The Hobbs and Uhler contracts, which purchased consultant services for the tax reduction task force, were legitimate uses of public funds under Stanson v. Mott (1976) 17 Cal.3d 206 [130 Cal.Rptr. 697, 551 P.2d 1]. (See maj. opn., ante, at pp. 36-37.) The task force’s function was to develop new legislative proposals and to lobby for these proposals before the Legislature. As this court has acknowledged, such work is “one of the primary functions of elected and appointed executive officials [].” (Stanson, supra, 17 Cal.3d at p. 218.)
There is no evidence that any public funds were used in the electoral campaign for the tax reduction initiative, a use which would have been illegal under Stanson, supra, 17 Cal.3d at page 218.
The Governor’s office appropriation would have been an entirely suitable funding source for the task force’s work.1 One of the most important duties of a Governor is “to devise legislative proposals to attempt to implement the current administration’s policies.” (Stanson, supra, 17 Cal.3d at p. 218.) It was contemplated by the Legislature that an appropriation such as item 20 would be used to pay staff and consultants to carry out this function.
The respective departments from which the Hobbs and Uhler contracts were actually funded were made whole when the Governor’s office reimbursed them from the item 20 appropriation. Since the state is not entitled to double recovery, the individual defendants should not be held liable for the amounts spent under these contracts.
*39However, it makes no difference that the departments were later made whole, as to whether there was an impropriety here. The sources from which these contracts were actually funded were not proper ones. The funds were drawn from budget items appropriated for other, unrelated purposes. And, the public officials who decided to spend funds from these budget items on task force activity violated the duty of care set forth in Stanson: “[P]ublic officials must use ‘due care,’ i.e., reasonable diligence, in authorizing the expenditure of public funds, and may be subject to personal liability for improper expenditures made in the absence of such due care. [Fn. omitted.] ” (Stanson, supra, 17 Cal.3d at pp. 226-227.)
Also, here, as in any action seeking damages caused by a defendant’s violation of a duty of care, recovery from one tortfeasor before or after judgment merely reduces pro tanto the amount for which the remaining defendants are liable. (Laurenzi v. Vranizan (1945) 25 Cal.2d 806, 813 [155 P.2d 633].) It does not eliminate the cause of action against them.
It is important that the court—and the defendants—not lose sight of the initial wrongdoing simply because the misused funds were later restored. The record here shows that several highly placed government officials took funds which the Legislature had appropriated for particular purposes and used them for activities entirely unrelated to those programs. The complete disregard for the Budget Act which these officials of the executive branch exhibited should not be condoned.
I.
The facts are instructive. In the fall of 1972, former Governor Ronald Reagan and his cabinet decided that in order to utilize the balance of his term most effectively three task forces would be formed to develop new policies and specific proposals. The task forces would address the areas of tax reform, criminal justice, and local government relations. Lewis Uhler, then assistant secretary of the Human Relations Agency, was appointed chairperson of the tax reduction task force.
The tax reduction task force (hereafter task force) was formed because “the Governor and the Cabinet were concerned about the seemingly inexorable growth in taxes and spending at the State and local government level and . . . wanted ... a Task Force, to investigate all aspects of taxes and spending, education, finance, unemployment compensation, funding and expenditures and a wide range of tax issues.”
The task force was given a charge to “review the entire tax and public financing system in our State and recommend a plan for reducing the tax *40burden carried by our citizens.” Specifically, the task force was directed to explore the feasibility of imposing a ceiling on government revenues, reducing government programs, legislating tax refunds, and redistributing the burden of taxation among the various types of tax, e.g., income, wealth, and consumption. It was also instructed to examine public education financing, bonding programs and state indebtedness, and other aspects of taxation which it deemed significant.
The task force had no budget of its own, but it was supported from several sources. The General Services Department made available unused office space and equipment. Apparently, defendant Uhler’s salary was paid from item 20, the Governor’s office budget.2 Defendant Hobbs left state service to work for the task force as a private consultant. Pursuant to a contract signed by defendant Geduldig, who became Director of the Human Resources Department (HRD) in December 1972, Hobbs’s consultant fee was paid from the administrative budget of the Unemployment Compensation Disability Fund (item 240 of the Budget Act). Numerous state employees provided services on a “release time”3 basis. Several outside economists performed studies. If they were paid, it was with funds provided by a private foundation. Finally, $30,000 was obtained from the operating expense appropriation for the Department of Social Welfare (DSW, or the department), item 255 of the Budget Act.
