dissenting.
I respectfully dissent.
In the first instance, I would hold that it was improper to assess the subject property at the commercial rate rather than the residential rate.
The Colorado Arlberg Club (club) is a nonprofit Colorado corporation dedicated to the furtherance of the sport of skiing. The land and the facilities involved in this dispute are operated solely for the recreational use of its members, and no use by the general public is permitted. The user fees assessed by the club are not to generate profit by the use of this facility but rather to recoup the cost of providing its use to the members.
Implicit in a holding that a facility is a commercial hotel or a motel is the right to use the facilities by any person in the general public. See Colorado Public Accommodations Act, § 24-34-601, et seq., C.R.S. (1982 Repl.Yol. 10). I find the statutory definition of hotel, as relied upon by the majority, to be of little consequence for it substantially tracks the Webster’s Third New International Dictionary definition of hotel. Therein, a hotel is defined as a house licensed to provide lodging and usually meals, entertainment, and various personal services for the public; a building of many rooms, chiefly for overnight accommodation of transients.
Here, utilization of the facilities of the club house is akin to the use of and interest in private residential vacation homes at a resort area. Section 39-1-102(14.4), C.R.S. (1985 Cum.Supp.) refers to residential land as meaning a parcel or contiguous parcels of land under common ownership upon which residential improvements are located and which is used as a unit in conjunction with the residential improvements located thereon. Thus, the touchstone for determining whether property is residential is whether there is common ownership and common use.
Certainly the joint ownership of the facilities by the members of the nonprofit corporation and the use made by them of their facility is less commercial than the timeshare condominiums or investment condominiums in resort areas which are taxed as residential rather than commercial property. See § 39 — 1—104(ll)(b)(I) and (II), C.R.S. (1985 Cum.Supp.) (exemption for condominium associations). Thus, in determining whether the facilities constitute a commercial or a residential unit, one must compare § 39-1-102(5.5), C.R.S. (1985 Cum.Supp.) with the exceptions contained in § 39-1-104(ll)(b)(I) and (II) and consider the actual use made of the facilities. Further, in construing these statutes, we must accord the word “commercial” its common usage. See § 2-4-101, C.R.S. (1980 Repl.Vol.lB). Thus, I would read the statutory definition as having implicitly contained therein the requirement that the accommodations be available to the public and further that the accommodations be used by transient guests rather than owners.
However, I would adopt the respondents’ contention that, in arriving at actual value pursuant to § 39-1-103, the assessor may properly consider reasonable anticipated future use of the property. I find no logic in requiring a governmental unit, in taking property, to consider the marketability of the property in arriving at actual value but that the government, in assessing value for tax purposes, may not consider such marketability. There is no constitutional, statutory, or rule authority for such different treatment.
*376Finally, I do agree with the holding of the majority that the Board erred in refusing to accept the club’s proffered witness as an expert witness.
I would, therefore, reverse the judgment of the district court and remand the cause to it with directions to set aside the order of the Board of Assessment Appeals and to remand to the Board to conduct another hearing consistent with the views expressed in this dissent.