concurring.
Two of Collins’s convictions must be reversed: his conviction under AS
11.71.040(a)(5) for maintaining a structure used for storing or distributing controlled substances (the “crack house” statute), and his conviction under AS 11.61.195(a)(1) for possessing a firearm during the commission of a felony drug offense.
Collins’s conviction for maintaining a crack house must be reversed because the State failed to present sufficient evidence to support a finding that Collins controlled the motel suite where he and the drugs were found. Collins’s conviction for possessing a firearm during the commission of a felony *749drug offense must be reversed because the jury was not instructed (and thus made no finding) concerning an essential element of this offense: the requirement of a nexus between the defendant’s possession of the firearm and the defendant’s commission of the drug felony.
The conviction for maintaining a building used for storing or distributing controlled substances
The crack house statute, AS 11.71.040(a)(5), requires proof that the defendant kept or maintained some type of “structure” for storing or distributing controlled substances. The statute declares that a person commits the offense if he or she:
knowingly keeps or maintains any store, shop, warehouse, dwelling, building, vehicle, boat, aircraft, or other structure or place that is used for keeping or distributing controlled substances in violation of a felony offense under [AS 11.71] or AS 17.30[.]
The indictment against Collins charged him with maintaining a “dwelling or building”. The State’s theory was that Collins kept or maintained the motel room (really, a motel suite) where he and his three housemates were living and where the drugs were found.
This motel suite was both a “dwelling” and a “building” as these terms are defined in AS 11.81.900(b). Under AS 11.81.900(b)(20), “dwelling” means a particular kind of building — “a building that is designed for use or is used as a person’s permanent or temporary home or place of lodging”. And, under the definition of “building” contained in AS 11.81.900(b)(3), each separate apartment or office in a mul-ti-unit structure is considered a “building”.
The motel suite shared by Collins and his housemates was a separate apartment in a multi-unit structure. Thus, if the- State had proved that Collins controlled that motel suite, this would have been sufficient proof that Collins kept or maintained a “building” and a “dwelling”.
But the State failed to prove this. The State’s evidence showed that Collins lived in the motel suite — but it also showed that three other people lived in the suite. The State did not produce rent receipts, a lease, or any other evidence to show that Collins (or any of the other three housemates, for that matter) had either legal or actual authority to control the premises — authority to decide who would reside there and to control what occurred on the premises.
When Collins moved for a judgement of acquittal on this charge, Judge Souter recognized this flaw in the State’s evidence. Addressing the prosecutor, Judge Souter said:
[T]he question I’ve got here is the “keeping and maintaining” [element of the offense]_ [I]n order to prove that [element], the State ... has to show that the defendant controlled or had the right to control the premises. And, other than his [statement] that he lived there, what else is there, [Mr. Prosecutor]?
In response to the judge’s question, the prosecutor presented two arguments.
The prosecutor first argued that the State did not have to prove that Collins had sole control of the motel suite; it would be sufficient if he exercised joint control with one or more of his housemates. This may be correct, but it does not help the State’s position because the State failed to present evidence of anyone’s control of the premises.
The prosecutor next argued that, even if the State failed to prove who controlled the motel suite, the State’s evidence did tend to show that drugs had been stored and distributed in the south bedroom of the suite, the bedroom where Collins slept. The prosecutor contended that the State’s case could go to the jury under the theory that Collins “controlled” the south bedroom.
Judge Souter accepted this second argument:
Well, ... the hotel room ... was really a hotel suite, not just a room.... [T]he testimony [shows that] there were two bedrooms and a living area. So it’s a hotel suite. And there were four people [living] there ..., the defendant and three others. And the only testimony that ties the defendant to the [premises] is the testimony of the police that he was found ... in the south bedroom, where a number of his personal belongings ... were [also] found. And his statement that he lived there.
*750I’ve got to draw all reasonable inferences in favor of the State.... [G]iven the fact that he had his personal belongings in there, including some guns that were under the mattress, it’s pretty apparent that he was controlling the bedroom. I mean,-... he had his stuff in there, and two guns under the mattress.... [That is] evidence from which the jury could reasonably infer that he was in control of the room.... [S]o I’m going to deny the motion for judgement of acquittal[.]