The item 255 funds were made available to the task force through a contract between Uhler, as chairman of the task force, and the chief deputy director of DSW. The contract recited that the money would be used to pay consultants for “analysis of the tax impact of welfare spending, including the availability and appropriateness of tax resources for welfare related programs.” The payments to the task force’s consultants were to be made initially from the Department of Health Care Services’ (DHCS) revolving fund, since it was felt that department was better able to provide the necessary processing and accounting services. Geduldig (who was director of DHCS in the fall of 1972) signed a separate contract which authorized Uhler to commit DHCS funds to task force purposes. By interagency agreement, the DHCS revolving fund was to be reimbursed from DSW’s item 255 appropriation.
Notwithstanding the first contract’s recital that the item 255 funds were to be used for welfare-related studies, it appears that no such limitation was intended or observed in practice. Uhler testified that “the objective of the *41funding here was to provide a modest degree of flexibility to the Task Force, out of the administrative funds of this department [DS W], under the direction and discretion of the Director of the Department, to assist with consultant fees, expenses of a miscellaneous nature, beyond those contributed pro bono publico and beyond the release time services of existing state employees.”
Some part of the task force’s overall work “included [analysis of the] impact on welfare recipients of both taxing and spending practices of State and local units of government. ’ ’ However, Uhler could not recall any contract for research on this topic which was funded from the item 255 monies. The item 255 funds were used to finance consultant contracts (1) “to develop a practical method for financing public schools in light of current court decisions”; (2) “to develop plans for an implementing organization and for the method of analysis of the impact of the tax limitation proposal”; (3) to “provide economic analysis of the impact of tax and spending programs”; and (4) to “develop programs to analyze and present tax and expenditure data for the [task force].” The item 255 money also paid for typing pool services, data analysis, two graphic artists and a full-time secretary.
II.
“Money may be drawn from the Treasury only through an appropriation made by law . . . .” (Cal. Const., art. XVI, § 7, formerly Cal. Const., art. XIII, § 21.) “[A] warrant shall not be drawn unless authorized by law, and unless . . . unexhausted specific appropriations provided by law are available to meet it.” (Gov. Code, § 12440.)
These provisions embody a fundamental and time-honored principle of representative government. Their “object is to secure to the legislative department of the government the exclusive power of deciding how, when, and for what purposes the public funds shall be applied in carrying on the government. . . . [These provisions] had [their] origin in Parliament in the seventeenth century, when the people of Great Britain, to provide against the abuse by the king and his officers of the discretionary money power with which they were vested, demanded that the public funds should not be drawn from the treasury except in accordance with express appropriations therefor made by Parliament . . .; and the system worked so well in correcting the abuses complained of, our forefathers adopted it, and the restraint imposed by it has become a part of the fundamental law of nearly every state in the Union. To the legislative department of the government is intrusted the power to say to what purpose the public funds shall be devoted *42in each fiscal year . . . .” (Humbert v. Dunn (1890) 84 Cal. 57, 59-60 [24 P. 111]; see also People v. Pacheco (1865) 27 Cal. 175, 209.)
The constitutional and statutory scheme ensures that decisions about the allocation of public funds will be made through the legislative appropriation process. Accordingly, “[t]he general requisite of an appropriation is certainty of purpose, of amount, and of the treasury fund which is to stand the expenditure. [Citation.]” (22 Ops.Cal.Atty.Gen. 243, 244-245 (1954).) The requirement of a “specific appropriation” (Gov. Code, § 12440, supra) reflects this need for “certainty of purpose.” “By a specific appropriation we understand an Act by which a named sum of money has been set apart in the treasury and devoted to the payment of a particular claim or demand.” (Stratton v. Green (1872) 45 Cal. 149, 151.)
