dissenting.
This case involves a search incident to arrest. Under the leading federal case of United States v. Robinson,1 once a suspect is arrested based upon probable cause, the police may conduct a full search of the suspect’s person for weapons and evidence. Alaska law differs. If a person is arrested for a crime where evidence of that crime could be concealed on the suspect, the police can search for evidence of the crime for which the person was arrested.2 Where no evidence of the crime for which the suspect was arrested could exist on their person, the police may conduct a search for weapons. Under Alaska law, the police can certainly conduct a pat-down search for typical weapons such as a knife, gun, or club.3 The case before us raises the question of the authority of the police to conduct a search incident to a lawful arrest for atypical weapons.
We last visited this question in Jackson v. State.4 In Jackson, the suspect was arrested under authority of an arrest warrant which had been issued for failure to appear on shoplifting and driving while license suspended charges.5 However, the arresting officer was not aware of the underlying charges supporting the warrant. While placing Jackson under arrest, the arresting officer conducted a search of Jackson which included a search of Jackson’s wallet. The officer stated that the reason he searched Jackson’s wallet was to ensure that the wallet did not contain razor blades or other atypical weapons. During the wallet search, the officer discovered cocaine. Jackson was charged with cocaine possession. Jackson moved to suppress the evidence. The trial court denied the motion. On appeal, this court explored the authority of police officers to search for weapons under Alaska law in conducting a search incident to arrest.
*765This court recognized a crucial distinction between a pat-down search conducted during an investigative stop and a search incident to arrest. The court quoted from Justice Thur-good Marshall’s dissent in United States v. Robinson:
[An investigative] stop involves a momentary encounter between officer and suspect, while an in-custody arrest places the two in close proximity for a much longer period of time. If the individual happens to have a weapon on his person, he will certainly have much more opportunity to use it against the officer in the in-custody situation. The prolonged proximity also makes it more likely that the individual will be able to extricate any small hidden weapon which might go undetected in a weapons frisk, such as a safety pin or razor blade. In addition, a suspect taken into custody may feel more threatened by the serious restraint on his liberty than a person who is simply stopped by an officer for questioning, and may therefore be more likely to resort to force.[6]
We noted Justice Marshall’s observation that the police discovered the contraband on Robinson during the search of a cigarette package. Justice Marshall concluded that, if the police were concerned about safety, they always had the option to impound the cigarette package. A search was therefore unnecessary.7
In Jackson we also relied on a California Supreme Court case, People v. Brisendine.8 In Brisendine, the defendant was arrested at a remote campsite on a minor charge. The officer searched the arrestee’s knapsack, ostensibly for weapons, and found drugs. We quoted the following language:
[An] officer who exceeds a pat-down without first discovering an object which feels reasonably like a knife, gun, or club must be able to point to specific and articu-lable facts which reasonably support a suspicion that the particular suspect is armed with an atypical weapon which would feel like the object felt during the pat-down.
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Typically in cases of warrantless weapons searches the police must be able to point to specific and articulable facts which reasonably justify a belief that the suspect is armed. In the ordinary citation situation the fact of the arrest alone will not supply this justification and additional facts must be shown. In the case of transportation in the police vehicle, however, or in the analogous circumstances here, the necessity of close proximity will itself provide the needed basis for a protective pat-down of the person. To intrude further than a pat-down, the officer must provide additional specific and articulable facts necessitating the additional intrusion!9]
In Jackson we stated our holding as follows:
We therefore conclude that a search incident to an arrest, where no evidence of the crime charged could exist on the person, may extend to the person of the arres-tee and any containers associated with the arrestee’s person which may contain a gun, a large knife, or a club. Search of smaller containers which could only contain atypical weapons such as a razor blade, a small knife, a safety pin, or a needle must be supported by specific and articulable facts which would lead a reasonable person to believe that such an atypical weapon was in the small container!10]
Applying this analysis, we suppressed the evidence which the officer found in Jackson’s wallet.
Thus, Jackson clearly stands for the proposition that an officer cannot search a wallet, backpack, or other closed container for atypical weapons without “specific and articulable facts which would lead a reasonable person to believe that such an atypical weapon was in the small container.”11 But the law is less clear about how to treat a search for atypical weapons on the suspect’s person which are not in a container.
*766It seems to me that an atypical weapon in a container such as a wallet or a backpack can be distinguished from a razor blade or other atypical weapon which is on the suspect’s person. First, a person generally has a higher expectation of privacy in a container such as a wallet. Second, as Justice Marshall pointed out in his dissent in Robinson, if the police suspect a razor blade in a wallet or backpack, they do have the option of seizing the item and keeping it away from the suspect. If a suspect has a razor blade in his wallet or in his backpack, a search for that item would involve a major invasion of privacy. If we were to allow that sort of intrusion, there seems little reason not to adopt the federal rule stated in Robinson. Yet, when the razor blade is located on the suspect, the balance is less clear. There is a stronger case for allowing a search to promote officer safety.
In analyzing the testimony in the present case, we are to look at the facts in the light most favorable to the prevailing party, the state. Officer Kantor’s testimony is set out on pages 755-756 of Judge Stewart’s majority opinion. As I read Officer Kantor’s testimony, he felt something small and hard in the suspect’s pocket which he could not identify. He stated he was concerned that the object might be a weapon, similar to a small knife or a razor blade. Officer Kantor conceded that he did not know what the item was, but he testified he was concerned that it might be a small weapon.
Judge Souter originally concluded that Officer Kantor’s conclusion that the two rocks of cocaine could feel like a knife or razor blade was preposterous. Yet after actually examining the rocks of cocaine, Judge Souter arrived at a different conclusion. He stated:
[A]t the time of the suppression hearing, relying on what I saw and heard but without the opportunity to feel the evidence which is a big difference, I ruled that Officer Kantor’s stated suspicion that these two rocks of cocaine might be a small knife or razor was ludicrous. That’s wrong. Considering that the defendant was wearing jeansf,] that these two so-called rocks of cocaine were in his watch pocket and that they were also covered by the thickness of his sweatshirt, there is no doubt in my mind at this point after having myself felt these two rocks of cocaine, physically, for the first time, there’s no doubt in my mind that Officer Kantor’s suspicion that this might be a small knife or a razor blade was reasonable. That’s a reasonable suspicion based on articulable facts.
Upon examining the evidence and evaluating Officer Kantor’s testimony, Judge Souter concluded that Officer Kantor had reasonable suspicion that Joubert might have had a small knife or razor blade in his pocket. In my view this finding would support Officer Kantor’s search of Joubert’s pocket to make sure that he did not have such a weapon. I accordingly dissent from the decision to suppress the evidence seized as a result of that search.
. 414 U.S. 218, 235, 94 S.Ct. 467, 38 L.Ed.2d 427 (1973).
. See Jackson v. State, 791 P.2d 1023, 1028 (Alaska App.1990).
. See id.
. Id.
. See id. at 1024.
. Id. at 1026 (quoting Robinson, 414 U.S. at 257-59, 94 S.Ct. 467).
. See id.
. 13 Cal.3d 528, 119 Cal.Rptr. 315, 531 P.2d 1099 (1975).
. Jackson, 791 P.2d at 1028 (quoting Brisendine, 119 Cal.Rptr. 315, 531 P.2d at 1108-09 (citations omitted)).
. Id.
. Id.