— James Lee Prater and Harold Lee Prater were each convicted by a jury of two counts of first degree *514robbery, two counts of first degree assault and one count of first degree burglary. In addition, the jury returned special verdicts finding that both were armed with a deadly weapon and a firearm during the commission of each crime. Subsequently, the State brought habitual criminal proceedings. In separate trials to the court, both James and Harold were found to be habitual criminals. From the judgments entered, both appeal.
The facts are these. On July 3, 1977 in Seattle, the two Praters broke into the apartment of Steven and Josephine Ross. At gunpoint the Praters forced both Mr. and Mrs. Ross to lie on the floor, then demanded money and sent Mrs. Ross looking for it. While she was searching, one of the Praters shot Mr. Ross in the face, causing him to lose consciousness. Harold Prater jabbed and poked at Mrs. Ross with a gun as she attempted to locate money, and when Mrs. Ross brushed it away from her head, he struck the side of her head causing her to stumble. The Praters then left with the money after firing a gun into a wall of the apartment.
The first question is whether State v. Workman, 90 Wn.2d 443, 584 P.2d 382 (1978), precludes the use of special verdict firearm findings in sentencing because the Praters were found guilty of first degree robbery, assault, and burglary, all of which can be, and were in this case, committed with a firearm. The State concedes that Workman requires resentencing without the firearms findings. This concession is accepted for the robbery and burglary charges but rejected as to the assault charges. State v. Adlington-Kelly, 95 Wn.2d 917, 631 P.2d 954 (1981).
The next question is whether the deadly weapon findings must be stricken because the jury was not instructed that it must find the Praters were armed with deadly weapons during the commission of the crimes, beyond a reasonable doubt.1 State v. Tongate, 93 Wn.2d 751, 613 P.2d 121 *515(1980).
A bullet hole was found in the wall of the Ross apartment where one of the Praters fired a gun, and an X-ray photograph taken after the incident showed a bullet fragment lodged in Mr. Ross' head. Assuming the issue can be raised for the first time on appeal, the absence of a Tongate instruction was harmless error beyond a reasonable doubt. State v. Claborn, 95 Wn.2d 629, 632, 628 P.2d 467 (1981); State v. Hall, 95 Wn.2d 536, 540-41, 627 P.2d 101 (1981). The deadly weapon special verdicts stand.
The third question is whether the assault and burglary convictions should merge into the robbery convictions. The Washington burglary antimerger statute (RCW 9A.52.050) controls. It provides:
Every person who, in the commission of a burglary shall commit any other crime, may be punished therefor as well as for the burglary, and may be prosecuted for each crime separately.
RCW 9A.52.050. James and Harold Prater could be punished for the robbery they committed while they were in the Rosses' apartment and the first degree burglary they committed in entering the apartment with the intent to commit a felony. The trial court did not err in refusing to dismiss the burglary convictions.
Whether the assault convictions must merge into the robbery convictions is controlled by State v. Johnson, 92 Wn.2d 671, 600 P.2d 1249 (1979). In Johnson the Supreme Court decided that when an offense is proven which elevates another crime to a higher degree,
an additional conviction [for that offense] cannot be allowed to stand unless it involves some injury to the person or property of the victim or others, which is sepa*516rate and distinct from and not merely incidental to the crime of which it forms an element.
State v. Johnson, supra at 680. Accord, State v. Fagundes, 26 Wn. App. 477, 485-86, 614 P.2d 198 (1980).
The injury sustained by Mr. Ross when he was shot in the face was no part of the robbery then being conducted for the purpose of obtaining money. By disabling him, the Praters effectively hindered rather than aided the commission of the crime. Therefore, the Praters can be separately punished for the first degree assault they committed upon Mr. Ross. State v. Allen, 94 Wn.2d 860, 621 P.2d 143 (1980). Accord, State v. Smith, 9 Wn. App. 279, 511 P.2d 1032 (1973).
In contrast, the striking of Mrs. Ross was part of the force used to induce her to find money, the object of the robbery. The purpose was to intimidate. It had that effect. "Under the evidence in this case, the assaults inflicted were not separate and distinct from the force required for the robbery." State v. Bresolin, 13 Wn. App. 386, 394, 534 P.2d 1394 (1975). Accord, State v. Ticeson, 26 Wn. App. 876, 614 P.2d 245 (1980).
Finally, the Praters contend that prior convictions, relied upon by the State to prove their status as habitual criminals, were based upon guilty pleas which were not shown to be constitutionally valid beyond a reasonable doubt. State v. Holsworth, 93 Wn.2d 148, 607 P.2d 845 (1980). In Harold Prater's case, defense counsel specifically challenged and offered to prove that one of the two prior felony convictions in the supplemental information was constitutionally invalid.2 The court rejected the challenge, *517ruling that it could not go behind the final judgment. This was error. State v. Holsworth, supra.
In James Prater's case, the question never came up and so cannot be considered.
The firearm findings as to the robbery and burglary are stricken, the convictions for the assault upon Mrs. Ross and the habitual criminal finding as to Harold Prater are vacated. Both cases are remanded to the Superior Court for further proceedings and resentencing consistent with this opinion. In all other respects, the judgments are affirmed.
Andersen, J., concurs.
Harold Prater did not argue in his brief, nor at oral argument, that State v. Tongate, 93 Wn.2d 751, 613 P.2d 121 (1980), required the striking of the deadly *515weapons findings. He did argue that State v. Workman, 90 Wn.2d 443, 584 P.2d 382 (1978), and the double jeopardy clause of the United States Constitution, U.S. Const, amend. 5, prevented the use of sentence enhancement by deadly weapon special verdicts (RCW 9.95.040). However, Workman specifically held that " [t]he State may . . . invoke the provisions of RCW 9.95.040 regarding restriction of parole rights" for sentence enhancement purposes. State v. Workman, supra at 457. Accord, In re Carle, 93 Wn.2d 31, 34, 604 P.2d 1293 (1980).
"Mr. Joshua [defense counsel]: We move at this point for the Court not to consider that as a prior conviction inasmuch as we think that the plea was violative of the Woods vs. Gray and the Boykin vs. Alabama cases."
And again, "Mr. Joshua: Well, the specific motion is that the State — this is a habitual criminal proceeding. The State has got to prove that there were two prior convictions. The trial court has got to be satisfied that the two, if those convictions by way of plea, that, number one, if out-of-state convictions would be valid convictions within the State of Washington; and number two, if by plea within the State of Washington that in fact at the time they were felonies and that at the *517time the plea was freely and voluntarily entered, that the full consequences of a guilty plea would have been known to the person at that time, and we allege, or I am prepared by way of offer of proof to put Mr. Prater on the stand to indicate that at the time that he did enter a plea he did not fully understand."