Thus, appropriation bills other than the budget bill are limited to “one item of appropriation, and that for one certain, expressed purpose.” (Cal. Const., art. IV, § 12, formerly Cal. Const., art. XIII, § 20.) The same certainty of legislative purpose is assured in the budget bill through the constitutional requirement that the budget be “itemized” (ibid.), and through the statutory requirement that it “contain a complete plan and itemized statement of all proposed expenditures of the state . . . and all of its institutions, departments, boards, bureaus, commissions, officers, employees and other agencies . . . .” (Gov. Code, § 12016; see present Gov. Code, §§ 13320, 13337, subd. (a).)
It is essential to this constitutional and statutory scheme that public officials be bound by legislative “certainty of purpose.” (22 Ops.Cal.Atty.Gen., supra, at pp. 244-245.) As this court recently held, “[w]e start with the general principle that expenditures by an administrative official are proper only insofar as they are authorized, explicitly or implicitly, by legislative enactment. . . . [S]uch executive officials are not free to spend public funds for any ‘public purpose’ they may choose, but must utilize appropriated funds in accordance with the legislatively designated purpose. ‘It is the policy of the law in the absence of a clearly negatived intention to have . . . funds authorized for a particular purpose expended for such purpose.’ [Citations.]” (Stanson, supra, 17 Cal.3d at p. 213.)
This principle was completely disregarded when the Uhler contracts were signed. Those contracts authorized the expenditure of funds from DSW’s operating budget for consultants to study subjects entirely unrelated to social welfare programs. No evidence in the record suggests that any of these subjects fell within DSW’s jurisdiction. Appellants can point to no statutory provision which indicates a legislative intent that DSW perform any duties connected with taxation and spending except as related to those social welfare *43programs which the department administers. Certainly, DSW has no statutory authority to involve itself in school finance, tax structures, or any of the other areas for which the item 255 funds were spent under these contracts.
Section 10553 of the Welfare and Institutions Code directs the director of DSW to “observe and report to the Governor on the conditions of public social services throughout the state” and to “[fjormulate, adopt, amend or repeal regulations and general policies affecting the purposes, responsibilities, and jurisdiction of the department and which are consistent with law and necessary for the administration of public social services.”4
Section 10602 of that code requires the department to “investigate, examine and make reports upon . . . [t]he charitable institutions of the state and . . . [t]he public officers who are in any way responsible for the administration of public funds used for public social services . . . .” Finally, Welfare and Institutions Code section 10612 requires the department annually to make a “full and complete report to the Governor of all its transactions during the preceding year, showing specifically all expenses incurred and moneys paid out by it, with suggestions and recommendations for legislative and executive action. ” While these provisions would authorize DSW to engage in a broad range of research projects concerning social welfare, they can scarcely be construed to authorize a study of educational financing.
Similarly, article V, section 4 of the California Constitution, which provides that “ [t]he Governor may require executive officers and agencies and their employees to furnish information relating to their duties,” does not authorize DSW to use its funds to gather information which is not related to its duties.
Appellants argue, quite correctly, that the courts may not demand an unreasonable degree of specificity in appropriations bills, because neither the Legislature nor the agency can be expected to foresee every item of expenditure. Nor may the courts hold public officials to an unreasonably literal reading of legislative appropriations. When an agency is charged in general terms with performance of duties, and funds are provided for that performance, “‘the department is clothed with a discretion in the exercise of which it is to determine the necessity for the expenditure of the funds involved.’” (19 Ops.Cal.Atty.Gen. 42, 43 (1952).)
*44Appellants further contend that this discretion is so broad that a department is not bound by a rule of strict necessity in its exercise. As Deputy Attorney General (later Court of Appeal Justice) Friedman concluded in his opinion, “[discretion is abused when the action exceeds the bounds of reason. [Citation.]. . . Action is reasonable when it is suitable in the circumstances, when it is legitimate in view of the end attained. [Citation.]” (21 Ops.Cal.Atty.Gen. 181, 182 (1953).)
While these principles are valid, they are of no assistance in this case. The expenditures here “exceed[ed] the bounds of reason” not because they failed to meet a test of absolute necessity, but because they bore no relation to performance of any duty with which the department was charged.
