dissenting.
The Court properly notes that the legislative purpose behind § 9 — 414 I.C. was to broaden the scope of admissibility of business records, and that a trial judge has wide discretion in determining whether or not the “business records” sought to be admitted possess the necessary attributes of necessity and trustworthiness. However, the discretion does not arise until the preliminary requirements are' satisfied. Kelson v. Ahlborn, supra, 87 Idaho at 529-530, 393 P.2d 578. Even then, the trial court must have a rational basis for the exercise of this discretion.
In this case, the trial court clearly erred when it allowed Exhibit K into evidence. This exhibit was allegedly prepared by an accountant who worked not for Mingo, but for Murdock Farms, after he received billing statements, not from Mingo, not from Murdock Farms, but from a dealer for gas put in Curiel’s trucks. The ledger sheet was then allegedly photocopied by him and sent to Mingo, who incorporated it into his records. There was more than just the “questionable sufficiency of the foundation laid” or “borderline question of admission,” as referred to in the Court opinion; there was a total lack of foundation. There was no testimony by the accountant who prepared the records or from any other qualified witness as to the identity of the records, their mode of preparation, that they were made in the regular course of business, or that they were made at or near the time the events occurred. There is also a total absence of testimony to authenticate the exhibit sought to be entered as even being the ledger sheet sent to Mingo. Mingo’s testimony alone was not sufficient to lay a proper foundation because Mingo had absolutely nothing to do with the preparation of the records. Since the preliminary requirements for admission were not met, the exhibit should not have been admitted.
The requirement of foundational testimony by the person preparing or holding the records has been consistently applied by this Court. In John Scowcroft and Sons Co. v. Roselle, supra, the plaintiff introduced the original records of its book of accounts showing the account of the defendant. In addition, the defendant admitted making payments and owing money to the plaintiff.
In Kelson v. Ahlborn, supra, the records sought to be admitted were the plaintiff’s account books which purported to show the amount of cash advanced to the defendant. In Mahoney v. Minsky, 39 N.J. 208, 188 A.2d 161 (1963), the case relied upon by the court in Kelson, supra, defendants sought to have their books of account used to show payment of a loan. The foundation testimony was provided by the certified public accountant who had kept their books for 25 years.
In Hammond v. Hammond, 92 Idaho 623, 448 P.2d 237 (1968), the records sought to be admitted were a financial statement of the company in question. This Court in affirming the admission of these records said:
These exhibits were introduced into evidence through the witness Donald E. Fairley, a certified public accountant. *307The witness testified that each statement had been prepared by him with the assistance of the bookkeeper of the H. J. Hammond Company, in the ordinary course of business of and for the company and from the books and records of the company. No attempt was made to contradict Mr. Fairley in this connection. Hence, the exhibits were admissible as business records. I.C. §§ 9-413 and 9-414. (emphasis added)
92 Idaho at 626, 448 P.2d at 240.
In Daniel v. Moss, supra, a case cited by the majority to demonstrate the broad discretion of the trial court, the record sought to be admitted was a certified copy of the federal estate tax return for the decedent defendant’s estate. The tax return was admitted during the course of the accountant’s testimony who prepared the form. In sustaining the admission of the tax return, this Court in pointing out why the return was trustworthy, said:
This tax return was “made in the regular course of [the] business” of the accountant Hefley and was required for the regular business of the estate. . For one thing, attorney’s fees are stated on the tax return in order to establish a tax deduction. It is, therefore, unlikely that the estate would underestimate the amount of attorney’s fees in order to pay excess taxes. The estate and the respondent were legally obligated to file a complete return. There was ample testimony on the part of the accountant that he had made the attorney’s fee entry based on his own first-hand knowledge of the transaction of which it is evidence. Finally, the return was prepared well over two years before Vernon Daniel’s demise, and, therefore, probably not in contemplation of that death or this action, (emphasis added)
93 Idaho at 613, 469 P.2d at 51.
In Simplot Soilbuilders, Inc., v. Leavitt, 96 Idaho 17, 523 P.2d 1363 (1974), the documents in question were prepared by the defendant to record his dealings with a third party. In this case the defendant was present to testify about the exhibits and this Court held they were business records within I.C. § 9-414 and were admissible.
The majority cites two additional cases pertaining to the wide discretion of the trial court in admitting evidence under the Business Records Act. In the first case, Shore Line Properties, Inc., v. Deer-O-Paints and Chemicals, Ltd., 24 Ariz.App. 331, 538 P.2d 760 (1975), the trial court refused to admit into evidence certain Federal Housing Administration records which related to the final FHA inspection of homes painted by the defendant. The trial court was found not to have abused its discretion when it “refused to admit the records in the absence of foundational testimony concerning the qualifications of the FHA inspector who filed the report.' Obviously, in the trial court’s opinion, the source for the information contained in the report was not of a stature sufficient to justify admission of the document.” 538 P.2d at 766.
In the second case, Richmond v. Frederick, 116 Cal.App.2d 541, 253 P.2d 977 (Cal.1953), plaintiff was a salesman who sought to enter his ex-employer’s books into evidence. They were admitted during the testimony of the bookkeeper who prepared the books. The bookkeeper testified that ledger sheets were kept and filed in the office for each salesman and she found and identified the ledger sheets pertaining to the plaintiff’s account. She also testified that the books were kept in her own handwriting at the request of the decedent defendant. The executrix objected on the ground that a proper foundation had not been laid because the bookkeeper was not the only person who kept the records. The court said that point was without merit and held the books were admissible under the Uniform Business Records as Evidence Act. Id. 253 P.2d at 982.
As can be seen from all of these cases, business records are admissible when a person who has personal knowledge or was directly reláted to the preparation testifies and provides a proper foundation.
In the present case, the accountant who received the statements from the gas company, and who then entered them on Mur*308dock’s books and who then allegedly photocopied the ledger sheet and transmitted it to Mingo was not brought forth to lay a proper foundation for the admission of Exhibit K. The accountant’s testimony should also have been required to authenticate the ledger sheet as the one sent to Mingo. According to McCormick on Evidence § 219 (E. Cleary ed. 1972),
“[i]t is generally held that business records may be authenticated by the evidence of one familiar with the books of the concern, such as a custodian or supervisor, who has not made the record or seen it made, that the offered writing is actually part of the records of the business.” (citations omitted)
at 545.
In Isaacson v. Obendorf, 99 Idaho 304, 581 P.2d 350 (1978), this Court held that it weis error in a paternity proceeding to admit blood test results without requiring the accompanying testimony of the expert who performed the tests. This Court 581 P.2d at 355 said:
The essence of the hearsay rule is a requirement that testimonial assertions shall be subjected to the test of cross-examination. The theory being that the many possible deficiencies, suppressions, sources of error, and untrustworthiness, which lie underneath the bare untested assertion of a witness, may be best brought to light and exposed by the test of cross-examination. 5 Wigmore, Evidence § 1362 (Chadbourn rev. 1974). The blood test report, an unsworn, out-of-court written statement of an expert concerning the possible paternity of the appellant, was admitted without giving the parties an opportunity to examine the expert who made the tests as to his competency, the methods used by him, and other factors relating to the reliability of the test. Respondent established no foundation for the admission of the report under any of the numerous exceptions to the hearsay rule.
In the present case, Curiel was denied the opportunity to cross-examine the account as to the preparation of the ledger sheets, especially in regards to entries concerning a Serrato. Curiel also had no opportunity to ascertain whether this was even the ledger sheet sent to Mingo. For these shortcomings and for the reasons given above, the trial court erred and the judgment should be reversed.