This ruling was error.
The first difficulty in the State’s “bedroom” theory is that Collins’s physical occupancy of the south bedroom does not amount to the legal control required by the crack house statute. Whoever was leasing or renting the motel suite would normally “control” all rooms and areas within the suite (in the sense of having the legal authority to decide who lived there and what went on there). The State presented no evidence as to the identity of the person or persons who leased or rented the motel suite. By the same token, the State presented no evidence that Collins had a subleasing agreement with the unidentified lease-holder of the suite. The mere fact that Collins lived in the south bedroom did not place him in “control” of that bedroom.
Equally important, even if the State’s evidence had established that Collins exercised legal control over the south bedroom, this would not be sufficient to prove a violation of the crack house statute. The statute requires proof that the defendant kept or maintained a “structure” — in Collins’s case, the “dwelling” or “building” cited in the indictment. As explained above, apartments and motel suites are “buildings” and “dwellings” for purposes of Title 11. But the separate bedrooms within apartments and motel suites are not.1
Judge Souter should have granted Collins’s motion for judgement of acquittal. Instead, he allowed this charge to be presented and argued to the jury under an improper legal theory.
On appeal, the State pursues a different theory to justify Collins’s conviction. The State argues that Collins “controlled” the motel suite because he was a drug dealer living among drug addicts, and because he was the only resident who possessed firearms. From this, the State concludes that Collins was socially dominant among the four residents of the suite: he could manipulate the others by cutting off their supply of cocaine, and he could exercise “brute authority to have the final word in any discussion with [his] unarmed [housemates]”.
Whether Collins “controlled” his housemates in this fashion is irrelevant. The crack house statute requires proof that Collins kept or maintained the premises — the motel suite. As we held in Dawson v. State, this statute requires proof that the defendant “controlled] or ha[d] authority to control the use or occupancy of the structure”.2
One can speculate that Collins was in a position to exercise physical or psychological control over his three housemates, to the point where they would acquiesce in whatever he chose to do in his bedroom. But this would be only speculation, for the State raises this factual issue for the first time on appeal. The State did not argue its case this way at trial, and the jury was not asked to convict Collins under this theory. Moreover, *751even if Collins had exercised physical or psychological dominance over the other three residents of the motel suite, this does not establish that Collins “ke[pt] or maintain[ed]” the premises — the element of proof required by the crack house statute.
For these reasons, we conclude that Collins’s conviction for violating the crack house statute must be reversed.
The conviction for possessing a firearm during the commission of a drug felony
Collins was charged with violating AS 11.61.195(a)(1), which prohibits a person from “possessing] a firearm during the commission of an offense under AS 11.71.010— 11.71.040”. The State presented evidence that Collins possessed cocaine and that Collins had two firearms hidden under his mattress — facts that seemingly established a violation of the statute.
The jury was indeed instructed that this evidence, by itself, was sufficient to establish a violation of the statute. Jury Instruction 17 told the jury that, to prove a violation of AS 11.61.195(a)(1), the State had to establish only the following two elements:
First, that the event in question occurred at or near Anchorage and on or about January 3,1997; and
Second, that Artie R. Collins knowingly possessed a firearm during the commission of a felony drug offense as charged in Counts I and II of the indictment.
The felony drug offenses named in Counts I and II of the indictment were: (1) possessing cocaine, and (2) keeping or maintaining a dwelling or building for storing or distributing controlled substances. The jury instructions contained no further explanation of the phrase “during the commission of a felony drug offense”.
After the jury convicted Collins of this crime, Collins filed what he called a motion for “judgement of acquittal”. Collins argued that mere possession of a firearm during the commission of a drug felony was not sufficient to establish a violation of AS 11.61.195(a)(1). Rather, Collins argued, the statute required proof of some connection between the firearm and the drug offense.
(a) Proper characterization of Collins’s motion
It is important to note that Collins’s motion was not actually a “motion for judgement of acquittal” — even though Judge Souter and both parties referred to it by this label in the trial court, and even though both parties continue to refer to it this way on appeal. Collins’s basic contention was — -and is — that the offense of possessing a firearm during the commission of a felony drug offense requires proof of one additional element: a nexus between the weapon and the drug offense. This element was not alleged in the indictment, and the jury instructions made no mention of it; thus, the jury never decided this asserted element of the offense.