The task force’s efforts to justify the use of DSW’s operating expense appropriation are not persuasive. In a memo written after the commencement of this law suit, the task force suggested that a reformed educational financing system would ultimately reduce the number of people on welfare by improving education. It claimed that its analysis of the “incentives and motivations of government employees” would improve their performance and that improved performance by government-employed social workers would result in fewer people on welfare. Additionally, it noted that even welfare recipients pay certain taxes which might be reduced as a result of the task force’s work.
These strained efforts after the fact to bring the task force’s work within the scope of DSW’s operations are unavailing. At most, they show that the task force’s efforts might incidentally benefit welfare recipients, as part of the general population. To accept this justification for the expenditure of DSW funds would be to write out the requirement of specificity.
Nor may the task force’s use of departmental funds be justified on the theory that its work was “budgetary.” I agree that all departments are required to assist the Governor in budget preparation and to make available whatever personnel and resources are needed for this job. (Cal. Const., art. IV, § 12, subd. (b); see also Gov. Code, §§ 13320, 13337.) However, this duty requires assistance only within the scope of the department’s (or official’s) legally mandated activities. Article IV, section 12 cannot justify the use of departmental funds or personnel for activities entirely outside the scope of the present budget based on some theory that these activities may affect some future budget.
The Uhler contracts were not justified simply because an operating expenses appropriation may be used to purchase outside services under section 26, subdivision (b) of the Budget Act. The objection to these contracts is *45not that they were for outside services, but rather that the purpose of the outside services had nothing to do with DSW’s mandate. Authorization for a department to purchase outside services cannot be construed as a blanket authorization to purchase such services for any “public purpose.” (Stanson, supra, 17 Cal.3d at p. 213.)
Uhler’s expenditure of item 255 funds for task force purposes cannot be justified under Mandel v. Myers (1981) 29 Cal.3d 531 [174 Cal.Rptr. 841, 629 P.2d 935]. In that case, this court found that an analogous budget item could be used to pay court-awarded attorney fees arising from litigation against the department. Such fees could be charged against a departmental operating expense appropriation because the award of those fees “rested in large part upon the fact that plaintiff’s attorneys had provided a substantial economic benefit to the department. . . ."(Id., at p. 543.) The court noted that it had been the practice of several state agencies to charge attorney fee awards against their general operating budgets. (Id., at p. 544.)
However, nothing in Mandel suggests that the Legislature intended that a department’s operating budget could be used to pay for activities wholly outside that department’s jurisdiction.
There are other distinctions. Mandel’s holding rested in part on serious constitutional considerations absent here. In Mandel, there was no specific appropriation to pay attorney fees. Yet, the attorney fees had been awarded by a court, which had entered a judgment for the amount it found proper. Had this court not found in Mandel that the fees could be charged against the department’s operating expense appropriation, it would have had to decide whether the omission of a specific appropriation for this purpose amounted to a “legislative usurpation of traditional judicial authority.” (Mandel, supra, 29 Cal.3d at p. 547.)
This court noted that “[o]ur Constitution assigns the resolution of such specific controversies to the judicial branch of government (Cal. Const., art. VI, § 1) and provides the Legislature with no authority to set itself above the judiciary by discarding the outcome or readjudicating the merits of particular judicial proceedings . . . . [1f] The recognition of such legislative authority would completely deprive court judgments of the respect and deference which the Constitution contemplates each branch of government will accord to final actions within the jurisdiction of a coequal branch, and would repose in the Legislature a combination of powers that the constitutional draftsmen specifically intended to forestall. [Fn. omitted.]” (Id., at pp. 547, 549.)
Here, the conflict is between the legislative and the executive branches. This case presents no suggestion of a legislative usurpation of executive *46powers. The Governor was free to carry out all the task force activities through the use of his own discretionary budget and the proper use of state personnel under article V, section 4. His discretionary budget is free of any fiscal supervision from the Legislature or from other constitutional officers.5 Therefore, the Governor’s “primary function [] . . . to devise legislative proposals to attempt to implement the current administration’s policies” (Stanson, supra, 17 Cal.3d at p. 218) is adequately protected from legislative curtailment. Under these circuipstances, the doctrine of separation of powers dictates that the executive branch should have a healthy respect for legislative intent when expending public funds.
