dissenting.
I must respectfully dissent.
*811First, I do not believe that the complainant presented a prima facie case of sex discrimination. Second, even if a prima facie case was presented, it appears that the employer did “articulate some legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason for the employee’s rejection,” McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792,802, 93 S.Ct. 1817,1824, 36 L.Ed. 668, 678 (1973), and that the employer’s reasons for rejecting the complainant were not merely a pretext for discrimination.
The reasons given by Mr. Eckhardt, who made the hiring decision, were that Fri-drikkson had no background in supervision or management, that until she started with Alaska USA she had not worked for ten years, her rotation date was undecided, and that it would be too costly to train her. But her lack of experience was the main factor in not hiring her. By contrast, Alan Andrews, who was hired as the manager, had completed numerous college courses in business administration and had worked in the business world, albeit in sales positions.
One who makes the hiring decision for a managerial position of this sort must weigh various intangible factors and arrive at an overall conclusion, based upon the data available. From my reading of the record it does not appear that the preferment of Andrews over Fridriksson was for any prohibited reason. Moreover, it appears to me that one in Mr. Eckhardt’s position might well have concluded rationally, on grounds other than sex difference, that Andrews was better qualified. Plainly and simply, the decision was merely the exercise of management prerogative, a sphere of action into which the law, even in its desire to prevent discrimination, has no business intruding.1
Additionally, the record shows that at the time that Fridriksson applied for this position Alaska USA controlled four full service branches. One of those branches, at Fairbanks, was managed by a woman. Moreover, the credit union had been expanding over a period of years. By the time of the Commission hearing in this case the credit union had hired 12 females and 20 males as managers at 11 of its branches. The Commission seems to have given no weight to those factors, although they might explain why the Commission made a finding that the credit union’s actions were not intentionally and willfully discriminatory-
In my opinion the circumstances of this case do not give rise to an inference of unlawful discrimination. The statute at issue here should not be construed to diminish traditional management prerogatives, and it does not require that an employer give preferential treatment to minorities or females. Steelworkers v. Weber, 443 U.S. 193, 205-07, 99 S.Ct. 2721, 2728-29, 61 L.Ed.2d 480, 490-91 (1979). Thus I would reverse the superior court and the determination of the Commission.
. It is not for courts or the Human Rights Commission to pass upon the business judgment of the employer, even though that judgment may seem poor or erroneous to others. An employer may articulate nondiscriminatory reasons for his actions even though those reasons would not be approved if a court were making the decision. The ultimate focus must be on whether the employer acted with discriminatory motivation, not on whether his business judgment is sound. See Loeb v. Tex-tron, Inc., 600 F.2d 1003, 1012, n.6 (1st Cir. 1979).