see: Tietzel v. Southwestern Construction Co., N.M., 94 P.2d 972 (1939); 126 A.L.R. 307; Durwood v. Dubinsky, Mo. 291 S.W.2d 909 (1956); North American Finance Corp. v. Cannavan, 130 Kan. 468, 286 P. 248 (1930); Keese v. Parnell, 134 S.C. 207, 132 S.E. 620 (1925); Iowa Public Service Co. v. Sioux City, 252 Iowa 380, 107 N.W.2d 109 (1961); Killingstad v. Meigs, 147 Wis. 511, 133 N.W. 632 (1911); Archuleta v. Archuleta, 52 Colo. 601, 123 P. 821 (1912); Williams v. Benton, 24 Cal. 424 (1864); Hastings v. Cunningham, 35 Cal. 549 (1868).