None of the justifications offered by the defendants for the expenditure of DSW funds on task force activities is valid. On the contrary, the expenditure of these funds was improper.
III.
Next, I turn to the propriety of using the administrative budget of the Unemployment Compensation Disability Fund to fund the Hobbs contract. The impropriety of this contract should have been clear to all participants.
The Unemployment Compensation Disability Fund is a special trust held for disabled, unemployed workers. (Unemp. Ins. Code, §§ 2601, 3001-3012.) It is funded by worker contributions and federal monies. (Id., §§ 984, 985, 3004.) These contributions “constitute an insurance-type trust fund which . . . create[s] a reserve which will fund payments of benefits to workers during adverse economic conditions.” (64 Ops.Cal.Atty.Gen. 482, 492 (1981).)6
Accordingly, all money in the fund is continuously appropriated for the sole purpose of paying disability benefits and the administrative expenses *47of the program. (Unemp. Ins. Code, § 3012, subd. (a).)7 As is the case with the Unemployment Fund (see id., § 1521), “moneys so contributed [to the fund] are not public moneys in the sense that they are subject to appropriation other than as provided in the act. The funds thus raised are in their nature a continuing appropriation for a specific purpose. (See Daugherty v. Riley [(1934)] 1 Cal.2d 298[, 308].) The balances therein do not revert to the general fund at the end of the fiscal year and under both the state and federal acts constitute trust funds ....’’ (Gillum v. Johnson (1936) 7 Cal.2d 744, 758 [62 P.2d 1037, 108 A.L.R. 595].) Consequently, none of the money in the fund may be appropriated for a general public purpose unrelated to the disbursement of benefit payments to unemployed and disabled workers. (Cf. Valdes v. Cory (1983) 139 Cal.App.3d 773, 782-783 [189 Cal.Rptr. 212].)
As authorized by Unemployment Insurance Code section 3012, supra, the Legislature appropriated a portion of the fund to pay the administrative expenses for processing payments. (Budget Act, item 240.) Like any other expenditure from the fund, this appropriation is only for the “specific purpose” (Gillum v. Johnson, supra, 7 Cal.2d at p. 758) for which the fund exists. It is not available for any other purpose.
Hobbs’s contract work was not even remotely related to the administration of the disability benefits program. The record shows clearly that the intent of the parties in entering that contract was to do work for the task force. It had nothing to do with the administration of the disability program. At the time Hobbs signed the contract, he was already working for the task force as a salaried assistant to the Governor. He testified that his reason for entering into the contract was to continue his task force work as a private consultant rather than as a state employee. Michael Deaver of the Governor’s office suggested the Unemployment Insurance Disability Fund to Hobbs as a source of payment.
Hobbs spoke to Geduldig, who by December of 1972 had left DHCS to assume the directorship of HRD, the agency responsible for administering the fund. Hobbs explained that he would be working on all types of taxation, including unemployment disability funding. Geduldig approved the contract to pay Hobbs. The contract recited that Hobbs was to “act as a Special Consultant to the Governor’s Office for tax and spending programs.”
*48Hobbs’s actual activities under the contract did not involve the administration of the disability fund. Hobbs testified that he researched the area of taxation. In January and February of 1973,8 he spent most of his time preparing the constitutional amendment. Thereafter, he testified about it at legislative hearings and researched some points (none of which involved unemployment disability funding) at the request of the Senate Finance Committee.
When it appeared that the Legislature was not interested in the constitutional amendment, Hobbs turned his attention to other areas—educational finance, state bonding practices, job programs, unemployment insurance, and disability insurance. After May 1st, he worked primarily on the subjects of school finance and unemployment disability insurance.
The fact that one small portion of Hobbs’s research during the last two months of the seven-month contract concerned the disability insurance program is insufficient to bring his contract within the limitations of item 240. Nothing in the record gives the slightest indication that Hobbs’s research was directed toward the administration of the program. Nothing indicates that his assignment extended beyond the design of a comprehensive tax reduction scheme for the Governor.