If Collins is correct, then he is entitled to dismissal of the indictment and a new trial, but he would not be entitled to a judgement of acquittal. This is true because, had Judge Souter granted Collins’s motion, this would have been a dismissal on legal grounds — that is, dismissal on a ground not requiring factual resolution of any of the elements of the offense. Such a dismissal “does not amount to a judgment of acquittal, regardless of its timing or the label attached thereto.” State v. Martushev.3
For example, in Steve v. State4, a defendant filed a post-trial “motion for judgement of acquittal” after he was convicted of second-degree sexual abuse of a minor (having sexual relations with a child under the age of 16). At trial, Steve had asserted the affirmative defense of reasonable mistake: he claimed that he reasonably believed his sexual partner was older than 16. The jury rejected this affirmative defense. In his post-trial motion, Steve asserted that he had been denied due process because the jury instructions (in accord with the statute) required him to prove this defense by a preponderance of the evidence. Steve claimed that, as a matter of constitutional law, it was the government’s burden to disprove his asserted defense beyond a reasonable doubt.5
*752We held that, because Steve was attacking his conviction on a legal ground that did not require resolution of any of the facts of the case, his pleading was not a “motion for judgement of acquittal”, and the granting of his motion would not preclude the State from re-trying him:
[I]f the defendant convinces an appellate court that the trial court adopted an erroneous definition of the offense or misallo-cated the burden of proof, this conclusion necessarily undermines the assumption that the government had its fair day in court. We can not know what evidence the State might have presented at [the defendant’s] trial if it had known [the true elements of the offense or that] the State bore the burden of proof on the [disputed] issue[.]
Steve, 875 P.2d at 115. Thus, if the defendant prevails on such a motion, the defendant is “entitled to a new trial, not an outright acquittal”.6
The holdings in Martushev and Steve apply to Collins’s “motion for judgement of acquittal”. Collins’s argument concerned the legal definition of the offense; in essence, he claimed that the indictment failed to allege each essential element of the crime and that the jury was not asked to decide each essential element. Thus, if Collins prevailed in his motion, the State would be able to re-indict and re-try Collins, attempting to establish this additional element of the crime.
(b) Proper resolution of Collins’s claim
When Collins’s motion was first argued, Judge Souter expressed preliminary agreement with Collins’s construction of the statute. The judge declared that he did not think the legislature intended to inflict separate felony punishment on people who possessed or used drugs at one location (for example, in a restaurant or at a cabin) and who happened to possess a firearm at home. Nevertheless, Judge Souter took the matter under advisement. He invited the parties to
file supplemental briefs on (1) the meaning of the statute and (2) how the State’s evidence at Collins’s trial either established or failed to establish a violation of the statute.
In its supplemental brief, the State conceded that Collins and Judge Souter were right: the statute required more than simply proof that a person possessed cocaine and simultaneously owned a firearm. The State admitted that AS 11.61.195(a)(1) required proof of some nexus between the firearm and the drug offense. However, relying on federal cases, the State argued that the statute did not necessarily require proof that the defendant used or threatened to use the firearm during the drug offense. Rather, the State argued, the offense could be established by proof that, because a firearm was nearby and available, the defendant was “emboldened” to commit the felony drug offense. The State further argued that, viewing the evidence at Collins’s trial in the light most favorable to the State, this required nexus was proved in Collins’s case — because the evidence suggested that Collins dealt drugs in the bedroom where the firearms were found.
Based on the arguments presented in the State’s supplemental brief, Judge Souter denied Collins’s motion for judgement of acquittal.
Judge SouteFs ruling is troublesome. In the State’s supplemental brief to Judge Souter, the State conceded that the crime required proof of an additional element — proof of a nexus between the firearm and the felony drug offense. Even assuming that the State presented enough evidence at Collins’s trial to prove this additional element, the fact remains that the indictment did not allege this element, the jury was never instructed on this element, and the jury made no finding with regard to it. Because of this, Collins’s conviction was flawed.7 Although Collins was not entitled to a judgement of acquittal, Judge Souter’s ruling nee-*753essarily meant that Collins was entitled to dismissal of the indictment and a new trial.