I do not suggest that it would have been improper for HRD to use funds from item 240 to “furnish information relating to [its] duties” (Cal. Const., art. V, § 4). Nor would any impropriety arise if the Governor requested this information in connection with the task force’s work. The Constitution does not so circumscribe the Governor when he or she seeks information. Nor would it have been improper for the department to hire outside consultants to assist in discharging this constitutional function.
However, nothing in the record suggests that the Hobbs contract was intended to or did furnish information to the Governor about the administration of the Unemployment Insurance Disability Fund. On the contrary, the record demonstrates that Hobbs, Geduldig and Deaver simply saw item 240 as an expedient method for funding a project for the Governor. The fact that the bulk of work of the project had nothing to do with the fund was a mere inconvenience. A few vague references to research about disability insurance to overcome the constitutional impropriety cannot change this conclusion.
IV.
I am aware that the Governor’s office reimbursed the agencies affected by the unauthorized expenditures and that no permanent losses were suf*49fered. I agree that to exact damages from the defendants in this case would give the state a double recovery. I do not urge such a result.
Additionally, it would be unfair to fix sole responsibility for the improper expenditures on defendant Geduldig. He evidently played no role in the decision to misappropriate item 255 funds to the task force. He signed the contract giving Uhler authority to spend funds from the DHCS revolving fund on the understanding that this was merely a funding arrangement and that DHCS would be fully reimbursed from the item 255 funds. Furthermore, in signing the Hobbs contract, Geduldig was apparently acting under instructions from the Governor’s office. If the decisions that led to the misappropriation of state funds from items 240 and 255 were indeed made by others, Geduldig should not be found to have breached a duty of due care.9
The fact that the damages were later repaid does not mean that there was no violation of the duty of due care on the part of those who engineered a scheme by which funds were misappropriated. Nor does this fact mean that no cause of action was stated. A cause of action is lacking where a plaintiff has suffered no harm as a result of negligence. (Budd. v. Nixen (1971) 6 Cal.3d 195, 200 [98 Cal.Rptr. 849, 491 P.2d 433]; Kirtland & Packard v. Superior Court (1976) 59 Cal.App.3d 140, 144 [131 Cal.Rptr. 418].) However, reimbursement—before or after judgment—from one alleged tortfeasor does not vitiate a cause of action. It simply reduces pro tanto the amount for which the remaining defendants are liable. (Laurenzi v. Vranizan, supra, 25 Cal.2d at p. 813; Krusi v. Bear, Stearns & Co. (1983) 144 Cal.App.3d 664, 673 [192 Cal.Rptr. 793].)
Here, the state did suffer a loss when the improper expenditures were made in 1972 and 1973. The loss remained uncompensated at the time the *50complaint was filed in September of 1973.10 Therefore, a valid cause of action was filed.
V.
If DSW funds were not available for task force purposes, the department’s services and personnel could not be so used. However, the record before this court does not permit affirmance of the entire judgment of $94,231 against Uhler for ordering the use of these services and personnel for the task force.
It is clear that Uhler may be held responsible for the decisions which led to the release of these employees. He identified those employees whose services the task force wanted. He had the power to require department and agency heads to make employees available. In this respect, the trial court’s finding that Uhler should be held liable for the value of their services is supported by substantial evidence.
However, the record is inadequate to enable this court to affirm the full amount of the judgment against Uhler or to determine how much of the judgment should be affirmed. The trial court held Uhler liable for the full cost of the release time given the task force. The theory advanced was that the task force was an improper governmental activity. Therefore, the trial court concluded that no public funds or public employee time could properly have been used. This conclusion was erroneous. The Governor’s discretionary budget could properly have been spent on the task force’s work.
Furthermore, some of the release time may have been proper even if the employees remained on their respective agencies’ payrolls. To the extent those employees were asked to provide the Governor’s office with information relating to their duties, the use of their time was authorized by article V, section 4 of the state Constitution.
Since the trial court was proceeding on the erroneous premise that the task force’s entire operation was an improper use of any public funds, it failed to break down the release time into that which was proper under article V, section 4 and that which was not. The record before this court consists solely of a list of agencies which furnished release time employees and services, and the total value of the services rendered. The trial court erred in failing to inquire as to what portion of these services should have *51been reimbursed, either by the Governor’s office discretionary fund or by defendants.
Respondent’s petition for a rehearing was denied August 20, 1986, and on July 30, 1986, the opinion was modified to read as printed above.
Item 20 of the Budget Act of 1972 (Stats. 1972, ch. 156, hereafter Budget Act) appropriated nearly $1.7 million “for support of Governor and of Governor’s office.”
Uhler testified he was not certain who paid his salary or the salaries of the other task force personnel.
These employees remained on the payrolls of their respective agencies, even though some if not all of their time was devoted to task force work.
These code provisions are unchanged since 1972, even though the department which implements them is now designated the Department of Social Services rather than the Department of Social Welfare. (See Welf. & Inst. Code, §§ 10054, 10055, 10550, 10553.)
Item 20 provides that the Governor’s office appropriation shall be “exempt from the provisions of Sections 925.6, 12410, and 13320 of the Government Code.” These sections would otherwise require that the Controller audit all expenditures drawn against the appropriation and that a detailed budget for these expenditures be prepared in advance.
The Unemployment Compensation Disability Fund is one of the “component elements of a general, coordinated plan of social insurance developed by the Legislature.” (California Comp. Ins. Co. v. Ind. Acc. Com. (1954) 128 Cal.App.2d 797, 806 [276 P.2d 148].) It was created in 1946 (Stats. 1947, First Ex. Sess. 1946, ch. 81, p. 101), il years after the enactment of the original State Unemployment Reserve Act. (Stats. 1935, ch. 352, p. 1226.) The fund was designed to provide benefits for the loss of wages by an employee whose disability disqualifies him or her from receiving unemployment insurance (see Unemp. Ins. Code, § 1253, subd. (c)) but does not establish an entitlement to benefits under the Workers’ Compensation Act (see Lab. Code, § 3600, subd. (a)(2)). (Garcia v. Industrial Accident Com. (1953) 41 Cal.2d 689, 692 [263 P.2d 8]; 64 Ops.Cal.Atty.Gen., supra, at pp. 486-490.)
This subdivision provides that “all money in the disability fund is continuously appropriated ... for the purpose of providing disability benefits pursuant to this part, including the payment of refunds, credits, or judgments, and interest thereon, the payment of disability benefits to all eligible persons not covered exclusively by an approved voluntary plati, and the payment of the expenses of administration of this part . . . .”
The contract period was from December 1, 1972, through June 30, 1973.
The trial court also held Geduldig liable for the Uhler contracts on the procedural ground that he improperly delegated to Uhler discretionary authority to spend DHCS funds. Geduldig, on behalf of DHCS, signed a contract which purported to delegate to Uhler authority to draw on the DHCS revolving fund for task force work up to the amount of $30,000. Since the power to spend these public funds is clearly one of the “powers conferred upon public agencies and officers which involve the exercise of judgment or discretion . . .” (California Sch. Employees Assn. v. Personnel Commission (1970) 3 Cal.3d 139, 144 [89 Cal.Rptr. 620, 474 P.2d 436]), it cannot be delegated except by statutory authorization. (Ibid.) Government Code section 12854 would authorize delegation to an “officer or employee within the agency.” Uhler was neither.
Under the circumstances, this improper delegation should not be an independent basis for Geduldig’s liability. Uhler was in reality being given discretionary authority to spend DSW, not DHCS, funds. This decision was made by others several months before Geduldig was brought into the scheme.
Furthermore, the “procedural” violation is not really independent of the “substantive” one. Had the expenditure of item 255 funds been for a proper purpose, there would not have been any violation of Government Code section 12854 for the DSW director to contract with an outside consultant and to allow that consultant the discretion to decide how much of his work to subcontract. Here, the delegation was improper because the purpose for which the funds were committed to Uhler’s discretion was improper.
The Governor’s office reimbursed the departments a few days after the complaint was filed.