Now, on appeal, it appears that the State has recognized this problem. In its brief to this court, the State disavows the construction of the statute adopted by the trial prosecutor and by Judge Souter. The State claims that no nexus must be proved between the firearm and the drug felony; instead, the State argues that the offense is committed whenever someone simultaneously commits a drug felony and possesses or exercises control over a firearm — even a firearm located in another place. According to the State, “[t]he only nexus required by the statute is one [of] time: possession [of the firearm] must coincide at some point in time with the commission of a felony drug offense.”
We find ourselves in agreement with Judge Souter and the trial prosecutor on this issue. Possession of cocaine is a felony drug offense — a class C felony, carrying a maximum penalty of 5 years’ imprisonment.8 Possession of a firearm during the commission of a felony drug offense is a more serious crime; it is a class B felony, carrying a maximum penalty of 10 years’ imprisonment.9 Even though the wording- of AS 11.61.195(a)(1) could be interpreted in the fashion urged by the State in this appeal, it seems quite unlikely that the legislature intended to double or, if the defendant receives consecutive sentences, even triple the penalty for possession of cocaine whenever a cocaine user also happens to be a gun owner.
When interpreting statutes, it is this court’s duty to shun interpretations that lead to absurd results.10 We agree with Judge Souter that, unless AS 11.61.195(a)(1) is interpreted to require some nexus between the possession of the firearm and the commission of the felony drug offense, the statute leads to inexplicably draconian penalties for run-of-the-mill drug possession offenses.
For these reasons, we conclude that AS 11.61.195(a)(1) requires proof of a nexus between a defendant’s possession of the firearm and the defendant’s commission of the felony drug offense. We need not define the exact contours of this required nexus at this time. To resolve Collins’s appeal, it is sufficient to note that the indictment returned against Collins did not allege this element of the offense and the jury at Collins’s trial made no finding with respect to this element. Collins’s indictment and conviction for possessing a firearm during the commission of a drug felony must therefore be reversed.
. One could conceivably argue that, because AS 11.71.040(a)(5) speaks of “any ... structure or place”, the statute may have been intended to apply to individual rooms within apartments or motel suites. However, given the list of structures and places included in AS 11.71.040(a)(5), this does not appear to be a likely construction of the statute.
This issue of statutory interpretation need not be addressed for two reasons. First, the State does not raise this argument on appeal. Second, the jury instructions in Collins's case did not allow the jury to convict him under the theory that he kept or maintained a "place” as opposed to a "structure”. Instruction 16(a) told the jury:
A person keeps or maintains a building, dwelling!,] or other structure or place if: I) the person knowingly uses or allows another to use the building, dwellingf] or other structure for a business operation involving the keeping or distributing of one or more controlled substance[s]; 2) the keeping or distributing of the controlled substance(s) is a felony in violation of AS 11.71; and 3) the person, either alone or with others, controls or has the right to control the building, dwellingL] or other structure^]
. 894 P.2d 672, 676 (Alaska App.1995).
. 846 P.2d 144, 148 (Alaska App.1993).
. 875 P.2d 110 (Alaska App.1994).
.See id. at 114-15.
. Id.
. A trial judge is under a duty to instruct the jury on all essential elements of the offense. See Thomas v. State, 522 P.2d 528, 531 n. 11 (Alaska 1974); Sears v. State, 713 P.2d 1218, 1219 (Alaska App.1986). It is plain error when instructions fail to inform the jury of all the essential elements of an offense, unless the record as a whole establishes that the incomplete jury instructions had no significant influence on the jury's decision. See S.R.D. v. State, 820 P.2d 1088, 1095-96 (Alaska App.1991).
. AS 11.71.040(a)(3)(A), AS 11.71.040(d), AS 11.71.150(c), AS 12.55.125(e).
. AS 11.61.195(a)(1), AS 11.61.195(b), AS 12.55.125(d).
. See Millman v. State, 841 P.2d 190, 195 (Alaska App.1992).